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INTRODUCTION 
he amateurism principle has been a mainstay of college athletics, 
at least since the inception of the National Collegiate Athletic T
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Association (NCAA)1 in 1906.2 In its narrowest sense, it means that 
athletes who are, or have been, paid to play are thereby ineligible to 
compete in varsity athletic competition.3 More broadly, it means that 
student-athletes professionalize themselves if they capitalize 
financially on their athletic skill or reputation.4 
The amateurism principle forms part of the “collegiate model” of 
intercollegiate athletics whereby university athletic programs are to be 
“a vital part of the educational system,”5 student-athletes are to be “an 
integral part of the student body,”6 and there is to be “a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”7 In turn, the collegiate model advances the “collegiate 
mark”—a market product for collegiate athletics that is separate from 
the market for professional sports. 
Certainly, there is something essentially right in requiring that 
those who compete on a university athletic team must be students at 
that university in more than name only.8 Equally, there is something 
essentially right in expecting university athletic departments to 
advance the values of higher education both on their own, and also 
through the NCAA and the athletic conferences to which they belong. 
Because intercollegiate athletics are an important aspect of campus 
life at a significant number of universities, there also is something 
essentially right in maintaining a collegiate mark separate from 
professional sports, thereby insulating fan interest, donor support, and 
revenue streams. Without these, the viability of intercollegiate 
athletics would be at risk, to the ultimate detriment of all student-
athletes and, at many universities, to the ultimate detriment of campus 
 
1 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a private association of four-
year post-high-school educational institutions that derives its authority from the member 
institutions that created it. NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 3.02.3.1 
[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/product 
downloads/D114.pdf. All citations to NCAA Constitutional Articles and Bylaws are to the 
2013–14 Division I manual. 
2 G. WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: 
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 40 (1995) (describing the amateurism principle in the 
1906 NCAA manual) [hereinafter BYERS]. 
3 Id.; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2. 
4 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.2. 
5 Id. § 1.3.1. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 But see ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND 
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 200 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter 
ZIMBALIST]. 
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life. The collegiate model, then, gets it right. But, and it is a big but, 
only if it is more than simply aspirational or is not, as many critics 
would have it, simply a shell game by which revenues that otherwise 
might go to student-athletes instead feed bloated athletic department 
budgets and coach salaries. 
We live in a world bound by finites, where policy articulation and 
implementation rarely achieve perfection and where group decisions 
are compromises that balance a variety of competing interests. No 
matter the policy choice, there often are outlier undesirable 
consequences. Inevitably, then, NCAA and institutional articulation 
and enforcement of the collegiate model will have aspects ripe for 
critical picking. Almost with the first game played on a college 
campus, critics have claimed that intercollegiate athletic programs do 
not promote the goals of higher education, but rather subvert or engulf 
them.9 These complaints have reached a crescendo. 
It is simply impossible today to have even a passing interest in 
college sports and fail to hear the cacophony of complaints that 
college athletics are not amateur athletics, but instead are big business 
divorced from the campus ethos10—at least at the major NCAA 
Division I11 Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools12 and in the 
 
9 See BYERS, supra note 2, at 1–3, 365–74; see generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 
15, 20–26, 189. 
10 See, e.g., Frank G. Splitt, Time for Accountability in Sports: Corrupt Collegiate 
Athletics Overshadow Faltering Academic Mission, NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER, Nov. 
14, 2008, at 11a; REPORT OF THE KNIGHT FOUND., COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS, A CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2001); MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
SPORTS IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION (2000); RICK TELANDER, THE 
HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
TO STOP IT (1996); THE COALITION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (COIA), A 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPREHENSIVE ATHLETICS REFORM (2003); F. WILLIAM G. BOWEN 
& SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL 
VALUES (Princeton Univ. Press 2003); BYERS, supra note 2; H. JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY 
PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE (2000); JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE 
GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (Princeton Univ. Press 
2001); JOHN R. THELIN, GAMES COLLEGES PLAY: SCANDAL AND REFORM IN 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (1994). 
11 The NCAA has three divisions (I, II, III). NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 20.01.2. 
Division I institutions include the largest and most well funded research universities. They 
must sponsor fourteen sports for which the NCAA operates a postseason championship. 
Id. § 20.9.6. For each of these fourteen sports, they must award at least fifty percent of the 
maximum number of grants-in-aid permitted. Id. § 20.9.3.2. Division I is divided into three 
subdivisions. Institutions that sponsor football are either in the Football Championship 
Subdivision (FCS) and play in the NCAA football championship, or are in the Football 
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revenue sports of football and men’s basketball. In turn, critics reject 
the idea that a full-ride athletic scholarship,13 plus the educational and 
lifetime economic benefits of a university education, appropriately 
cabin the full economic scope of what men’s basketball and football 
student-athletes are entitled to derive from their college careers and 
athletic participation. As these critics see it, the genie is out of the 
bottle and the amateurism principle must give way. 
Some critics mount a frontal attack, seeking a policy capitulation to 
treat football and men’s basketball student-athletes as university 
employees who should be paid wages to compete.14 This so-called 
pay-for-play model is outside the scope of this Article.15 To be clear, 
however, we oppose its implementation—both because it eliminates a 
foundational difference between college and professional sports, and 
because it conflicts with campus treatment and expectations of 
students who are not athletes.16 
 
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and play in bowl games. Id. §§ 20.01.2, 20.7.1.1(b), 20.4.1.1. 
Division I institutions without football are known simply as Division I. Prior to 2006, the 
FBS was known as Division I-A. For ease of reference, this Article refers to this 
subdivision uniformly as the FBS, even if its historical designation was Division I-A at the 
time of a bylaw, case, or research initiative being discussed. 
12 FBS institutions must sponsor at least sixteen sports, at least eight of which must be 
women’s sports. Id. § 20.9.9.1. In general, FBS football teams must play at least sixty 
percent of their games against other FBS teams and average at least fifteen thousand 
dollars in paid attendance computed every two years on a rolling basis. Id. § 20.9.9.3. The 
remaining teams must be in sports for which the NCAA has a post-season championship 
and meet minimum contest requirements. Id. §§ 20.9.9.6.1, 20.9.6.3. An FBS conference 
must have at least eight FBS institutions. Id. § 20.02.6. 
13 A full-ride scholarship covers tuition, room and board, required textbooks, and fees. 
Id. § 15.2.1.4. 
14 See, e.g., RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
ATHLETIC REFORM (2011); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The 
Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 71 
(2006). 
15 The pay-for-play model picked up steam when student-athletes at Northwestern 
University petitioned the NLRB for recognition as a union. See, e.g., Teddy Greenstein, 
Northwestern Football Players Seek to Join Labor Union, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2014, 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-28/sports/chi-northwestern-foot 
ball-players-labor-union-20140128_1_basketball-players-labor-union-national-labor           
-relations-board. 
16 See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 53 (stating that pay for play “is neither 
economically feasible nor socially desirable”). We recognize, of course, that graduate 
students are paid to teach undergraduate courses and that student research assistants are 
paid to assist professors in research projects. These undertakings, however, directly relate 
to a university’s core missions of education and research, and, therefore, are part of the 
totality of a student’s university education. This is particularly true of graduate assistants, 
who teach in the subject area of their graduate degree. Whatever the value and 
appropriateness of varsity athletic teams on a college campus, there can be no argument 
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Another target for critics, and the catalyst for this Article, is the 
NCAA prohibition on student-athlete receipt of compensation for the 
use of their names and likenesses. There are two variants on this 
theme. First, student-athletes independently might market their names 
and likenesses in much the same way that the University of 
Colorado’s Jeremy Bloom sought to endorse products.17 Second, 
student-athletes might be paid a percentage of NCAA, conference, or 
university revenues derived from marketing, promotional, or licensing 
ventures in which their names and likenesses are used or from their 
participation in broadcast games. 
The debate roiling over the uncompensated use of student-athlete 
names and likenesses has been long on platitudes, but short on any 
close analysis of what the NCAA, conferences, and member 
universities currently do, should do, or might need to do. It is equally 
short on details of how student-athlete name and likeness 
compensation might be achieved, including what might be the 
attendant legal and practical constraints, and on the impact on the 
collegiate mark and collegiate model. Our purpose in this Article is to 
fill the void. 
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of amateurism. We begin 
with a short history of the amateurism principle, one with a murkier 
genesis and evolution than those waxing nostalgic would have it. We 
then trace the evolution of NCAA and campus treatment of student-
athletes pursuant to the amateurism principle. 
Part II describes the campus environment and how athletic 
revenues are spent. It also discusses the monetary value of an athletic 
scholarship and other benefits afforded student-athletes. 
 
that they are similarly central to a university’s mission. Moreover, we note that a pay-for-
play model could have serious adverse income tax consequences for universities claiming 
an exemption from federal (and, if applicable, state) income taxation under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). (All citations to the 
Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, codified in 
Title 26 of the United States Code.) Revenue generated by athletic programs operated 
under a pay-for-play model would generate “unrelated business income” subject to federal 
(and perhaps state) corporate income tax. The pay-for-play model might even result in the 
university’s loss of its section 501(c)(3) income tax exemption for all purposes. 
17 Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004). Before enrolling at Colorado, 
Bloom was a World Cup skier with offers to host a TV show, model clothes, and endorse 
products. Id. Once he enrolled at Colorado, however, Bloom had to cease such modeling 
and endorsement deals because NCAA bylaws made him ineligible for competition if he 
engaged in these or other paid business opportunities related to his athletic ability. Id.; 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.2.1. 
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Part III describes and analyzes the current bylaw structure that 
embodies amateurism in NCAA Division I. We discuss the extent to 
which the NCAA, conferences, and universities currently engage in 
marketing and promotional activities. We also discuss NCAA bylaw 
restrictions, both on such activities and on student-athletes. 
Part IV briefly addresses the scope of two lawsuits, subsequently 
consolidated, brought on behalf of football and men’s basketball 
student-athletes that may resolve whether student-athletes have legal 
entitlement to revenues from broadcast games in which they 
participate or from commercial ventures in which their names and 
likenesses are used. We also discuss the impact on athletic department 
revenues were student-athletes to be compensated for use of their 
names and likenesses, and whether a combination of changes over 
time (the slippery slope, as it were) ultimately might undermine the 
viability of the collegiate mark to the ultimate detriment of college 
athletics and all student-athletes. 
Part V provides an econometric model of how one might value 
what student-athletes are worth, identifies reasons that such valuation 
is complicated, and highlights limitations in any valuation estimate. 
We also evaluate other renditions of student-athlete value. 
Part VI considers alternatives to the current NCAA Division I 
bylaw structure, and whether and how the NCAA feasibly might 
accommodate compensation to student-athletes for use of their names 
and likenesses. We consider the impact on funding for non-revenue 
sports and the requisites of gender equity if athletic departments were 
to divert funds to pay football and men’s basketball student-athletes. 
We also discuss the specter of increased obstacles to NCAA rules 
enforcement in a highly competitive world in which policing against 
major rules violations and protecting against illicit well-heeled 
booster and agent involvement already are significant problems.18 
Part VII considers how universities might defer paying student-
athletes until they no longer are eligible to compete. We then consider 
the federal tax issues and potential practical impediments attendant on 
this approach. 
Part VIII examines some of the commercial, marketing, and 
promotional initiatives of the NCAA, conferences, and institutions. 
We evaluate these initiatives for their impact on the collegiate model. 
Part IX sets forth elements of a collegiate model that would 
preserve the essential centrality of the student part of “student-
 
18 See infractions reports and authorities cited infra notes 38–39. 
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athlete” and the campus part of collegiate athletic competition, but 
that would also recognize that a century of changes in how 
universities and athletics departments operate should trigger changes 
in the treatment of student-athletes. 
Finally, in Part X, we identify potential negative consequences to 
athletic programs and the greater campus were more funds and 
services to be directed to student-athletes, including cutting sports and 
diverting even more money from the greater campus to athletics. We 
also suggest ways to temper policy decisions that lead to these 
consequences. 
I 
AMATEURISM 
Many sing the praises of amateurism as (they think) it was. They 
revere the ancient Greeks who exemplified, they say, the Platonic 
ideal of mind and body combined.19 They laud the absence of 
commercial motive or exploitation in the ancient Olympic Games. 
They rhapsodize about competition for the sake of competition and 
amateur athletes who policed themselves and did not cheat to win. 
They yearn for the days when athletic competition was divorced from 
political influence. 
It is a lovely, uplifting tale. The only trouble is, it was never thus. 
A. Amateurism Redux 
Among others, David Gilman Romano, the Karabots Professor of 
Greek Archaeology at the School of Anthropology of the University 
of Arizona, has described amateurism in ancient times.20 According 
to Romano, the word “athlete” seems to combine two Greek words—
”athlos,” meaning contest, and “athlon” meaning prize.21 An athlete 
in ancient Greece, therefore, was someone who competed for a prize. 
And, the prize was pretty good. According to Plutarch, in 600 BC, a 
citizen of Athens who won an Olympic event would receive a cash 
 
19 See generally Verity Harte, Plato’s Metaphysics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PLATO 191 (Gail Fine ed., 2011); C.C.W. Taylor, Plato’s Epistemology, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PLATO 165 (Gail Fine ed., 2011). 
20 See David Gilman Romano, The FAQs: Modern Myths of The Ancient Olympic 
Games, UNIV. OF PA. MUSEUM OF ARCHAEOLOGY & ANTHROPOLOGY, http://www.penn 
.museum/sites/olympics/olympicfaqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
21 Id. 
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award of five hundred drachma,22 enough to support a family of three 
for thirty-three months.23 
Political influence and cheating scandals also occurred.24 Athletes 
were known to claim citizenship for competition depending on how 
large the bribe. As to commercialization, the ancient Greek 
equivalents are odes to athletes (sometimes commissioned by the 
athletes themselves), commemorative coins, and statues.25 
Now fast forward to the nineteenth-century iteration of amateurism 
in Great Britain26 and the modern understanding that amateurs 
compete for the sake of the competition and not for the money. 
Amateurism to Victorians embodied neither a laudatory nor even 
benign ideal of the nature of athletic competition. Instead, amateurism 
fostered class-consciousness.27 If only amateurs could compete, then 
competition necessarily could be reserved for the “gentlemen” leisure 
class or at least would extend no further than the upper middle class.28 
 
22 Id. 
23 One half of a drachma reportedly could support a family of three for one day. See, 
e.g., XENOPHON, WAYS AND MEANS: A PAMPHLET ON REVENUES n.18 (H.G. Dakyns, 
trans., Macmillan & Co., 1897); Aristophanes, Wasps, THE COMPLETE DRAMA 2, lines 
300-02 (Eugene O’Neill, Jr. ed., 1938), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper 
/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0044 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). THUCYDIDES, HISTORY 
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 3.17.4 (Thomas Hobbes ed., 1843). 
24 See Christopher Klein, 5 Myths About the Ancient Olympics, History in the 
Headlines, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.history.com/news/5-myths-about   
-the-ancient-olympics. 
25 Id. 
26 A nineteenth century where the sun never set on the British Empire; where native 
populations in India were subjugated in their own land; and where jingoism reigned. David 
Cody, Kipling’s Imperialism, VICTORIAN WEB, http://www.victorianweb.org/authors 
/kipling/rkimperialism.html (last updated 1988). See generally PAUL SCOTT, THE JEWEL 
IN THE CROWN: THE RAJ QUARTET: I (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998). A nineteenth century 
where existed poverty, squalor, workhouses for the poor, and debtor prisons. See generally 
CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (2002); CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1996). A 
nineteenth century where married women had no separate identity and lost any 
independent wealth to their husbands the moment the marriage contract was signed. See 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). 
27 MIKE HUGGINS, THE VICTORIANS AND SPORT 52, 54–56 (2004) [hereinafter 
HUGGINS] (noting that “[a]mateurism, accompanied by snobbishness, hypocrisy and 
double standards, became emblematic of class” and “a way of keeping working class 
players in their place or keeping them out”). See generally DAVID CANNADINE, THE 
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH ARISTOCRACY 8–15 (1996). 
28 HUGGINS, supra note 27, at 19–83. 
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B. Amateurism on Campus and the NCAA 
Athletic competition came to campus in the early nineteenth 
century.29 Centralized administration of intercollegiate competition 
began to develop in 1906 with the formation of the NCAA.30 
Early twentieth-century universities primarily were open only to 
those whose families could afford the price. General liberal arts 
curriculum was not geared toward employment after graduation.31 
Scholarship assistance was limited.32 College athletic competition 
understood as competition among unpaid amateurs fit well on these 
campuses. Amateurism also was a good fit when college sports—even 
football—generated neither large revenues nor much national public 
attention.33 At least by the 1980s, however, things had changed 
dramatically,34 and they continue to change. 
 
29 BYERS, supra note 2, at 38–40. 
30 Id. At least in part, the NCAA was formed as a result of the large number of student-
athlete injuries and deaths. Id. 
31 It was only in 1862, with the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862, that the mission of 
universities expanded beyond the liberal arts to include degree programs that prepared 
students more directly for employment after graduation. See Celebrating the Morrill Act of 
1862, COLO. ST. UNIV. (Jan. 2013), http://www.colostate.edu/morrillact/. Land grant 
universities then transformed into public universities with missions to provide wide access. 
See Elise Young, 150 Years of College Access, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/06/27/birthday-celebration-land-grant-colleges 
-get-advice-about-their-future; see also Aaron Cooley, Higher Education Act (HEA), 
LAWHIGHEREDUCATION.ORG (May 1, 2011), http://lawhighereducation.org/75-higher      
-education-at-hea.html?newsid=75&seourl=higher-education-at-hea. 
32 States to varying degrees began to provide need-based assistance. It was only in 
1965, with the passage of the Higher Education Act, however, that the federal government 
took significant steps to make college education affordable to those priced out by financial 
need. 
33 Even in the 1880s, some college football teams generated a lot of public attention 
and, at the time, fairly substantial revenues. ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 7. For example, 
Princeton-Yale football games were played in front of forty thousand fans and produced 
revenues equivalent to $420,000 in 1998 dollars. Id. But, the attention primarily was local, 
not national, and these instances were not by any means universal. Id. 
34 In 1984, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA illegally restrained trade under the 
federal antitrust laws when it limited the number of times individual football teams could 
appear on television. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). This decision opened 
the floodgates for huge conference television deals and increased the difference between 
major football schools and others in the amount of revenues they generated. See Josephine 
R. Potuto, They Take Classes, Don’t They?: Structuring a College Football Post Season, 7 
J. BUS. & TECH. LAW, 311 (2012); Lenn Robbins, Smaller Conferences Need Their Own 
Playoff, N.Y. POST (July 27, 2013), http://www.nypost.com/p/sports/college/football 
/smaller_Conferences_need_their_own_AuadB8EPOfZ90DgmdUUx9O; George 
Schroeder, College Football Playoff Revenue Distribution Set, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 
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Early NCAA efforts to mesh student-athletes with students who 
were not athletes required that athletic scholarships be need-based,35 
and that athletic scholarship awards be decided by campus academic 
administrators and not by coaches.36 Over time, varsity athletic 
competition mutated from an extra-curricular student avocation to a 
year-round focused commitment. Similarly, interest in college teams 
and players extended beyond students, faculty, and alumni at an 
individual school to substantial, even national, fan bases and donor 
support, often from those who neither attended nor were employed by 
the university they supported. 
Increased athletic time demands on student-athletes37 excluded 
realistic opportunities for outside employment. At the same time, 
booster and agent intrusion into athletic programs led to illicit 
payments to student-athletes that could be laundered through 
ostensible bona fide employment.38 The NCAA responded with 
bylaws that eliminated opportunities for student-athletes to be 
employed in activities related to their athletic skill or reputation and 
also by increased scrutiny of student-athlete summer jobs.39 
Ultimately, scholarship awards were tied to athletic participation, not 
need, and scholarship decisions were made by coaches, not campus 
administrators.40 
 
2012, 12:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/bowls/2012/12/11/college  
-football-bcs-playoff-revenue-money-distribution-payouts/1762709/. 
35 The switch to full-ride athletic scholarships came in 1952. ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, 
at 41 (noting that the switch to full-ride athletic scholarships began in 1956). 
36 BYERS, supra note 2, at 76. 
37 See generally KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, RESTORING THE 
BALANCE: DOLLARS, VALUES, AND THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE SPORTS § 3 (Mar. 6, 2014), 
available at http://www.knightcommission.org/restoringthebalance/recommendation-iii. 
Increased time demands are the product of more games, more travel time to games, and 
time spent on campus over breaks, including summers, to hone skills. Id. 
38 There also was a time under NCAA bylaws when boosters could funnel money to 
particular student-athletes by providing scholarship money earmarked for them. BYERS, 
supra note 2, at 73. 
39 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 323 
(2010); MARSHALL UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 191 (2001). 
40 One explanation for these bylaw changes is to avoid the threat that the federal labor 
laws would cover student-athletes. Equally, however, the bylaw changes may be seen as 
reasonable accommodations to the time demands of college athletic participation. BYERS, 
supra note 2, at 69–72. The federal income tax treatment of athletic scholarships seems 
motivated by a related concern. Section 117(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that 
the exclusion for “qualified scholarships” does not apply “to that portion of any amount 
received which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student 
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 117(c)(1) 
(2012) (emphasis added). Although an athletic scholarship might appear to fall within 
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Although the amateurism principle is part of assuring that student-
athletes are treated similarly to students who are not athletes, the 
foremost criterion of similar treatment comes from NCAA bylaws 
requiring uniform application to both cohorts of university 
admissions, grading, and degree requirement standards and decisions. 
At its inception, however, the NCAA imposed no additional academic 
requirements for competition eligibility.41 Instead, all academic 
decisions were local to each university.42 
NCAA bylaws now dictate minimum standards for initial 
eligibility.43 Such standards include an academic component that 
connects NCAA calculation of high school grade-point average to 
grades and credits in specified core courses.44 There also are initial 
 
section 117(c), since 1977, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that if a 
student-athlete is not required to participate in the particular sport, section 117(c) does not 
prevent the student’s athletic scholarship from being an excludable “qualified 
scholarship”: 
 In the instant case, the university requires no particular activity of any of its 
scholarship recipients. Although students who receive athletic scholarships do so 
because of their special abilities in a particular sport and are expected to 
participate in the sport, the scholarship is not cancelled in the event the student 
cannot participate and the student is not required to engage in any other 
activities in lieu of participating in the sport. 
 Accordingly, in the instant case, the athletic scholarships are awarded by the 
university primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing their studies, and therefore, 
the value of the scholarships is excludable from the recipients’ gross incomes 
under section 117 of the Code. 
Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (emphasis added). The Revenue Ruling appears to track 
the NCAA rule that an athletic scholarship, once awarded, must continue for the full 
period of the award even if the student-athlete decides not to play. As commentators have 
pointed out, “[t]he apparent flaw in this reasoning is that if the recipient does not choose to 
play sports, the scholarship need not (and probably will not) be renewed for the following 
year. Thus . . . to keep his scholarship going from year to year, the recipient must play 
sports.” DANIEL Q. POSIN & DONALD T. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION § 3.09, at 120 (7th ed. 2005) (emphasis added). Although the Revenue Ruling 
is consistent with NCAA rules, from a tax policy perspective, the Revenue Ruling is 
difficult, if not impossible, to defend. We note that universities now may award multi-year 
athletic scholarships. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 15.02.7, 15.3.3.1. As with one-
year scholarship awards, multiyear scholarships may neither be conditioned on a level of 
athletic performance achieved nor reduced or cancelled because of subpar athletic skill or 
performance. Id. §§ 15.3.4.3.1, 15.3.4.3. 
41 ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 20–22, 26–27. 
42 See BYERS, supra note 2, at 309–17; see generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 26–
36. 
43 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.3. 
44 Id. § 14.3.1.1. 
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eligibility requirements for transfer student-athletes.45 NCAA 
continuing eligibility requirements focus on individual student-
athletes and specify progress-toward-degree markers.46 The 
Committee on Academic Performance focuses on team academic 
performance47 and may exclude from NCAA championship 
competition teams that have a poor record of academic 
performance.48 
The NCAA, conferences, and universities have done far less well, 
however, in administering athletic departments consistent with how 
colleges administer academic departments (or, for that matter, 
imposing additional requirements that set a higher standard). Today, 
college athletics is a multibillion dollar enterprise. Payouts to 
universities from their conference offices can exceed $26 million 
annually,49 and such payouts keep growing.50 The FBS football 
championship television deal is worth $470 million annually to the 
FBS conferences,51 and there are even more revenues to come from 
 
45 Among them are limits on the number of physical education courses that may count 
toward eligibility upon transfer to a member institution. Id. § 14.5.4.5.4. 
46 The progress-toward-degree requirements are more restrictive than those that apply 
to students who are not athletes because the NCAA sets additional annual benchmarks that 
must be met. Id. § 14.4. 
47 Id. § 21.7.8.2. 
48 See APR: Ten Teams Lose Postseason, ESPN.COM (June 20, 2012, 9:23 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8077431/connecticut-huskies-9        
-others-sit-postseason-apr. Team academic performance is calculated by a metric that 
awards each scholarship student-athlete on a team an eligibility point and a retention point 
for each semester in which they are eligible to compete and remain on a team. Team totals 
are computed. Low scores trigger imposition of penalties. The APR metric can be found at 
Academic Progress Rates (APR), NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources 
/research/academic-progress-rate-apr (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
49 Chris Smith, How Massive Conference Payouts are Changing the Face of College 
Sports, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013 
/12/26/how-massive-conference-payouts-are-changing-the-face-of-college-sports/. 
50 Stu Durando, Big Ten Payouts to Hit $25.7 Million Per School, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 6, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/illini/big-ten  
-payouts-to-hit-million-per-school/article_4eef1c1a-5a79-5b79-899b-3dbf2a99c871.html. 
Projections are that Southeastern Conference schools could each receive nearly $34 
million in 2014–15. Steve Berkowitz, SEC Revenue Set to Jump 50% with Playoff, New 
TV Deals, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports 
/college/2013/01/16/sec-conference-money-increases/1836389/. For a list of major 
conference broadcast contracts, and their value, see, e.g., Potuto, supra note 34, at 322–23. 
51 Rachel Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324851704578 
133223970790516. The FBS Conferences are not all equal. The five major conferences are 
the Big Ten Conference, Pacific 12 Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference, Southeastern 
Conference, and the Big 12 Conference. These major conferences, along with the 
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ticket and merchandise sales.52 In forty states, the highest paid public 
official is a college head coach (27 football; 13 men’s basketball).53 
Head football and men’s basketball coaches also have side deals that 
bring them even more money.54 
Not surprisingly, all this money triggers serious concerns that 
athletic departments are driven by revenues and profits, rather than by 
the academic mission of their universities and the best interests of 
their student-athletes.55 All this money also is parent to the perception 
that everyone but student-athletes gets a big piece of an increasingly 
bigger pie.56 Walter Byers, the NCAA’s first full-time executive 
 
American Athletic Conference, formerly were BCS automatic qualifier (AQ) conferences. 
See Potuto, supra note 34, at 313, 314 n.6, 319–21. 
52 As just one example, John Calapari, the former men’s basketball head coach of the 
University of Massachusetts, copyrighted and sold the team slogan, “Refuse to Lose,” and 
he did so even though the slogan was developed by others and initiated with the football 
team. Michael Rosenberg, Refuse to Lose: Master Salesman Calipari is the Best at what 
he Does, SI.COM (Mar. 17, 2010, 6:35 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers 
/michael_rosenberg/03/17/calipari/. Individual athletic departments generate revenues on 
their own through, among other things, tickets sales (including suites), donor 
contributions, and merchandising. See discussion infra Part V. Institutional revenues can 
even come from their own television networks. For example, the University of Texas has a 
twenty-year $300 million deal with ESPN. Matt Hinton, ESPN’s All-Longhorn Network is 
the First of its Kind, but it’s too Lucrative to be the Last, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 19, 2013, 
9:42 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/blog/dr_saturday/post/ESPN-s-all            
-Longhorn-network-is-the-first-of-its-?urn=ncaaf-309658. 
53 Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid Employee A 
Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN.COM (May 10, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://deadspin.com 
/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228. The data was derived 
from media reports and state salary databases. 
54 ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 137–38. See infra notes 302–03. 
55 See, e.g., Frank G. Splitt, Time for Accountability in Sports: Corrupt Collegiate 
Athletics Overshadow Faltering Academic Mission, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Nov. 14, 2008), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Time+for+accountability+in+sports%3A+corrupt 
+collegiate+athletics. . .-a0189872306; William C. Dowling, College Sports: Faut-il 
Légaliser la Prostitution?, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS (2001), https://www.rci.rutgers.edu 
/~wcd/prostitu.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2014); Paul M. Barrett, Carolina Confronts 
Classroom Corruption as Athletes Fail to Read, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2014, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-27/carolina-confronts-classroom-corruption-as 
-athletes-fail-to-read.html. The current controversy over concussions, and the claim that 
the NCAA failed to act early enough, is one illustration. Associated Press, Concussion Suit 
Seeks Class-Action, ESPN.COM (July 20, 2013, 7:53 AM), http://espn.go.com/college         
-sports/story/_/id/9493871/concussion-suit-ncaa-seeks-class-action-status. 
56 See supra note 10. The current NCAA president earned more than $1.7 million in tax 
year 2011. Tom Fornelli, NCAA President Mark Emmert Made $1.7 Million for 2011 Tax 
Year, CBSSPORTS.COM (July 10, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/college 
football/eye-on-college-football/22710002/mark-emmert-made-17-million-for-2011-tax     
-year. Not all commentators believe that a college scholarship and other support provided 
student-athletes is insufficient quid pro quo for their athletic participation. See Mike 
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director, described student-athlete amateurism as administered by the 
NCAA in the 1980s as a form of “economic tyranny” over student-
athletes.57 If Byers was right back then, he is even more right now. 
The questions on the table are: was he?, and is he? 
II 
ATHLETIC SPENDING AND STUDENT-ATHLETE BENEFITS 
The NCAA today is a large, national, multi-faceted private 
association with three divisions. It has nearly 1300 members.58 More 
than 453,000 student-athletes competed in the 2011-12 school year, 
with just short of 170,000 of them competing in Division I.59 
All three divisions have bylaws requiring student-athletes to be 
treated like students who are not athletes.60 The three divisions 
articulate the same overarching principles, including promotion of 
student-athlete well-being,61 sound academic standards,62 gender 
equity,63 amateurism,64 and eligibility decisions that “place proper 
emphasis on educational objectives, . . . promote competitive equity 
among institutions, and . . . prevent exploitation of student-
athletes.”65 Although there are association-wide and division-wide 
 
Bianchi, Spurrier, SEC Should Know a College Education is Enough of a Reward for 
Football Players, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 27, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com 
/2013-07-27/sports/os-mike-bianchi-paying-college-athletes-0728-20130727_1_football    
-players-college-education-sure-spurrier. 
57 BYERS, supra note 2, at 347. Byers also described coining the term “student-athlete” 
and using the term “team” and not “club,” as efforts to combat the threat to amateurism 
and the push to pay college athletes. Id. at 68–69. 
58 See Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury Demand at 9, NCAA v. 
Collegiate Licensing Co. & Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2013cv238557 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury Demand]. 
59 Gary Brown, NCAA Student-Athlete Participation Hits 450,000, NCAA.ORG (Sept. 
19, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-student-athlete    
-participation-hits-450000. 
60 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1. 
61 Id. § 2.2. 
62 Id. § 2.5. 
63 Id. § 2.3. 
64 Id. § 2.9. 
65 Id. § 2.12. There is also an executive committee of university presidents and 
chancellors from all three divisions that has general policy-making authority for 
association-wide issues as they arise. Id. § 4.1. 
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policies and bylaws,66 NCAA governance fundamentally is division-
centric.67 
Because Division I, and more specifically the FBS, is the lightning 
rod both for claims that intercollegiate sports are amateur in name 
only and claims that student-athletes are exploited under the guise of 
amateurism, our focus in this Article is on Division I bylaws and 
policies and on Division I institutions and conferences. We focus our 
econometric model of student-athlete value on FBS football and 
Division I men’s basketball student-athletes because, with rare 
exception, they are the only student-athletes who might have 
independent value in their names and likenesses. 
A. The Campus 
We doubt that universities ever were pristine, ivy-hung places of 
teaching and learning divorced from efforts to locate revenues to fund 
operations. From time immemorial, universities have received 
government funding and donor contributions.68 In these days of less 
state support, public universities increasingly look to commercial 
ventures for funding. 
Funding sources external to a university are not pernicious simply 
because they are external. They are pernicious only if universities fail 
to manage them consistently with their academic mission and the 
values of higher education. Funding higher education simply through 
tuition could price universities out of the reach of all but the 
wealthiest students. Universities therefore generate revenues by 
giving Pepsi (or Coke) an exclusive campus deal.69 They take money 
from drug manufacturers to research a problem of particular interest 
 
66 See id. § 5.02.1. 
67 Divisions I, II, and III have separate manuals because the divisions have separate, 
and different, governance and legislative structures. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra 
note 1, §§ 4–5, with NCAA, 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL (2014), and NCAA, 
2013-14 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL (2014). 
68 Colleges at the great British universities, Oxford and Cambridge, were initially 
funded by the church or the crown. See, e.g., The History of Christ Church, CHRIST 
CHURCH (OXFORD), http://www.chch.ox.ac.uk/visiting/history (last updated May 16, 
2013) (noting that the Christ Church was originally founded by Cardinal Wolsley); see 
also The History of the Chapel, KING’S COLLEGE (CAMBRIDGE), http://www.kings.cam 
.ac.uk/chapel/history.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that King Henry VI founded 
the chapel at King’s College). 
69 UNL Re-ups Pepsi Contract, UNL NEWS RELEASES (Feb. 27, 2009, 2:00 PM), 
http://newsroom.unl.edu/releases/2009/02/27/UNL+re-ups+Pepsi+contract. 
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to them. They have chaired professorships paid for by donors.70 
Athletic programs are part of that world. 
One difference between campus revenue-producing projects and 
those of athletic departments may relate to the uncompensated use of 
students in promotional, commercial, or revenue-producing activities. 
To the extent that the NCAA, the conferences, or campus athletic 
departments might do this, however, they hardly would be unique. 
Way back when we were children, Little League teams already were 
sponsored by local businesses and children on the teams wore the 
names of those businesses prominently displayed on their backs (such 
a use of student-athletes is prohibited under NCAA bylaws).71 
Without that sponsorship, some Little League teams might have 
competed without uniforms and with limited equipment, if they 
competed at all. Today, the major sponsors of Little League Baseball 
include Honda, Subway, Gatorade, and Hilton HHonors.72 
Criticism also revolves around the size of the NCAA and FBS 
athletic department operations as too big to be exempt from federal 
taxes and also just too big, period.73 The federal tax laws do not 
decide tax-exempt status on the size of net revenues,74 however, and 
some charities are big business.75 To be tax-exempt, an educational 
institution76 must show that it is organized77 and operated exclusively 
 
70 Two of the three authors of this Article have chaired professorships funded by 
private donors. 
71 See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text. 
72 Erik Spanberg, How Little League Scores Big with Sponsors, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTS BUS. J., July 1, 2013, at 20, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues 
/2013/07/01/In-Depth/Little-League.aspx. 
73 For example, the entire Savannah State athletic department budget is $200,000 less 
than what Texas head football coach Mack Brown made in 2012. Lenn Robbins, Big 5 
Conferences Don’t Want to Play Smaller FCS Schools, N.Y. POST (July 26, 2013, 4:00 
AM), http://nypost.com/2013/07/26/big-5-conferences-dont-want-to-play-smaller-fcs         
-schools/. 
74 The IRS does not use the term “non-profit” for educational institutions. 
75 Forbes estimates that in 2011, $300 billion was given to 1.2 million nonprofits in the 
United States. William P. Barrett, The Largest U.S. Charities for 2012, FORBES (Nov. 8, 
2012, 5:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampbarrett/2012/11/08/the-largest-u-s   
-charities-for-2012/. The American Red Cross is listed fifth on Forbes’s list of one 
hundred top revenue-producing charities, with $3.12 billion in revenues. Id. In 2011, the 
American Red Cross had net assets of $2.2 billion and total operating expenses of $3.4 
billion. Brian Rhoas, American Red Cross FY 2011 Financial Results, AM. RED CROSS, 
http://www.redcross.org/about-us/publications/fy11-financials (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
76 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code covers most educational institutions. 
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
77 An educational institution usually satisfies its exclusive organizational purpose 
through its articles of incorporation and bylaws. 
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for educational purposes and that none of its net earnings benefit 
private individuals or shareholders.78 
In 2012, the University of Texas football team generated $163 
million in revenues.79 Big, certainly. But these athletic revenues pale 
in comparison to the nearly $1.4 billion in 2012 total operating 
revenues generated by the University of Texas campus.80 
The real criticism of athletic department revenues seems to be 
focused on how the money is spent as well as on the disconnect 
between NCAA and institutional revenue-producing ventures and the 
limits imposed on funds and sources of funds available to student-
athletes.81 There is merit to the claim that athletic departments are out 
of touch with campus spending. A head coach gets a raise for fear he 
might bolt to another program.82 At the same time, there is a campus 
salary freeze. Sport support staffs continue to increase,83 while faculty 
 
78 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008) (“An organization will be regarded as 
operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in 
activities which accomplish one or more of [the] exempt purposes specified in section 
501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its 
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.”). See Church of Scientology of Cal. 
v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (taxpayer was not 
operated exclusively for an exempt purpose under section 501(c)(3) because taxpayer had 
a substantial commercial purpose, namely that its net earnings benefited key Scientology 
officials). 
79 Steve Berkowitz et al., Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, 
USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college 
/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/. 
80 UNIV. OF TEX. SYS., OPERATING BUDGET SUMMARIES, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 
(Aug. 2011), available at http://www.utsystem.edu/cont/reports_publications/summaries 
/2012/FY2012%20Budget%20Summaries.pdf. Less than one-third of that amount came 
from tuition and fees. 
81 Gregg Doyel, Time To Pay College Football Players–Changing Times, Money Say 
So, CBSSPORTS.COM (Sept. 25, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/general 
/writer/gregg-doyel/23838595/its-time-pay-college-football-players-changing-times           
-money-say-so (comparing Oklahoma football coach salaries and ticket prices from 
1950—when Bud Wilkinson earned fifteen thousand dollars and game day tickets went for 
less than five dollars—to 2013, when Bob Stoops made $4.55 million and tickets sold for 
as much as $650). 
82 Or he doesn’t, and he does. Chris Bahn, Bret Bielema Attracted To Razorbacks By 
Money Available To Assistant Coaches, ARK. BUS. (Dec. 6, 2012, 9:45 AM), 
www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/89406/new-coach-attracted-to-razorbacks-by-money    
-available-to-assistant-coaches. 
83 In 2013, the University of Oklahoma added five additional football support positions: 
director of player personnel, director of sports nutrition, and “quality control” personnel 
for offense, defense and special teams. John Shinn, OU Football Support Staff Gets A 
Boost, NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Aug. 8, 2013), http://normantranscript.com/sports/x1084 
949806/OU-football-support-staff-gets-a-boost/print. See Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Cabinet 
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positions go unfilled. A state-of-the-art dormitory is built for student-
athletes.84 A football weight room has Brazilian Ipe wood floors.85 
Football lockers are equipped with iPads and locker rooms showcase 
waterfalls.86 At the same time, the ceiling in the campus computer lab 
is falling down. Indeed, if athletic facility projects were evaluated on 
the same metric as campus projects, we doubt that any athletic facility 
project at a major FBS school would make the top 100 construction 
needs on the greater campus. 
University intra-campus revenue redistribution is a form of 
academic socialism where all revenues generated locally are gathered 
centrally and distributed as needed. By contrast, athletic departments 
at major FBS universities often are operated as satellite enterprises 
insulated from campus revenue reallocation and from campus 
constraints on how revenues are spent. Despite the amount of athletic 
revenues produced, moreover, when revenue redistribution occurs, it 
almost always is a one-way street—from the campus to the athletic 
department.87 
Even if athletic department revenues were sufficient to cover all 
athletic department expenses, we still would neither defend nor 
endorse current athletic spending. The converse is true, however. 
Even in the FBS, not all athletic departments generate big revenues,88 
 
to Discuss Legislation to Limit Coaching Support Staffs, USA TODAY (June 7, 2010, 5:02 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2010-06-07-coaching-support-staffs 
_N.htm. Larger and larger staffs are not a new phenomenon. In 1958, for example, the 
Alabama football program had seventeen assistants. BYERS, supra note 2, at 219. 
84 Ryan Osborne, Oklahoma Sooners Student-Athletes Begin Moving Into “State-of-the-
Art” Dorm Sunday, SPORTSDAYDFW (July 28, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://collegesportsblog 
.dallasnews.com/2013/07/oklahoma-sooners-student-athletes-begin-moving-into-state-of   
-the-art-dorm-sunday.html/. 
85 Landon Hemsley, Commentary: Oregon’s New Football Facilities Are Just Too 
Much, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 2, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article 
/865583946/Commentary-Oregons-new-football-facilities-are-just-too-much.html?pg=all. 
86 Brent Yarina, What’s In Your Locker? At Nebraska, There’s An iPad, BTN.COM 
(Aug. 30, 2012, 8:02 PM), http://btn.com/2012/08/30/whats-in-your-locker-at-nebraska     
-theres-an-ipad/; Andrew Gribble, More Than Just Eye Candy, Alabama’s New Player-
Friendly Facility Thrives Off ‘Functionality’, AL.COM (Aug. 2, 2013, 6:52 AM), 
http://www.al.com/alabamafootball/index.ssf/2013/08/alabama_players_facility.html. 
87 Subsidization of athletic departments by the greater campus is not a new 
phenomenon. Pauley Pavilion at UCLA, for example, was built in 1969 using among other 
revenues, $1.5 million in student registration fees; student fees at Indiana, as another 
example, were used to retire bonds floated to build the football stadium. BYERS, supra 
note 2 at 221, 223. 
88 Troy University, for example had $16.5 million in revenues in 2012. John Zenor, 
Troy in Midst of $73 Million Athletics Makeover, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 10, 2013, 3:29 
PM), http://collegefootball.ap.org/article/troy-midst-73-million-athletics-makeover. 
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and the great majority of them, regardless of total revenues, operate at 
a deficit. These deficits can run as high $28 million annually.89 USA 
Today annually collects data on more than 225 Division I college 
athletic programs at public universities.90 In 2012, only seven 
operated their athletic departments in the black with no subsidy from 
the greater campus,91 and only fourteen more covered expenses with a 
campus subsidy.92 Whether one evaluates spending in the absolute or 
compared to overall campus spending protocols, FBS athletic 
spending seems out of control. 
B. The Big Money and Where It Goes 
We wonder whether the outrage over athletic department revenues 
and the concomitant failure to compensate student-athletes would be 
the same no matter where the revenues landed. Mack Brown, 
formerly the Texas head football coach, was paid $5 million in 
2013.93 Suppose, instead, that he was paid $1 million with no bonuses 
or side deals. Suppose none of his assistant coaches made more than 
$100,000. Suppose athletic facilities were evaluated in the same 
manner as all other campus projects. Suppose there was an 
independent audit and an assessment of the need for a new or 
upgraded facility, and its appeal to recruits was not a factor that could 
be considered. Suppose bonds could not be floated to cover new 
facilities.94 Suppose that the University of Texas mirrored Ohio State 
University and sponsored thirty-seven teams95 rather than sixteen.96 
 
89 Kelly Heyboer & Ted Sherman, Rutgers Athletics Ran Nearly $28 Million Deficit 
Last Year, Report Shows, NJ.COM (May 14, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://www.nj.com 
/rutgersfootball/index.ssf/2013/05/rutgers_athletics_ran_28_milli.html. 
90 For a full list of all schools included in the survey, see NCAA Finances, 2012 Total 
Revenue, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2014). Data were acquired through the NCAA and open record requests. 
Methodology for NCAA Athletic Department Revenue Database, USA TODAY (May 10, 
2013, 11:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/10/college         
-athletic-department-revenue-database-methodology/2150123/. 
91 These were Nebraska, Texas, Ohio State, Oklahoma, Penn State, Purdue, and LSU. 
Berkowitz et al., supra note 79. 
92 Id. 
93 Associated Press, Brown to Receive $5M a Season, ESPN.COM (Dec. 10, 2009, 2:06 
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4728932. 
94 See BYERS, supra note 2, at 221–23. 
95 OHIOSTATEBUCKEYS.COM, http://www.ohiostatebuckeys.com/ (last visited Apr. 6, 
2014). 
96 TEXASSPORTS.COM, http://www.texasssports.com/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
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Suppose all excess Longhorn revenues went back to the greater 
campus. 
If all of this were the case, Texas athletics still would generate big 
revenues, and those revenues still would go in pockets other than 
those of student-athletes. Would the cry of mistreatment to football 
and men’s basketball student-athletes still be heard? Or be as strident? 
Coach salaries, fancy new facilities, and athletic department 
spending divorced from campus constraints certainly are one part of 
the story regarding athletic spending. The other part of the story, 
largely untold, is the support provided to student-athletes. 
A full-ride athletic scholarship covers tuition, room and board, and 
books. Its value ranges between universities and even between in-
state and out-of-state students at the same state university.97 At 
Stanford University, for example, a full scholarship is worth more 
than $54,500,98 while at the University of Florida it is worth about 
$22,000 annually for in-state students and $44,000 for those from out 
of state.99 Andrew Zimbalist, the Robert A. Woods Professor of 
Economics at Smith College, evaluated the value of a full-ride 
academic-year athletic scholarship as equivalent to the salary paid to a 
minor league baseball player.100 In addition to an academic-year 
scholarship, moreover, student-athletes may receive financial aid to 
attend summer school.101 
NCAA bylaws also permit assistance to student-athletes beyond 
scholarships. Student-athletes may receive full medical care.102 They 
 
97 Scholarships are tax-exempt, moreover. 26 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). 
98 Kathleen J. Sullivan, Stanford Raises Undergraduate Tuition 3 Percent for the 2012-
13 School Year, STAN. REP. (Feb. 7, 2012). 
99 Bianchi, supra note 56. 
100 ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 51. The total amount spent on scholarships by all 
NCAA institutions is more than $2 billion annually. How Do Athletics Scholarships 
Work?, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/how-do-athletics   
-scholarships-work (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). However, minor league baseball players 
claim they are not even paid the minimum wage required by law. See Cheryl Armstrong, 
Minor Leaguers Sue Baseball for Low Pay, in Federal Class Action, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERV. (Feb. 11, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2014/02/11/65251 
.htm. 
101 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.2.8. 
102 Id. § 16.4. This can include drug rehabilitation, insurance costs, expenses that result 
from permanent disability, travel and actual and necessary expenses for treatment. See 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL FIGURE 14-1. Institutions also must certify that they have 
insurance coverage for student-athlete athletically related injuries. NCAA MANUAL, supra 
note 1, § 3.2.4.8. In addition, student-athletes may receive free legal assistance in NCAA 
proceedings when their eligibility is at issue or in lawsuits that result from a student-
athlete’s involvement in practice or competition. Id. § 16.3.2. 
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get tutors and academic counselors free of charge; at the major 
football programs, tutors are available for all courses in which a 
student-athlete is enrolled.103 If there is an emergency at home, a 
student-athlete may receive funds to cover expenses.104 They also 
receive team apparel, including shoes. And has anyone checked the 
price of shoes recently? 
Student-athletes may receive athletic funds additional to their 
scholarships through the NCAA Student Assistance Fund.105 During 
the 2013-14 school year, for example, each student-athlete at the 
University of Nebraska received $700 to help defray car expenses, 
campus parking permits, cell phone bills, travel expenses, and 
educational expenses; financially-disadvantaged student-athletes 
received $1400.106 Notwithstanding their athletic scholarships, which 
cover board, student-athletes also receive meals when on team travel 
and when on campus during break times if they are there for team 
practice or competition.107 
Athletic departments pay travel costs to competition, travel that is 
almost always by private charter for football and at least periodically 
 
103 Id. § 16.3.1.1. 
104 These are processed as pre-approved incidental waivers and include, for example, 
reimbursement for stolen items. John Infante, Clinton-Dix Loan May Not Have Been 
Necessary, ATHNET (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.athleticscholarships.net/2013/10/04 
/clinton-dix-loan-may-not-have-been-necessary.htm. 
105 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 15.01.6.1, 16.11.8(f). Federal funds are also 
available to students with financial need, over and above a full athletic scholarship. 20 
U.S.C. § 1070(a)(1) (2012). The Pell Grant was established to assist students with 
financial need to cover the costs of higher education. Id. Students with less than full need 
receive Pell Grant funds proportionate to their need. Id. There are several federal 
scholarship funds that are excluded from athletic scholarship computations. NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 15.02.4.3, 15.2.5. 
106 In 2013-14, at the University of Nebraska, Pell Grant funds also amounted to $5645 
per student. See also e-mail from Jena Johnson, Assistant Dir. of Compliance for Student-
Athlete Servs., Univ. of Neb., to J.R. Potuto, author (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:49 AM) (on file at 
UNL Law College); e-mail from Jena Johnson, Assistant Dir. of Compliance for Student-
Athlete Servs., Univ. of Neb., to J.R. Potuto, author (July 19, 2013, 4:53 PM) (on file at 
UNL Law College). Additional permissible uses included utility, cell, and cable bills. Id. 
All scholarship student-athletes received Student Opportunity funds, and non-scholarship 
student-athletes who were on a team for at least one semester also received $700. Id. 
107 Among other authorized expenses are funds for transportation, housing and meals 
for a student-athlete’s parents or legal guardians, a spouse, and other student-athletes to be 
present if a student-athlete suffers from a life-threatening illness or for student-athletes to 
attend a teammate’s funeral, and transportation, hotel, and meal expenses for spouses and 
children to attend a bowl game or one round of an NCAA championship. NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 16.6.1.3, 16.6.1.1. 
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for other sports.108 Athletic facilities for the exclusive use of student-
athletes may include academic services facilities, practice facilities, 
strength and conditioning facilities, and locker rooms.109 Stadiums 
and arenas may have donor suites and other amenities to which 
student-athletes have no access, but one could hardly say that student-
athletes make no use of these facilities overall or derive no benefit 
from them. There also is economic value to all the other services that 
universities with major football programs may provide to their 
student-athletes (all student-athletes, not just football and men’s 
basketball student-athletes). Such services include academic 
counseling, media relations, nutritionists, dieticians, weight trainers, 
strength and conditioning specialists, and sports psychologists. 
A college education also has economic value (a value not part of 
the deal for minor league baseball players). The 2012 median weekly 
salary of a college graduate was $1066, more than $400 over that of a 
high school graduate.110 The current projected difference in lifetime 
earnings is $1 million.111 Contacts made with donors and fans offer 
lifetime business and professional advantages.112 
Additional context comes from a comparison of the situation of 
student-athletes with that of students who are not athletes. Students 
 
108 David Woods, Charter Flights a Benefit of Butler’s Evolution into Top Program, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab 
/2013/01/23/butlers-evolution-hoops-team-now-takes-charter-planes-to-games/1858519/; 
Switch to Big Ten May Change How Nebraska Teams Travel, HUSKERBOARD.COM (July 
21, 2010, 3:49 AM), http://www.huskerboard.com/index.php?/topic/44935-switch-to-big   
-ten-may-change-how-nebraska-teams-travel/; Mary Jane Credeur, Delta Woos Teams 
With Legroom, Leather as Charters Pad Profit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2011, 7:37 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-05/delta-pampers-teams-with-legroom-snacks  
-as-charters-pad-profit.html; see also Paul Steinbach, Athletic Departments Rethinking 
Ways to Make Travel Dollars Go Farther, ATHLETIC BUS. (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.athleticbusiness.com/Budgeting/athletic-departments-rethinking-ways-to-make 
-travel-dollars-go-farther.html. 
109 Purdue University is one example of a school providing such facilities, and the 
value of services such as sports information, sports performance, video staff, sports 
medicine, and academic support is estimated at six thousand dollars annually per student-
athlete. E-mail from Morgan J. Burke, Athletic Dir., Purdue University, to Jeffrey T. 
Bolin, Christie L. Sahley, Mitchell Daniels, and Timothy D. Sands (Sept. 12, 2013, 2:36 
PM) (on file in office of J.R. Potuto). 
110 Employment Projections, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/emp 
/ep_chart_001.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2013) (providing that a high school graduate’s 
median weekly salary was $654). 
111 ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: 
EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS 2 (2011), available at http://www9 
.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/collegepayoff-summary.pdf. 
112 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 53. 
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who are not athletes have to pay for services that student-athletes get 
for free. Tutoring services, for example, can cost anywhere from ten 
to forty dollars per hour.113 As another example, no one provides 
students who are not athletes with funds if they encounter an 
emergency. Or for shoes. Two-thirds of college graduates, moreover, 
had to borrow money to attend college.114 The average amount 
borrowed in 2013 was $26,600, while one in ten college students 
borrowed more than $40,000. These students leave college with a 
substantial debt burden that also includes the accruing interest 
incurred on the debt.115 
C. The NCAA and Student-Athletes 
Student-athletes also receive benefits directly from the NCAA. 
NCAA revenues cover at least a portion of travel and hotel 
expenses116 for the nearly fifty thousand student-athletes117 who 
annually compete in the eighty-nine NCAA championships118 (and 
preliminary rounds), and also the costs of administering the 
championships. They fund postgraduate scholarships, as well as 
education and leadership programs for student-athletes in all three 
divisions.119 There are degree-completion funds available for student-
athletes who have exhausted eligibility but have not yet graduated.120 
Finally, revenues are distributed back to the conferences and 
campuses, and form part of the budgets used by them to fund their 
operations. 
 
113 Information about the cost of tutors comes from discussion with students who avail 
themselves of tutors. 
114 Chris Denhart, How The $1.2 Trillion College Debt Crisis is Crippling Students, 
Parents and the Economy, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/specialfeatures/2013/08/07/how-the-college-debt-is-crippling-students-parents-and   
-the-economy/. 
115 Id. 
116 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 31.4.6. 
117 Championships, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/what-we-do/champion 
ships (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
118 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 18.3. 
119 See NCAA, Student-Athlete Affairs Program Descriptions (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file in 
office of J.R. Potuto). 
120 See NCAA, DIVISION I DEGREE COMPLETION AWARD, APPLICATION FOR 
FALL/SPRING 2014-15 (2014), available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/D1_DC 
_APP_FS_2014_15_FORM.pdf. The funds are limited, however. 
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III 
NCAA AMATEURISM BYLAWS 
NCAA bylaws limit NCAA, conference, and university 
commercial or promotional uses of student-athletes, including their 
names and likenesses. NCAA bylaws also prohibit student-athletes 
from deriving revenues from any commercial or promotional uses. 
A. Student-Athletes 
NCAA bylaws prohibit student-athletes from capitalizing on their 
athletic talent and reputation in two general categories.121 The first 
category prohibits student-athletes from professionalizing themselves 
by pay for play,122 including receiving cash or cash equivalent awards 
for athletic participation;123 competing, even unpaid, on professional 
teams or with professional athletes;124 and hiring agents to negotiate 
with professional teams.125 The second category prohibits student-
athletes from making money from their athletic ability or 
reputation.126 These NCAA bylaws prohibit student-athletes from 
sharing in any NCAA, conference, or institutional revenues that are 
generated by the use of their names and likenesses.127 They also 
 
121 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12. 
122 Id. §§ 12.1.2(c)–(d), (g). Also included in this category is payment based on athletic 
ability, entering a professional draft, and accepting a promise when still a student-athlete 
for pay when no longer a student-athlete. Id. §§ 12.1.2(a)–(c), (e)–(f). Pay includes 
bonuses, a percentage of game receipts, preferential treatment based on athletic ability or 
reputation, reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses when related to performance, 
and provision of funds for educational expenses when based on athletic ability and 
provided by an entity other than a national Olympic Committee pursuant to its Operation 
Gold program. Id. §§ 12.1.2.1.2, 12.1.2.1.3, 12.1.2.1.5, 12.1.2.1.6. A student-athlete may 
receive an award (e.g., a trophy or medal) based on performance in “outside” non-NCAA 
competition, however. Id. § 12.1.2.1.5.2. A student may also obtain insurance based on 
future earnings potential. Id. § 12.1.2.4.4. In addition, a student-athlete may 
simultaneously be a professional in a sport in which he does not compete in college and 
yet be an amateur in a sport in which he does compete. Id. § 12.1.3. This area of 
amateurism is a patchwork reflecting a balancing of equities in the particular. Combined 
with other areas of amateurism, the entirety provides no golden thread of amateurism easy 
to discern and to explain. 
123 Id. § 12.1.2.1.4.1. 
124 Id. § 12.2.3.2. 
125 Id. §§ 12.3.1,12.3.2, 12.3.3. 
126 Id. § 12.3.1. 
127 Id. § 12.5.1.1(e). 
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prohibit student-athletes from making their own deals or from hiring 
agents to negotiate deals for them.128 
B. NCAA, Conferences, and Universities 
NCAA bylaws129 prohibit the use of student-athletes to promote 
the commercial activities of a for-profit enterprise,130 sales of 
merchandise that have the name or likeness of individual student-
athletes on them,131 and sales of printed promotional material (e.g., 
calendars or posters) that have the name or likeness of an individual 
student-athlete on them when they also include logos or other 
corporate marks that may be identified with a sponsor.132 Although an 
institution may sell commercial items with the names or likenesses of 
teams or other student-athlete cohorts, it may do so only on campus or 
at its own off-campus outlets when profits go directly to the 
institution itself.133 
NCAA bylaws oblige institutions and conferences to include 
language binding contract partners to adhere to NCAA bylaws, 
policies, and interpretations involving the use of student-athlete 
names or likenesses when the subject matter of the contract suggests 
such use might be possible.134 A commercial entity that acts on its 
own to market the name or likeness of a student-athlete will receive a 
letter from that student-athlete’s university requesting that it cease 
 
128 Id. § 12.3.1. Student-athletes also may not sell equipment in their sport if their name 
or likeness is used or if their athletic reputations are used to push sales. Id. § 12.4.2.3. 
129 NCAA bylaws explicitly limit institutional uses of student-athletes in promotions. 
They also limit the NCAA and conferences, although there is no explicit bylaw language 
saying so. First, the only explicit authorization afforded the NCAA and conferences to use 
student-athletes in promotions is set forth in NCAA Bylaws 12.5.1.1.1 and 12.5.8. If 
explicit authorization were not necessary, then those bylaws would be surplusage. Second, 
the amateurism principle applies to treatment of student-athletes; for amateurism purposes, 
that treatment does not change because the activity is sponsored by the NCAA or 
conference rather than an institution. 
130 Id. § 12.5.1.1(g). 
131 Id. § 12.5.1.1(h). However, informational items such as media guides and 
institutional publications may be sold. 
132 Id. § 12.5.1.1(c). 
133 Id. §§ 12.5.1.1(e), (h). 
134 Id. §§ 3.2.4.18.1, 3.3.4.7.1; see also THE NCAA’S ADVERTISING AND 
PROMOTIONAL STANDARDS CURRENT 2012–13, available at http://i.turner.ncaa.com/dr 
/ncaa/ncaa/release/sites/default/files/files/Advertising_Promotional_Standards.pdf. 
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and desist,135 as doing so violates NCAA bylaws136 and threatens the 
student-athlete’s eligibility.137 
The prohibition against NCAA, conference, and university use of a 
student-athlete’s name and likeness in promotional activities 
describes a narrow area in which these activities are permissible.138 
Administering team championships is the central role played by any 
sports governing body, amateur or professional. NCAA bylaws 
authorize NCAA and conference use of a student-athlete’s name and 
 
135 Typically entities comply. If an entity is a booster of an athletic department, the 
department can disassociate the entity for noncompliance. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, 
§ 19.5.2.4. If an entity is not a booster and refuses to comply, then the only option is a 
lawsuit brought on behalf of the student-athlete. Clay Travis, Johnny Manziel Opens 
Massive Loophole in Paying Players Rule, FOX C. FOOTBALL BLOG (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://msn.foxsports.com/college-football/outkick-the-coverage/johnny-manziel-opens       
-massive-loophole-in-paying-players-rule.php. 
136 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.2.2. 
137 A typical cease and desist letter reads as follows: 
 This correspondence is in regard to the [insert commercial use] including the 
likeness of [insert university name] student-athlete [insert student-athlete name] 
that you are selling on your website. Please find a photograph of the item in 
question attached. NCAA bylaw 12.5.2.2 below prohibits a commercial agency 
from selling commercial items that include a student-athlete’s name, image, or 
likeness. Therefore, your selling [insert item] including [insert student-athlete’s 
name]’s likeness is impermissible. 
12.5.2.2 Use of a Student-Athlete’s Name or Picture without Knowledge or 
Permission: If a student-athlete’s name or picture appears on commercial items 
(e.g., T-shirts, sweatshirts, serving trays, playing cards, posters) or is used to 
promote a commercial product sold by an individual or agency without the 
student-athlete’s knowledge or permission, the student-athlete (or the institution 
acting on behalf of the student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an 
activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for intercollegiate athletics. 
 The University requests that you permanently cease selling the [insert item]. In 
addition, we ask that you refrain from using the names, images, or likenesses of 
any of our student-athletes on future commercial items and in any future 
promotions or advertisements. Failure to comply with these requests places the 
eligibility of the student-athletes in jeopardy. Please respond in writing that you 
have received this email and that you have stopped selling the [insert item] and 
any other commercial items containing the names, images, or likenesses of any of 
our current student-athletes. 
Sincerely, 
Compliance Department 
138 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 3.2.4.18.1 (explaining how institutions may use 
student-athletes’ name and likeness); id. § 3.3.4.7.1 (explaining how institutions and 
conferences are required to include in all commercial agreements involving student-athlete 
names and likenesses, NCAA language binding a commercial entity to NCAA bylaws, 
interpretations, and policies on the permissible scope of licensing and marketing 
agreements language). One general restriction is that student-athlete personal appearances 
may not involve missed class time. Id. § 12.5.1.1(d). 
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likeness to promote, respectively, NCAA139 and conference 
championships.140 
In addition, institutions more generally may use student-athlete 
names and likenesses to support educational activities and activities 
“incidental to the student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate 
athletics,”141 while the NCAA may use student-athlete names and 
likenesses to promote NCAA “events, activities or programs.”142 
These activities and events may generate revenues through corporate 
sponsorships, but the only permitted evidence of sponsorship is the 
inclusion of a trademark or logo, together with address information on 
printed promotional materials.143 
There is no restriction on sales of merchandise that include neither 
a student-athlete’s name nor likeness but nonetheless might be closely 
identified with a particular student-athlete. The most obvious example 
is a team jersey with a number on it. When a player is particularly 
talented, particularly successful athletically, or has a particularly 
compelling back-story that captures the affection of fans, the jersey 
number may be identified with him long after he stops playing 
competitively.144 Universities select the particular numbers to be used 
on jerseys that are sold. These presumably relate to which player 
 
139 Id. §§ 12.5.1.1.1, 12.5.1.8. The NCAA also may engage a third party to act on its 
behalf to handle promotions. Third parties include athletic conferences, institutions hosting 
the activity, and local organizing committees. Id. NCAA bylaws also permit an Olympic 
or national team’s governing body to use a student-athlete’s name or likeness on team 
trading cards so long as the student-athlete is a member of the team and all revenues from 
the sale are deposited directly with that Olympic or national team. Id. § 12.5.1.1.4.1. 
140 Id. § 12.5.1.8. Conference merchandise sales using an individual student-athlete’s 
name or likeness are limited to posters produced by the conference or a member 
institution. Id. 
141 Id. § 12.5.1.1. Noninstitutional charitable and other nonprofit agencies, with athletic 
department permission, also may use student-athletes and their names and likenesses in 
promotions to support their charitable or non-profit activities. The same restrictions apply 
to them as apply to institutions—sales of merchandise only at official outlets; evidence of 
commercial entity involvement limited to logos, trademarks, and address information; all 
revenues directly to the nonprofit; no commercial activities of a nonprofit may be 
promoted; no depictions of individual student-athletes, their names and likenesses, except 
for items such as media guides. Conferences are similarly restricted. 
142 Id. § 12.5.1.1.1. 
143 Id. § 12.5.1.1(b). 
144 An example is the New York Yankees’ Mickey Mantle and the number seven. In 
some cases—again, Mickey Mantle is an example—the uniform number may even be 
permanently retired. 
POTUTO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:54 AM 
908 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 879 
numbers are expected to generate the most sales.145 Related to the 
general question of valuing student-athlete names and likenesses, the 
unanswered question here is whether putting numbers on jerseys 
increases overall jersey sales, or only the distribution of sales. 
IV 
KELLER/O’BANNON LITIGATION 
Sam Keller played college football at Arizona State University and 
then the University of Nebraska.146 He sued the NCAA, claiming 
infringement of a right of publicity on his behalf and on behalf of 
other former football and men’s basketball student-athletes147 arising 
out of an exclusive license granted by the NCAA to Electronic Arts, 
Inc. (EA Sports) to market football and men’s basketball video games 
using the NCAA’s name and logo.148 These EA Sports video games 
used avatars that were easily recognizable as actual players on the 
university teams for which they competed and were named as those 
players through use of a readily accessible computer application that 
complemented the game.149 
Ed O’Bannon played basketball at UCLA.150 He sued the NCAA 
on behalf of himself and other former football and men’s basketball 
student-athletes, claiming that the NCAA offends the antitrust laws 
 
145 Bob Hertzel, Numbers Play Vital Role When Buying Jerseys, TIMESWV.COM (July 
12, 2013), http://www.timeswv.com/wvu_sports/x1952120496/HERTZEL-COLUMN       
-Numbers-play-vital-role-when-buying-jerseys. It is said that at West Virginia University, 
for example, the back of the jersey may not say “‘Austin’ [Tavon Austin, star wide 
receiver and eighth pick in 2013 NFL draft] or ‘Smith,’[Geno Smith, star quarterback and 
second round pick in the 2013 NFL draft] but in the mind of the fan it is his tribute to that 
player,” and that “[a] No. 5 jersey is going to be a Patrick White [star quarterback and 
second round pick in the 2009 NFL draft] jersey, almost no matter to whom it is assigned 
that season.” Id. 
146 See Sam Keller Bio, HUSKERS.COM, http://www.huskers.com/ViewArticle.dbml 
?ATCLID=866801 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
147 The other named plaintiffs were Bryan Cummings, Lamar Watkins, and Byron 
Bishop. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No.4:09cv01967, 2013 WL 3772677 (N.D. 
Cal. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint]. 
Keller also sought class certification. 
148 Student-Athlete Likeness Lawsuit Timeline, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/student-athlete-likeness  
-lawsuit-timeline. 
149 Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 147, at 3, 152–
73. 
150 See History and Records, UCLA BASKETBALL, http://members.tripod.com/ucla 
_hoops/Bruin%20History.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
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when it prevents players from exploiting their right of publicity 
through group licensing arrangements with videogame developers and 
broadcasters.151 
In the resultant, consolidated Keller/O’Bannon lawsuit, current and 
former football and men’s basketball student-athletes challenge the 
uncompensated use of their names and likenesses under both a right 
of publicity and the antitrust laws, focused particularly on the EA 
Sports videogames (right of publicity plaintiffs) and videogames and 
game broadcasts (antitrust plaintiffs).152 A subclass of the antitrust 
plaintiffs was certified as a class action for injunctive relief while 
certification of the damages subclass was denied.153 
A. Legal Claims, in General and in Brief 
Our discussion of the lawsuit brought by Keller and O’Bannon is 
not intended to be a close and detailed analysis of the merits. Instead, 
we provide a brief rendition of the contours of the legal claims and 
available defenses as context for our discussion of the collegiate 
model of athletics. 
The Keller/O’Bannon antitrust claim is that through its member 
universities, the NCAA combined in restraint of trade to restrict the 
opportunity for players to enter into group licensing arrangements to 
profit from their rights of publicity.154 This claim is derivative of the 
right of publicity claim. If there is no violation of a right of publicity, 
 
151 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class Certification at 2, In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967CW (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Class Certification Order]. 
152 Keller and O’Bannon were not the only former student-athletes to sue. A right of 
publicity lawsuit was brought in New Jersey (Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 14 (3d Cir. 
2013)) and in West Virginia (Complaint, Alston v. Electronic Arts, 2013 WL 4799103). 
See also Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury Demand, supra note 58. 
Should the plaintiffs prevail, other merchandising and commercial activities likely subject 
to these same claims would include archived game broadcasts on the NCAA on-demand 
website, game re-telecasts on ESPN Classic, and sales of team and individual photographs 
and game video clips. 
153 Class Certification Order, supra note 151. The injunctive subclass (and what would 
have been the damages subclass) is comprised of current and former Division I football 
and men’s basketball student-athletes. 
154 The statutory genesis of federal antitrust claims is the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). Plaintiffs claim a violation of § 1, which makes it a violation for 
entities with requisite market share to contract, combine or conspire to restrain trade or 
commerce. See Washington v. NFL Ventures, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (D. Minn. 2012) 
(holding that former NFL players failed to state antitrust claim in allegation that the NFL 
monopolized the market in game footage). 
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then the antitrust claim falls of its own weight. If the right of publicity 
claim is viable, the antitrust plaintiffs then will need to prove that 
there is an injury to competition in a relevant market in which the 
NCAA has a sufficient market share to trigger antitrust injury.155 
The right of publicity derives from the right of privacy.156 Its scope 
is determined by state law.157 In general terms, the right of publicity 
embodies an individual’s right to control the use of his name or 
likeness from commercial exploitation. 
The right of publicity is subject to First Amendment defenses. The 
First Amendment calculus, very generally, balances the similarity and 
degree of use of an individual’s name and likeness with the ideas, 
expressive content, or artistic creativity contributed by the individual 
or entity that used the name or likeness. Although the commercial use 
of an individual’s name or likeness is a relevant consideration in 
determining whether a right of publicity has been breached, First 
Amendment protection is not defeated simply because the individual 
who uses another’s name and likeness made money from it. 
An individual cannot claim a right of publicity if her name or 
picture is used in a news story even though newspapers are profit-
making, or at least aspire to be.158 Equally, Joe DiMaggio could not 
have prevailed had he claimed a share of royalties from Simon and 
Garfunkel’s lyrics in their song,159 “Mrs. Robinson,”160 that say 
“Where have you gone, Joe DiMaggio, our nation turns its lonely 
eyes to you.” The First Amendment also may insulate an author from 
a right of publicity claim arising out of a fictionalized account of a 
 
155 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa City Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Chicago Bd. 
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The plaintiffs claim injury in two markets: 
the student-athlete, Division I college education market and the market for student-athlete 
group licensing rights. Class Certification Order, supra note 151, at 2. 
156 See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.5[d] (2d ed. 2000); 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
157 See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See generally J. Gordon Hylton, Baseball 
Cards and the Birth of the Right of Publicity: The Curious Case of Haelan Laboratories v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 273 (2001). 
158 See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 
1120 (1983); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
159 Joe DiMaggio is a Hall of Fame centerfielder who played for the New York 
Yankees in the 1940s through the mid-1950s. 
160 THE GRADUATE (Embassy Pictures Co. 1967). DiMaggio also could not have 
prevailed against the producers of the movie, The Graduate, for their use of the song in the 
film. 
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real person or an unauthorized biography.161 On the other hand, Joe 
DiMaggio would prevail against a manufacturer who sold T-shirts 
silk-screened with DiMaggio’s face.162 
B. EA Sports Videogames 
EA Sports has ceased production of NCAA Football.163 More 
recently, it announced a settlement with Sam Keller and his plaintiff 
class.164 The settlement was no surprise, given that EA Sports’ claim 
that its videogames were entitled to First Amendment protection was 
rejected by two federal circuit courts.165 Although videogames are not 
per se outside of First Amendment protection, the EA Sports games 
did not constitute creative transformation sufficient to trigger First 
Amendment protection in that the player avatars looked just like 
actual players and engaged digitally on the same teams, and in the 
very activity in which the actual players engaged. 
There are unsettled issues arising out of the EA Sports 
settlement.166 Prime among them is how the NCAA will respond if 
the settlement approved by the federal judge, Claudia Wilken, 
provides that money is to be distributed to current student-athletes. 
On the one hand, this money looks much like payment for use of their 
 
161 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1968), aff’d, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). 
162 This assumes that Joe DiMaggio, and not his estate, brought suit. In many 
jurisdictions a right of publicity does not survive the death of the individual whose right it 
is. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). See Groucho Marx 
Prod., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
163 Jerry Hinnen, NCAA Declines to Renew Contract with EA Sports, CBSSPORTS.COM 
(July 17, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college           
-football/22796985/ncaa-declines-to-renew-contract-with-ea-sports. Presumably, the 
settlement also includes NCAA Basketball, as the issues are the same for both games. 
164 Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury Demand, supra note 58. 
165 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 
(9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). On January 13, 2014, 
the Supreme Court denied the NCAA’s motion for leave to intervene to file a petition for 
writ of certiorari. NCAA v. Keller, 134 S.Ct. 980 (Mem.) (2014). The NCAA sought 
Supreme Court review of the lower court decisions that the first amendment did not 
insulate the EA Sports video game from student-athlete right of publicity claims. 
166 Universities and conferences also licensed to EA Sports the right to use their marks 
and names in the EA Sports videogames. Both the NCAA and most of the universities and 
conferences interacted with EA Sports through their licensing agent, Collegiate Licensing 
Company (CLC). One issue relates to the legal position of the universities and CLC over 
contract revenues that they expected to receive through sale of the videogame. Another 
issue is whether EA Sports will seek to have CLC contribute to the damages it pays. And, 
in turn, whether CLC will seek contribution from its clients, the universities. 
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names and likenesses, a payment prohibited under NCAA bylaws. On 
the other hand, the payment is in settlement of a legal claim the 
players have.167 
We expect that the NCAA will resolve this matter, should it arise, 
in the way it handled a lawsuit brought by Johnny Manziel, the Texas 
A&M 2012 Heisman-winning quarterback. Manziel sued an 
individual for selling “Johnny Football” T-shirts while he was still 
competing at A&M.168 The NCAA said that Manziel could protect his 
legal rights by suing and that he also was entitled to any damage 
award, so long as the lawsuit was a bona fide, arms-length dispute and 
not a sweetheart deal between Manziel and the defendant calculated 
to circumvent NCAA amateurism rules. 
The NCAA is still a defendant in the Keller lawsuit. To prevail 
against the NCAA regarding the EA Sports videogame, Keller will 
need to show that, in licensing its name and logo for use in the game, 
the NCAA was complicit with EA Sports, such that EA Sports’ 
violation of his right of publicity makes the NCAA liable too. 
Should the NCAA be found to be liable, however, the 
intercollegiate athletic world would not implode. The NCAA already 
has announced that it will no longer license its name and logo for use 
in the game.169 And, EA Sports already has ceased production.170 
More fundamentally, the NCAA also could refrain from all the 
ancillary marketing activities that the Keller/O’Bannon plaintiffs 
describe in their complaint—game highlight films; archived 
broadcasts; DVDs of famous games; photographs of players taken 
during the games—and the intercollegiate athletic world still would 
not implode. Per contra, the result would be that NCAA operations 
would be more fully consonant with the collegiate model. 
C. Broadcast Rights 
The claim that current student-athletes should be paid a percentage 
of revenues from television broadcasts of games in which they 
 
167 In any event, any amount paid to student-athletes would be income to the student-
athletes under 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012). Such payments would not be damages for 
“personal physical injury” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2012). 
168 Travis, supra note 135. 
169 Darren Rovell, EA Sports Settles With Ex-Players, ESPN.COM (Sept. 26, 2013, 9:23 
PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9728042/ea-sports-stop-producing       
-college-football-game. 
170 Id. 
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participate is a new entry in the name and likeness debate.171 We 
know of no state court that has found a right of publicity in a player to 
receive name and likeness revenues from an appearance in a televised 
game. 
To date, right of publicity cases have involved professional athletes 
and entertainers. With regard to these professionals, the courts have 
found that, through their contracts of employment, they consent to 
dissemination of their performances (games).172 Student-athletes may 
be said to provide consent through their annual signed authorizations 
on the “student-athlete statement”173 for the NCAA, or a third party 
acting on its behalf,174 to use their names or likenesses to promote 
NCAA championships, events, activities, and programs; and for their 
universities and conferences to make use of their names and 
likenesses.175 The question is whether student-athletes execute the 
authorizations knowingly and voluntarily.176 
Whatever the resolution of the validity of student-athlete consent, 
however, the critical obstacle to their right of publicity claim is the 
 
171 Because the claim to entitlement to broadcast revenues was not part of the original 
complaint that O’Bannon filed, the trial judge granted the NCAA the opportunity to re-
depose three of the plaintiffs. See Jon Solomon, NCAA Allowed to Depose 3 Ed O’Bannon 
Plaintiffs Again, Including Tyrone Prothro, AL.COM (Feb. 11, 2014, 8:32 AM), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/02/ncaa_allowed_to_depose_3_ed_ob.html. 
172 E.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 670–73 
(7th Cir. 1986); Toney v. L’Oreal, 384 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2004). 
173 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 3.2.4.6 (Student-Athlete Statement); id. § 
14.1.3.1 (Student-Athlete Statement; Content and Purpose); id. § 30.12 (Student-Athlete 
Statement); NCAA Form 12-3a, Student-Athlete Statement–NCAA Division I. There are 
seven parts to the Statement. In addition to authorizing use of their names and likenesses, 
student-athletes also sign a Buckley Amendment consent form; affirm their eligibility as 
amateurs; affirm that they have not tested positive on any drug test administered by 
national or international sports entities; affirm neither involvement in NCAA rules 
violation(s) nor knowledge of violations at the student-athlete’s university no matter who 
committed them; and, for student-athletes matriculating to an NCAA institution for the 
first time, affirm that information provided to the NCAA Eligibility Center and a 
university’s admissions office was valid and accurate, including ACT or SAT scores, high 
school attendance, completion of coursework and high school grades. Before signing the 
form, student-athletes are directed to review a summary of NCAA regulations or pertinent 
NCAA bylaws (the form references NCAA Bylaw Chapters 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 
Bylaws 18.4 and 31.2.3). 
174 These include a university that hosts an NCAA championship, a Conference, and a 
site committee that organizes and administers a championship on site. 
175 Samples of an institutional and conference consent form are on file in the office of 
J.R. Potuto, UNL Law College. 
176 Another question, likely relevant to the EA Sports videogame, is whether the 
language in the authorizations is sufficiently comprehensive to cover videogames. 
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application of federal copyright law.177 Copyright protection attaches 
to a creative work fixed in tangible form.178 A game, as it is played, 
does not meet that criterion. But the game also simultaneously is 
broadcast, and broadcasts may be copyrighted.179 Copyright rights 
preempt a state right of publicity, assuming a state would find one in 
the circumstances. Because the game played is simultaneous with the 
game broadcast, the courts have held that the two cannot feasibly be 
separated and, therefore, that federal copyright preempts a right of 
publicity for both.180 In addition, the courts also have held that if a 
particular use of name and likeness—say in broadcasting a game—
does not violate an individual’s right of publicity, then there also is no 
violation of the right of publicity in using the individual’s name or 
likeness to promote the game.181 
Consider now the claim that the NCAA, through its member 
universities, offends the antitrust laws by combining in restraint of 
trade to restrict the opportunity for players to enter into group 
licensing arrangements to profit from their right of publicity. As 
noted, a necessary precondition for success on this claim is that the 
plaintiffs have a legally cognizable right of publicity in game 
broadcasts. Assuming that they do, the plaintiffs still will need to 
prove antitrust injury, in other words, economic injury to competition, 
not competitors. Whether the plaintiffs can show injury to 
competition arising out of restrictions on a market for group licensing 
deals remains to be seen. 
If the plaintiffs were to prevail against the NCAA on a straight 
right of publicity ground, then football revenues managed at the 
conference and institutional level would be next up for division. 
Antitrust violations depend on market share. If the plaintiffs were to 
prevail on antitrust grounds, therefore, the judgment of its own force 
is much less likely to trigger changes in conference operations or 
 
177 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq. (2012). 
178 Id. To be copyrightable, a work fixed in tangible form must be original and show 
creativity. See generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (1985) [hereinafter 
NIMMER]. 
179 E.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976). See generally NIMMER, supra note 178, § 2.01. 
180 E.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 
(7th Cir. 1986); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), 
aff’d, 352 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1976). 
181 E.g., Cher v. Forum Int’l Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 
1120 (1983). 
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revenue distribution and would have none on institutions. Whether 
public pressure would push voluntary change is a different story. 
1. Financial Consequences 
The NCAA Division I men’s basketball tournament will generate 
nearly $11 billion over its fourteen-year run.182 Upwards of ninety 
percent of all NCAA revenues come from the sale of broadcast and 
affiliated rights for the Tournament.183 Out of these revenues, the 
NCAA not only funds programs that directly advantage student-
athletes, but it handles membership services; enforcement/infractions 
and student-athlete reinstatement cases; provides staff support and 
also covers expenses for all meetings of boards, councils, cabinets, 
and committees;184 funds national office staff salaries and expenses; 
and operates the Eligibility Center, which certifies eligibility for 
domestic and international prospects on academic and amateurism 
grounds.185 
As previously noted, the FBS football championship television deal 
is worth $470 million annually to the FBS conferences, and payouts 
to their member institutions from the five major conferences—Big 
Ten, SEC, Pac 12, Big 12, and ACC—in some cases already exceed 
$26 million. The conference money comes primarily from television 
deals.186 
 
182 Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Reaches 14-Year Deal With CBS/Turner for Men’s 
Basketball Tournament, Which Expands to 68 Teams for Now, USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 
2010, 4:09 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/2010/04 
/ncaa-reaches-14-year-deal-with-cbsturner/1#.Uxg0Ujn_RUQ. The advent of television 
not only has had a marked effect on athletic department and NCAA revenues, but it, and 
airplane travel, have translated the fan interest in college sports from local teams and local 
competition to a national fan base. BYERS, supra note 2, at 93. 
183 Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 147, at 77. Big 
television deals not only are commercial in themselves but they also have commercial 
consequences. The NCAA agreed to more commercial breaks during telecasts of the men’s 
basketball tournament as part of the quid pro quo for the extra contract money. BYERS, 
supra note 2, at 269. 
184 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 31.7.2. 
185 Id. § 4.01.2.2. They are the source of the campus Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund, 
for example. As noted previously, revenues from the Tournament also are distributed back 
to the conferences and, through them, to the campuses, and form part of the budgets used 
by them to fund their operations. For a schematic that describes NCAA revenue 
distribution, see NCAA 2012–13 FINANCIAL UPDATE, DI LEADERSHIP COUNCIL 
SUPPLEMENT NO.6 (Apr. 2013). 
186 See generally NCAA 2012–13 FINANCIAL UPDATE, supra note 185; Potuto, supra 
note 34, at 311. 
POTUTO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:54 AM 
916 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 879 
2. More than Financial—the Collegiate Mark and the Slippery Slope 
Compensating student-athletes for the value of their names and 
likenesses is not pay for play. It also is different in kind from 
providing an athletic scholarship to cover the full cost of a college 
education. At least in theory, name and likeness compensation need 
not mean that the collegiate model will be irreparably harmed and that 
the wall of amateurism will come tumbling down. In practice, the 
“law” of unforeseen (unintended) circumstances is the elephant in the 
room. Every chink in the wall of amateurism leaves the structure less 
clear, less sound, and more difficult to defend as a coherent whole. 
Even if pay for play is not the end result, campus treatment of 
student-athletes may very well change, and in ways that undercut 
even more what should be the academic primacy of college athletics. 
Jim Delany, the Big Ten Conference Commissioner, suggested that 
pay for play, or a model that provides student-athletes with fifty 
percent of television revenues rather than outright salaries, might lead 
Big Ten universities to “downsize the scope, breadth and activity of 
their athletic programs,” perhaps even moving to NCAA Division III, 
where athletic scholarships are not provided.187 His concern was 
neither exclusively nor primarily focused on lost revenues. 
The very fact that student-athletes share revenues from commercial 
and promotional licensing ventures might impel member institutions 
to remove current NCAA bylaw constraints on how student-athlete 
names and likenesses may be used in commercial and promotional 
ventures. This increased use, in turn, may lead courts to decide that 
there is not enough left to the amateurism principle to continue it even 
for pay for play. 
Other consequences are predictable. The largest FBS programs 
have the biggest donors and are the ones most likely to negotiate 
major commercial and promotion contracts.188 These athletic 
departments already have major multimedia rights deals for 
sponsorship, signage, and advertising. Ohio State University, for 
example, has a ten-year, $110 million multimedia rights deal with 
IMG College while Alabama renegotiated a ten-year, $76 million deal 
 
187 Declaration of James E. Delany in Support of the NCAA’s Class Certification 
Opposition Brief at 3, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litig., 
No. 09-cv-1967-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013). 
188 See, e.g., Hemsley, supra note 85. 
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with IMG College and Learfield Jet that had minimum annual 
guaranteed revenues of $7.9 million.189 
Donors interested in helping these athletic programs might be 
willing to sign on for institutional promotions and commercials 
simply so revenues from these projects could flow through to student-
athletes, with the expectation that the opportunity for these revenues 
will entice student-athletes to attend their schools. Coaches at these 
schools no doubt will use the opportunity for name and likeness 
compensation as a recruiting inducement to prospective student-
athletes. Prospective student-athletes already make choices about 
which university to attend that are too much influenced by factors 
other than the student benefits of the greater campus and the academic 
opportunities that are available. The economic motive would be yet 
another distraction. 
Student-athletes are talented athletically, but professional athletes 
in general are more talented than all of them and much more talented 
than all but a few of them. The percentage of football and men’s 
basketball student-athletes who play professionally is under two 
percent.190 As described by former men’s basketball student-athlete 
Tom McMillen, “[A] youngster gambling his future on a pro contract 
is like a worker buying a single Irish Sweepstakes ticket and then 
quitting his job in anticipation of his winnings.”191 A college team 
 
189 Michael Smith, Alabama Looks To Rework Rights Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS 
BUS. DAILY (Aug. 5, 2013), http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/08/05 
/Colleges/Alabama.aspx. 
190 In 2012, 1.7% of college football players were drafted (255 of 67,887) and 1.2% of 
men’s basketball players (48 of 17,500). Tony Manfred, Here Are The Odds That Your Kid 
Becomes A Professional Athlete (Hint: They’re Small), BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/odds-college-athletes-become-professionals-2012-2?op 
=1. Baseball players average above ten percent drafted (806 of 31,264). Id. But these 
numbers reflect only the professional draft, and not players who make it to the major 
leagues. Four of the top ten 2010 draft picks (Gerrit Cole and Trevor Bauer, UCLA; 
Danny Hultzen, University of Virginia; and Anthony Renden, Rice) were college baseball 
players. See Albert Chen, Fast Trackers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 8, 2013, at 25, 
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1207956/index 
.htm. None made it to any higher professional league than Single A Minor League 
Baseball. Of the top ten 2012 draft picks, five (Mark Appel, Stanford; Kris Bryant, 
University of San Diego; Jonathan Gray, Oklahoma; Colin Moran, North Carolina; Hunter 
Dozier, Stephen F. Austin State) were college players. None made it to any higher 
professional league than Single A Minor League Baseball. 
191 ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 16. 
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may overpower its opponents at the college level, but no college team 
is likely to beat a professional one.192 
The collegiate model assures that there is a marketable commodity 
called intercollegiate athletics that is different from the market for 
professional sports. It helps attract an audience to college athletics. 
Absent amateurism, the world of intercollegiate athletics might morph 
into something much like minor league baseball or arena football. In 
turn, there is a risk that intercollegiate athletics will lose its viability 
and attraction to fans. Were that to happen, collegiate athletic 
revenues would then begin to dry up—even in football and men’s 
basketball—to the ultimate detriment of college athletics and all 
student-athletes. 
V 
VALUING AN FBS FOOTBALL STUDENT-ATHLETE AND A DIVISION I 
MEN’S BASKETBALL STUDENT-ATHLETE 
The issue addressed in the Keller/O’Bannon litigation, and the 
catalyst for this Article, is whether student-athletes are entitled to 
compensation when their universities derive revenues from use of 
their names and likenesses. Student-athlete entitlement to name and 
likeness compensation, however, presupposes an ability to determine 
student-athlete name and likeness value. Unfortunately, such an 
econometric model of the name and likeness value of student-athletes 
is not feasible. 
A. Preliminary Comments 
Texas A&M estimated that Johnny Manziel was worth only an 
additional twenty thousand dollars to the school in 2012, the year he 
won the Heisman Trophy.193 How did it get there? By separating out 
 
192 Steve Spurrier, head football coach at the University of South Carolina, opined that 
the 2012 University of Alabama football team could beat an NFL team. Marc Sessler, 
Steve Spurrier: Alabama Could Beat “Couple” NFL Teams, NFL.COM (Oct. 31, 2012, 
3:01 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000088242/article/steve-spurrier           
-alabama-could-beat-couple-nfl-teams. The comment was widely derided. See, e.g., Doug 
Farrarr, Steve Spurrier Thinks That Alabama Could Compete With NFL Teams, And 
Here’s Why He’s Wrong, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 31, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://sports 
.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-shutdown-corner/steve-spurrier-thinks-alabama-could-compete-nfl   
-teams-222231388—nfl.html;_ylt=A0LEVw4C_hVTnBcAc8NXNyoA;_ylu=X3oDMTE 
zdmFpcnQzBHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDMgRjb2xvA2JmMQR2dGlkA1NNRTQwMl8x. 
193 Curtis Eichelberger, Manziel’s Heisman Brought Texas A&M about $20,000, School 
Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 1, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2013-11-01/manziel-s-heisman-brought-texas-a-m-about-20-000-school-says.html. 
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all its fixed revenues—sold out stadiums and related seat licensing 
fees, sales of luxury suites, long-term TV and radio contracts, 
corporate sponsorship deals—on which Manziel’s football 
participation had no direct impact.194 On the other hand, if no one 
played football at A&M, A&M obviously would have no football 
revenues. Hence, in a nutshell, the dilemma is identifying the value 
that individual student-athletes contribute to a team’s total revenues, 
much less identifying the value attributable exclusively to their name 
and likeness value.195 
Two points must be emphasized about the econometric model of 
student-athlete value set forth in this Part. First, and as with all 
student-athlete value models, our econometric model does not attempt 
to estimate student-athlete name and likeness value. Instead, we 
consider overall revenues generated by FBS football and Division I 
men’s basketball programs and then attempt to place a monetary 
value on the contributions to overall revenues of FBS football and 
Division I men’s basketball student-athletes. That being the case, 
inevitably our model embodies student-athlete monetary values that 
are larger than their name and likeness values, were those values 
capable of specific measurement. Second, our econometric model of 
student-athlete value is just that. It neither accounts for any offsetting 
benefits provided to a student-athlete by his university196 nor 
considers a university’s contribution to the independent marketing 
value of a student-athlete while enrolled at the university and 
thereafter.197 
 
194 Id. The twenty thousand dollars directly attributable from Manziel came from 
royalties from the sale of football jerseys with his number on them and money paid by 
donors to sit at his table at a fundraising dinner. Id. 
195 In denying class action certification to the damages subgroup in the 
Keller/O’Bannon litigation, the judge discussed what, in antitrust terms, is known as the 
“substitution effect.” Class Certification Order, supra note 151, at *18–22; see ZF Meritor, 
LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). In other words, if a student-athlete 
or group of student-athletes elects not to play football or men’s basketball, others will take 
their place. Similarly, if some might have stayed in college had there been revenues to 
them from a group licensing deal, they would have displaced others who would have 
played had they left. In addition, some universities might move from Division I to 
Division III because they could not afford to pay royalties or compete for prospective 
student-athletes. 
196 What the offsetting benefits may be are discussed elsewhere in this Article. See 
supra notes 94–115 and accompanying text. 
197 Separating out the university component of a student-athlete’s value will be no 
easier than identifying a student-athlete’s value to a university. Depending on when such 
valuation is calculated, moreover, it also will be complicated by calculating future value. 
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1. Athletic Department Revenue Accounting 
There also are inherent difficulties in the data used in our 
econometric model. One difficulty lies in comparing revenue sources 
among universities. A second difficulty is in considering revenues 
without consideration of matching expenses. 
a. Revenues 
The first difficulty in our data lies in comparing revenue sources 
among universities due to the different methods used by universities 
to account for revenues. The main revenue sources for universities—
at least those in the five major FBS Conferences: the Big Ten, Pac 12, 
ACC, SEC, and Big 12—are (1) gate revenues, with football claiming 
the lion’s share; (2) annual donations,198 including suites and club 
seating and booster club dues; (3) conference distributions (including 
distributions to a conference from the NCAA); (4) individual 
university multi-media rights, such as radio broadcasts; (5) 
concession and retail sales; (6) licensing; and (7) sponsorships. The 
five major FBS conferences pool and share equally with their 
members both revenues from bowl games and revenues from 
conference media contracts.199 Universities in these conferences 
generally retain revenues from marketing, donations (including suites 
and courtside seats), corporate sponsorships, licensing, retail sales, 
and, except for the Big Ten conference, gate revenues.200 
 
See Michael R. Morris, Michael Jackson Estate’s Valuation ($2,105) vs. IRS’ MJ 
Valuation ($434 Mil.): Guest Post, BILLBOARD BIZ (Nov. 11, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www 
.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/5785834/michael-jackson-estates  
-valuation-2105-vs-irs-mj. 
198 Donations can be twice the amount derived from television revenues. Kristi Dosh, 
Why Women’s College Basketball Operates at a Deficit, BUS. C. SPORTS (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://businessofcollegesports.com/2013/10/15/why-womens-college-basketball-operates   
-at-a-deficit/. 
199 See, e.g., Patrick Rishe, SEC, Big 12 Report Record-Setting Revenues for 2012–13, 
FORBES (June 3, 2013, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/06/03/sec-big  
-12-report-record-setting-revenues-for-2012-13/; Jon Wilner, Pac-12 Revenue Soars: 
School-By-School Breakdown, Scott’s Compensation and More, C. HOTLINE (May 20, 
2013, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.mercurynews.com/collegesports/2013/05/20/pac-12-revenue  
-soars-school-by-school-breakdown-scotts-compensation-and-more/; David Teel, Teel 
Time: Swofford Discusses ACC Divisions, Revenue Sharing, Bowls, DAILY PRESS (May 7, 
2013, 4:58 AM), http://www.dailypress.com/sports/teel-blog/dp-teel-time-swofford-acc     
-divisions-revenue,0,4602904.story?page=2. 
200 See Rishe, supra note 199; Wilner, supra note 199; Teel, supra note 199; Scott 
Dochterman, Indiana Moving 2010 Game to Washington Won’t Alter Big Ten Revenue 
Sharing, GAZETTE (Sept. 29, 2009, 11:21 AM), http://thegazette.com/2009/09/29/indiana  
-moving-2010-game-to-washington-wont-alter-big-ten-revenue-sharing/; Governance and 
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Although the major revenue sources are the same across FBS 
conferences, there are difficulties in identifying how each school 
accounts for the particular revenue streams it receives. For example, 
schools that require donations to purchase certain football tickets may 
account for the donations in football revenues or, alternatively, as part 
of general university funds. The data used in our model show 
donations made specifically to the football and men’s basketball 
programs, but it is unclear whether each school accounts for them in 
exactly the same way. These discrepancies could represent a minor 
undercount in some of the data. Unless they are systematically related 
to the level of revenues of the schools, however, they should not 
introduce significant bias into the results of our modeling. 
b. Matching Expenses 
A second difficulty in our data is that we have no information 
about university expenses to match our corresponding revenue data. 
For example, in the Big Ten Conference, member universities share 
gate revenues in football ($300,000 or 35% of game revenues up to 
$1 million).201 A Big Ten university’s revenue accounts may show its 
total ticket revenues and list as an expense the percentage of ticket 
revenue that is remitted to the conference office. At the same time, 
that university’s revenue accounts will show a conference distribution 
that includes its one-twelfth share of pooled ticket revenues. The 
result: the university’s revenue records will show a double count of 
ticket revenues of up to $7 million. These difficulties in our data are 
important in an accounting framework when looking at levels of 
revenues across schools but are less critical in our econometric 
analysis of student-athlete value. 
Some measurement error, as long as it does not all lead in one 
direction—either to a systematic over- or under-count—will not 
systematically bias our estimates of the marginal value of football and 
 
Commitment to Rules Compliance, PURDUESPORTS.COM, http://www.purduesports.com 
/school-bio/pur-compliance.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). Differences in distribution are 
attributable to differences in NCAA distributions that are based on number of sports 
sponsored, number of student-athletes, and, in some conferences, differences in 
distribution of men’s basketball tournament revenues. 
201 Dochterman, supra note 200; Governance and Commitment to Rules Compliance, 
Fiscal Integrity, Self Study Items, Part B, PURDUE ON CAMPUS, http://www.purdue 
sports.com/school-bio/pur-compliance.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Gate revenues 
also are shared for men’s basketball ($29,000 or thirty-five percent of game revenues up to 
$67,000). 
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men’s basketball student-athletes. Our econometric analysis estimates 
the impact of changes in team and market characteristics on changes 
in team revenues. True levels might be somewhat higher or lower 
than those reported. As long as changes in these levels respond to the 
important factors in our models, however, our estimates should be 
largely unbiased. 
2. Marginal Revenue Product 
As noted above, it is not possible to create an econometric model 
that exclusively measures the revenues attributable to the name and 
likeness value of student-athletes. Therefore, existing econometric 
models—including ours—consider overall revenue streams produced 
by a university’s football and men’s basketball program. In economic 
terms, the issue is how to estimate the marginal revenue product of a 
football or men’s basketball student-athlete.202 
Even more significant than the difficulties of accounting for 
revenue streams is the difficulty of appropriately assessing what 
proportion of a school’s revenues are attributable, respectively, to 
student-athletes,203 team performance, coaches, or, as discussed 
above, the school itself. In our methodology, we report the results of 
different assumptions concerning these proportions so that readers 
may see the effect of the split on the final results. 
3. Value 
We described above the caveats and qualifications in conducting a 
study to estimate the value contributed by football and men’s 
basketball student-athletes to overall revenues in their sport as well as 
the infeasibility of estimating in particular their name and likeness 
value. In the succeeding sections, we discuss the existing literature 
and also provide detailed information regarding the structure and 
conclusions of our study. For full information on the econometric 
estimations, see Tables 1 and 2 below.204 
As detailed below, our model bases student-athlete ability on his 
ranking at recruitment as either five-star, four-star, or three-star. We 
 
202 The marginal revenue product of a football student-athlete is defined as the extra 
football revenue a school receives because that player is part of the team. 
203 Not to mention the difficulty in attributing revenues to particular student-athletes. 
204 Appendix Tables 1 and 2 contain the complete econometric estimations from the 
fixed-effects, random-effects, and the instrumental variables (IV) models for both football 
and men’s college basketball revenues and winning percentage equations. 
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econometrically estimate his influence on team wins.205 We then 
estimate the influence of team wins and other factors on overall team 
revenue. Three sources of team revenue are estimated in our models: 
The first comes from the influence of the players on team wins. The 
second is the fixed revenue that comes from longer-term contracts and 
factors like season tickets. The third is the extra revenue that accrues 
each year as the market for college sports grows over the sample 
period. We then attribute the revenue to each team based upon its 
distribution of five-star, four-star, and three-star players, along with a 
fixed proportion of each of the fixed components of total revenue. 
With the assumption that a football team contributes fifty percent of 
the total revenues attributable to all aspects of a football program, our 
study shows that at the fiftieth percentile of the player estimates, a 
football player on a team has a marginal revenue product of 
approximately $101,000 per year.206 At the fiftieth percentile of the 
men’s basketball distribution, a men’s basketball player has a higher 
marginal revenue product of roughly $127,000.207 
B. The Literature on the Value of a Division I Student-Athlete 
The existing literature estimating student-athlete marginal revenue 
product is thin. Below, we review three studies208: two by Robert 
Brown that investigate the value of NFL draftees to their 
universities;209 and one by Erin Lane, Juan Nagel, and Janet Netz that 
estimates the value of men’s basketball student-athletes with three 
 
205 See infra Table 3 and accompanying explanation. 
206 See infra Table 3. 
207 For other assumptions and what they show, see infra Table 3. 
208 An additional study, produced by Robert Noll and used in the Keller/O’Bannon 
litigation is not reviewed here because it is narrower in scope and uses an entirely different 
methodology tailored to a different purpose. See Expert Report on Class Certification of 
Robert G. Noll, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 09-
cv-1967-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013). It is primarily a study attempting to establish 
noncompetitive behavior. At the end, Noll provides an example of how one might 
determine damages. Noll uses a top-down approach to count total revenues most directly 
related to names/likenesses (telecasts, sales of highlight clips, and videogames). Then, 
after determining that a fifty-fifty split is appropriate between the athlete and the school, 
Noll allocates the athlete portion to current players on an equal basis and also to former 
players based upon their presence in rebroadcasts and video games. 
209 Robert W. Brown, An Estimate of the Rent Generated by a Premium College 
Football Player, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 671 (1993) [hereinafter Brown I Study]; Robert 
Brown, Research Note: Estimates of College Football Player Rents, 12 J. SPORTS ECON. 
200 (2011) [hereinafter Brown II Study]. Brown is an economist, most recently from 
California State University, San Marcos, California. Id. at 200. 
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different approaches (the LNN Study).210 The main shortcoming of 
existing literature is that it fails to separate monies that flow to 
schools because of their reputation, athletic history, or “love” from 
general alumni and fans from the value of a particular student-athlete. 
As in our analysis, the existing literature assesses student-athlete 
value by creating a proxy for the talent level of particular student-
athletes and estimating how much that talent adds to the number of 
wins in a season. In turn, the extra wins increase the visibility and 
marketability of a program and should increase some of the variable 
revenue streams associated with team success. 
The current literature estimating marginal revenue product of 
athletes utilizes some form of instrumental variables methodology to 
control for the endogeneity of winning and revenues.211 Of primary 
interest here is the impact of a student-athlete on the revenue streams 
that accrue to the universities. Once we are able to estimate a student-
athlete’s influence on wins, we can calculate the student-athlete’s 
influence on revenues through the extra wins generated by that 
particular student-athlete. The studies differ in the data employed in 
the models and in the exact type of models used. 
Robert Brown produced one of the earliest studies to estimate the 
value of an NCAA athlete.212 His data consisted of information for 
thirty-nine Division I FBS teams with 1988 revenue figures. His 
methodology assumed a direct relationship between the number of 
team players drafted into the NFL and team revenues. Brown’s 
sample of thirty-nine schools averaged eight draftees per team, each 
of whom was counted as a 1988 team player and was drafted in any of 
the subsequent three years. The primary shortcoming of the Brown 
Study is the limitation that a single year of data imposed on the 
estimation strategy. Without having multiple years per school, Brown 
was unable to separate the influence of players from the general, 
 
210 Erin Lane, Juan Nagel & Janet S. Netz, Alternative Approaches to Measuring MRP: 
Are All Men’s College Basketball Players Exploited?, J. SPORTS ECON. 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter LNN Study]. Lane, and Netz are three economists from applEcon in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan; Nagel is an economist from Universidad de los Andes, Santiago, Chile. 
Id. at 1. 
211 An instrumental variables technique is an econometric method that attempts to 
eliminate the endogeneity from a variable in a model. In our analysis, we postulate that 
extra wins generate extra revenue. But the reverse could also be true: more revenues can 
contribute to more wins. If the researcher doesn’t account for this endogeneity of wins in 
an equation of revenue generation, the estimate one gets from the data could be biased 
upward. 
212 Brown I Study, supra note 209. 
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unchanging support given to the schools themselves. His results were 
sensitive to different specifications and the inclusion of different 
variables, and the estimates of the marginal revenue product of an 
NFL-drafted athlete ranged from roughly $540,000 to $650,000. In a 
more recent research project, Brown expanded upon his earlier work 
using data from the 2004 to 2005 season and a larger sample of 
eighty-six FBS teams.213 Using a methodology similar to his previous 
study, the newer models generated estimates of the average marginal 
revenue product of a drafted player at roughly $1.1 million. 
The LNN Study focused on Division I men’s basketball players 
from 2001 to 2006.214 Because of data availability, their sample of 
schools varied from 170 to 180 schools per year. The LNN Study 
utilized three different methods for estimating the marginal revenue 
product of an NBA-drafted college basketball player. Of primary 
interest here is their implementation of the Scully215 method as 
compared to our methodology employed below. Loosely outlined, 
Scully’s methodology postulates that player quality leads to team 
success and team success leads to higher revenues.216 Therefore, one 
can back out player marginal revenue product from a marginal 
player’s influence on team success.217 The LNN Study also compared 
the Scully methodology to the general methodology employed in the 
two Brown Studies, which assumes that there is a direct relationship 
between the elite players and team revenues.218 The LNN Study was 
able to compare the results obtained from the different methods and 
data.219 
The LNN Study was the first to use data from multiple time 
periods. As a result, it was the first to estimate panel data models.220 
We believe panel data models are important because they allow the 
 
213 Brown II Study, supra note 209. 
214 LNN Study, supra note 210. 
215 Gerald W. Scully, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 915, 915–30 (1974). 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
218 See LNN Study, supra note 210. 
219 Id. 
220 Panel data models follow the unit of observation—in our case, the university 
itself—over multiple time periods. Those methods allow the estimation of individual 
effects—“fixed effects”—that are essentially a dummy variable or constant for each 
university. In MRP models, the fixed-effects estimate can be thought of as the part of team 
revenue that is unchanging across time. It is specific to each school. 
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separate estimation of revenues that accrue from annual variation in 
team success, along with revenues that accrue from fixed 
characteristics of the school or program itself. In all of the 
implementations, the LNN Study rejects ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression models221 in favor of fixed-effects models. However, in 
their final analysis, panel-data models are abandoned in favor of the 
OLS results. Because the OLS estimates of marginal revenue product 
are roughly three times the size of the fixed-effects estimates, this 
decision has important implications for their final marginal revenue 
product estimates. Highlighting just their results from high-revenue 
schools (schools with over $10 million in average revenue for their 
samples), the LNN Study estimates of the median marginal revenue 
product are roughly $950,000 for the Scully method and about $1.2 
million for the Brown method for college basketball players drafted 
by the NBA.222 
C. Analysis of Econometric Model 
1. Data and Methodology 
Our empirical approach is to exploit a panel of data on FBS 
football and Division I men’s basketball revenues so that we are able 
to separate out the fixed revenue product of a school’s popularity or 
athletic history in the particular sport from the more variable revenue 
product that comes from elite and “regular” players and the above-
trend wins that they add to a team’s success. Part of extra wins can be 
attributed to having more elite players on the rosters and part to the 
quality of the rest of the team. While both Brown Studies focused on 
drafted players, our study uses the distribution of the three-star, four-
star, and five-star recruits on each team. There are shortcomings to 
using either one as a measure of student-athlete quality as neither 
proxy is a complete measure of team quality. We feel, however, that 
in the bigger programs that are the focus of our analysis, the use of 
the broader range of recruited student-athletes—as opposed to the 
narrower range of drafted athletes—is a more complete accounting 
for the quality of the overall squad.223 We are also able to include in 
 
221 OLS models are basic line-fitting models that ignore the panel component, the 
characteristic of the data that allows the researcher to follow a single school’s revenues 
over time. 
222 LNN Study, supra note 210, at 16 tbl.6. 
223 The distribution of five-star recruits in a four-year timespan in football is somewhat 
concentrated in our sample. Only the University of Florida averaged more than single-digit 
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our analysis popular student-athletes who were not drafted by the 
NFL or NBA. 
Our data cover the 2005 through 2012 academic years and come 
from various sources. Revenue and Expense data are from the Equity 
in Athletics Data Analysis (EADA) tool.224 The NFL and NBA draft 
data were obtained from the Sports Reference website.225 
Demographic, income, education, and household expenditure data 
from the areas surrounding the universities are obtained from various 
years of the Estimates Professional Database maintained by 
Geolytics.226 Team performance data (wins, bowl bids, bowl wins, 
NCAA tournament appearances and wins, and school attendance 
figures) were obtained from the NCAA website and individual school 
websites.227 Team recruit lists were obtained from Rivals.com, a part 
of Yahoo Sports that is concerned with all things related to the 
identification, development, tracking, ranking, and cataloging of high 
school football and basketball recruits.228 Finally, some team revenue 
data that filled in gaps in the EADA data, along with football 
coaching records and rosters, were generously provided by Winthrop 
Intelligence.229 
 
numbers (eleven) over the sample period. The next ten schools averaged between eight 
and three five-star recruits, and it falls off from there. The rest of the distribution is split 
between four-star and three-star recruits, with the top fifteen schools being more heavily 
four-star, and the rest being more heavily three-star. In men’s basketball, the story is 
similar. The top seventeen schools averaged more than one five-star recruit in a three-year 
time-span, led by Kentucky, of course, with an average of six. Outside of those schools, 
another twenty averaged one five-star recruit and then the distribution of recruits is quite 
variable between four- and three-star recruits. For information regarding our various 
sources, see infra notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 
224 See The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/Index.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
225 See SPORTS REFERENCE, http://www.sports-reference.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2014). 
226 See GEOLYTICS, http://www.geolytics.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). Geolytics is 
a company that provides demographic data, census demographics, market research data, 
and geocoding for social researchers and business marketing. Company Information, 
GEOLYTICS, http://www.geolytics.com/Company.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
227 See, e.g., NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/d1 (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
228 See RIVALS.COM, http://www.rivals.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
229 See WINTHROP, http://winthropintelligence.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
Winthrop Intelligence provides information to college and university athletic directors 
relating to athletic program expenses and revenues. Id. 
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2. Descriptive Information 
There is a clear hierarchy in college football when it comes to team 
revenues. On average, the top ten teams have earned over $60 million 
annually over the past eight years.230 In addition, there are forty-five 
teams that averaged between $20 million and $60 million annually.231 
There is a similar pattern in Division I men’s basketball, where the 
top twelve teams have average revenues greater than $15 million per 
year and another seventy-one teams average between $4 million and 
$15 million annually.232 The range for men’s basketball is not as 
great as in football, but there are many more teams in the middle of 
the distribution.233 Below, Table 1 compares the distribution of the 
average team revenues in 2013 dollars over the sample period 
between the top FBS football and Division I men’s basketball 
programs. 
  
 
230 See infra Table 1 for a more complete list of teams and their average annual 
revenues. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 See id. 
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Table 1: Average Annual School Revenues by Sport in 2013 Dollars: 2005-
2012 
Football  Revenue  Basketball Revenue 
Texas 92,469,431  Louisville 33,214,631 
Georgia 74,378,414  North Carolina 21,911,545 
Alabama 72,120,880  Duke 21,014,411 
Florida 71,953,212  Arizona 20,013,682 
Auburn 71,110,206  Syracuse 19,450,540 
University of Notre Dame 70,006,280  Kentucky 17,929,095 
Michigan 69,777,028  Michigan St. 17,262,083 
Ohio State University 68,346,308  Indiana 17,015,428 
LSU 64,774,924  Ohio State University 17,001,593 
Penn St. 64,102,298  Wisconsin 16,873,197 
Oklahoma 52,974,678  Texas 16,791,560 
University of South Carolina 52,419,412  Arkansas 16,242,137 
Arkansas 52,348,254  Kansas 15,690,216 
Nebraska 49,649,826  Illinois 15,431,100 
University of Tennessee 48,157,692  Marquette 14,889,105 
Michigan St. 47,762,892  Minnesota 14,350,661 
Iowa 47,042,149  North Carolina St. 12,723,109 
Texas A&M 45,023,436  Oklahoma St. 12,530,519 
Wisconsin 44,160,858  University of Tennessee 12,422,395 
Washington 42,886,692  Maryland 12,149,180 
Clemson 36,113,786  Pittsburgh 11,686,151 
Virginia Tech 35,779,698  UCLA 11,077,281 
USC 34,331,780  Washington 10,695,792 
Oregon 33,714,636  Wake Forest 10,613,754 
Arizona St. 31,777,727  Georgetown 10,581,386 
Oklahoma St. 31,282,238  Xavier 10,562,413 
Kentucky 30,593,379  Florida 10,421,609 
   Dayton 10,284,793 
   Alabama 10,201,113 
   Iowa 10,098,500 
   Northwestern 10,084,022 
     
28 Schools: $20-30 million   52 Schools: $4-10 million  
20 Schools: $10-20 million   174 Schools: $1-4 million  
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3. Specification Issues and Models 
There are three main issues involved in estimating a model of team 
revenues over time. The first is how the possible endogeneity of 
important variables is handled. The second is the question of whether 
panel data techniques or simple OLS models are estimated. Finally, 
there is the question of whether time should be included as a factor in 
the models. How team revenues are modeled determines many of the 
differences in estimates of marginal revenue product found in the 
literature to date. 
The first issue involved in estimating a model of team revenues 
over time is in handling the possible endogeneity of important 
variables. The estimation of marginal revenue product for student-
athletes involves some form of a revenue equation where team 
revenues are a function of team quality along with various other 
controls measuring school characteristics (school size, stadium/arena 
capacity, conference) and market characteristics (population, income, 
etc. in the area of the school). In all cases, there is the possibility that 
wins and team quality are simultaneously determined. If so, the OLS 
estimates for the influence of quality players on team revenues will 
suffer from an upward bias, causing one to overestimate their effect 
on revenues. The solution to this problem is to use instrumental 
variables techniques in an attempt to get an unbiased estimate for the 
impact of team quality on revenues. 
Methods used in the two Brown Studies used the number of 
athletes who were drafted into the professional leagues as an 
explanatory variable for team wins. Scully and the LNN Study used 
team performance statistics. In our football and men’s basketball 
models, we measure the influence of player talent on team wins by 
individual player recruiting ratings from Rivals.com. Each team is 
made up of a certain number of five-star, four-star, and three-star 
recruits. These measures, along with other team-quality controls—
such as head coach and staff, two-year historical coaching success, 
staff size, and operations costs—act as instruments in a first-stage 
equation that predicts team quality as measured by winning 
percentage. The predicted value from the first-stage winning 
percentage equation is then used in the revenue equation to produce 
an unbiased estimate of the effect of wins on revenues. We employed 
the Hausman test234 for endogeneity and found that endogeneity is 
 
234 J.A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 1251, 
1251–71 (1978). 
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not an issue in our data, so our final models are not the instrumental 
variables models discussed above. 
The second issue involved in estimating a model of team revenues 
over time is the question of whether panel data techniques or simple 
OLS models are estimated. More specifically, the question is whether 
to exploit the time-dimension of the data and to use panel data 
techniques to generate fixed-effects estimates for each school. 
Essentially, any systematic level of revenue that accrues to the school 
but does not vary over time and does not vary with any of the other 
covariates (attendance, team quality, income changes in the area, etc.) 
is measured by the fixed effect. Because the data in Brown’s two 
studies were cross-sectional, his research could not produce a fixed-
effects estimate.235 By contrast, the research reported in the LNN 
study contains both panel and OLS estimations. We performed F-
tests—tests of whether the fixed-effects estimates are statistically 
different from zero—on the fixed-effects estimations illustrated below 
and found that all rejected the hypothesis that the fixed effects are 
zero. This means that there is in fact a part of the revenue that schools 
accrue that is unchanging and should be attributed to athletes. We 
discuss how to attribute this component of the school revenue in more 
detail below. 
The third issue involved in estimating a model of team revenues 
over time is the question of whether time should be included as a 
factor in the models. More specifically, the issue is whether to include 
a time trend in the data to account for the overall growth in FBS 
football and Division I men’s basketball real total revenues over time. 
The various models in the LNN Study include a time component. The 
Brown Studies do not because Brown’s data lacked a time dimension. 
Our football and men’s basketball models also include a time trend. It 
can be interpreted as an average amount of extra revenue that accrues 
to each school simply because there is more money in the sport each 
year. We will also discuss how to attribute this portion to the student-
athletes in more detail below. 
Equation 1 outlines the general form of the models being estimated 
for FBS football and Division I men’s basketball revenues. Our 
sample is restricted to football programs with average annual 
revenues totaling more than $10 million over the sample period and to 
basketball programs with average annual revenues over $4 million. 
 
235 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
POTUTO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:54 AM 
932 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 879 
We excluded football and men’s basketball programs that generated 
less revenue because we found very little to no correlation between 
revenues and player characteristics in those programs. Equation 2 is 
the specification for the team success equation and serves as the first 
stage for the two-stage least squares estimations that are tested. 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
The variables in Equations 1 and 2 are defined as follows: 
Revenues are total revenues for football and men’s basketball 
separately as reported to the Department of Education in each 
academic year. Winning percentage is total wins divided by total 
games and multiplied by 100. The natural log (log base e) of median 
household income and median household expenditures on 
entertainment and the percentage of men with a Bachelor of Arts 
degree are for a 100-mile radius around the campus. These are used as 
proxies for the consumer market characteristics of wealth and 
education levels in the vicinity of the university.236 Other 
characteristics for each school are the size of the student body, the 
percentage of out-of-state students, and the total attendance figures 
for football and men’s basketball in each year. These factors also 
control for the student population and fan interest in the sport. The 
factors in the winning percentage equation are a four-year history of 
the number of five-star, four-star, and three-star recruits in football, 
and a three-year history of the number of five-star, four-star, and 
three-star recruits in men’s basketball.237 The football equation also 
 
236 Alternative specifications with a 50-mile radius and 150-mile radius were tested and 
produced no qualitatively different results. 
237 We use a shorter recruit history for men’s basketball because the rules around being 
eligible for the professional draft are different than in football. Basketball student-athletes 
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contains coaching success measures for the head coach and the rest of 
the staff. First, we construct a winning percentage for each coach in 
each year that he coached. Then we look two years prior to the current 
year and construct the average winning percentage and the number of 
bowl appearances in the previous two years for the composition of 
coaches in the current year at the particular school. This creates 
measures of coaching quality that are related to the current coaching 
staff but are independent of the current season. We do not have 
equivalent detailed men’s basketball coaching data, so the men’s 
basketball equation omits those factors. Finally, to help explain a 
football or men’s basketball team’s winning percentage, there are 
measures of the total staff size, natural logs of operating expenses, 
and schedule strength ratings. 
4. Results 
Table 2 provides selected estimates from the various possibilities 
for modeling Equations 1 and 2. When comparable, we compare 
similar estimates from the existing literature. As discussed above, 
there are three main choices in modeling the system of equations. 
There are two panel data choices: random effects and fixed effects. 
The choice between those two methods involves the statistical test of 
whether or not the fixed effects equal zero. The third choice is 
whether instrumental variables techniques are required. This would be 
the case if the winning percentage variable in the revenue equation 
were found to be endogenous as discussed above. The model 
estimates of primary interest are at the top of Table 2, the various test 
statistics are provided in the middle, and basic model diagnostics and 
information are at the bottom. 
  
 
need only stay in college for one year. See infra note 299 and accompanying text. Football 
student-athletes must be out of high school for at least three years. Since we do not have 
an exact accounting of which players left early and which did not, we allow four years of 
recruiting classes for the football models and three for the basketball models to proxy for 
the team composition. 
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Table 2: Selected Results from Different Specifications of FB and BB 
Equations 
 FB-RE FB-FE FB-IV BB-RE BB-FE BB-IV 
Effect on Win %       
5-Star Recruits 1.30 1.77 1.68 1.96 1.20 0.61t 
4-Star Recruits 0.24 - - - - - 
3-Star Recruits 0.16 - - - - - 
       
Effect on Revenues       
1% ↑Winning % $43,206 $57,563 $141,793 $3,235 t $10,352 $34,562 
Average ↑ Per 
Year 
 
$1,286,321 
 
$1,296,035 
 
$1,293,416 
 
$343,400 
 
$348,106 
 
$348,968 
5-Star Impact  $101,887   $12,422  
       
Prob>χ2 (Hausman)       
IV vs. FE  .700   1.00  
FE vs. RE  .000   .000  
       
Overall R2       
Winning % 29% 12% 9% 13% 11% 17% 
Revenue 63% 22% 13% 47% 34% 21% 
       
F-Test ui=0 p-value  
     
Winning %  .000 .000  .000 .000 
Revenue  .000 .000  .000 .000 
       
Revenue Eq. Obs. 493 493 493 563 563 563 
# of Schools 64 64 64 75 75 75 
Max. Time Period ‘05-’12 ‘05-’12 ‘05-’12 ‘05-’12 ‘05-’12 ‘05-’12 
Notes: RE=Random Effects, FE=Fixed Effects, IV=2SLS. t p-value< .25. 
The first results to highlight are the F-tests for the significance of 
the fixed effects. In both instrumental variables and OLS 
formulations, the fixed effects that are equal to zero are strongly 
rejected. Those results are similar to the LNN Study findings.238 In 
other words, no model that tested for fixed effects rejected them as a 
contributing factor in revenue production. The Hausman test also 
points in the same direction.239 A comparison of the instrumental 
 
238 See LNN Study, supra note 210. 
239 See Hausman, supra note 234. 
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variable with the fixed-effect estimates shows no significant 
difference between the two, which suggests any presence of 
endogeneity is minimal in our models. The LNN Study also found 
endogeneity in some of their models and did not find any in others.240 
Finally, the second row of χ2 statistics suggests that the fixed-effects 
models are preferred to the random-effects models, again showing the 
importance of accounting for the fixed school-level revenues that do 
not vary with the other covariates in the models. 
The remaining discussion focuses on the middle column within 
each group of football and men’s basketball models, the fixed-effects 
models. Each five-star football recruit adds on average 1.77% to a 
team’s winning percentage.241 Each five-star men’s basketball recruit 
adds 1.20%.242 Multiplying these estimates by the impact of a one 
percentage-point increase in wins on revenues yields estimates of 
$101,887 for a five-star football recruit and $12,422 for a five-star 
men’s basketball recruit. Our estimate of the effect of a one-
percentage-point increase in men’s basketball winning percentage—
$10,352—is a similar order of magnitude to the $29,349 estimate 
reported in the LNN Study for large schools.243 Some of the 
difference could be attributed to our large-school sample containing 
schools with average revenues down to $4 million as compared to the 
LNN Study’s cut-off at $10 million.244 Our results for football five-
star recruits—$101,887—are orders of magnitude lower than Brown’s 
various estimates of $500,000 to $1 million.245 There are many likely 
reasons for this difference. 
First, because Brown had no panel of data, some information 
contained in our fixed-effects estimates are likely attributed to his 
estimates on the value of draft picks. Second, Brown models the value 
of draft picks while we model recruits. Although many draft picks are 
initially five-star recruits, it is not a perfect one-to-one matching. 
Finally, without the time dimension in his data, Brown’s estimates 
lack any accounting for the growth in the overall size of revenue in 
football and men’s basketball. Just as the same caliber player will 
have a different marginal revenue product if he plays for Louisiana 
 
240 See LNN Study, supra note 210. 
241 See supra Table 2. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
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State University instead of University of Louisiana-Monroe, some 
part of our estimates for the time effect should also be attributed to 
the student-athlete himself. Stated another way, some part of the 
marginal revenue product is dependent upon the existing market 
conditions in which a student-athlete competes. 
The results from the fixed-effect estimates of football and men’s 
basketball were used in the final calculations of average student-
athlete marginal revenue product. Our estimates have three 
components: The first is the impact of the players on wins. The 
number of five-star recruits on each team is multiplied by the effect of 
the student-athletes on wins, and then the impact of the extra wins on 
revenue is calculated. The second component is the fixed effect. Each 
team has its own estimate of the average level of revenues that 
accrues each year because of the fixed parts of the demand for 
football and men’s basketball. These factors include, for example, 
longer-term luxury box revenues, television revenues, conference 
bowl or tournament disbursements, and any other general, 
unchanging, revenue-generating support for the program. Some part 
of these revenues should be attributed to the student-athletes and 
some to the schools and coaches. Without a direct way to attribute 
them, we present different sets of results to see how sensitive our 
findings are to the different assumptions. The third component is the 
time effect. On average, over-time real revenues to each team have 
increased because of the growth in sport popularity. The time effects 
measure this increase and it is added to the total value of each team 
and treated in the same way as the fixed effects. 
Below, Table 3 contains the results of these calculations under 
different assumptions for how the fixed component of revenue is 
attributed. We evaluate a twenty-five-, fifty-, and seventy-five-percent 
value attributed to the student-athletes. The results are presented for 
the teams at the ninetieth, seventy-fifth, fiftieth, twenty-fifth, and tenth 
percentiles of student-athlete marginal revenue product. 
  
POTUTO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:54 AM 
2014] What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and  937 
the Treatment of Student-Athletes 
Table 3: MRP Estimates for NCAA Football and Men’s Basketball Players: 
Annual $ 2013 
  Football   Basketball  
% Fixed 
Value to 
SAs: 
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
90th 
Percentile 110,578 220,278 329,977 186,155 370,484 554,812 
75th 
Percentile 74,731 149,292 223,853 108,298 215,215 322,132 
50th 
Percentile 51,498 101,439 152,113 64,037 127,660 191,284 
25th 
Percentile 28,175 56,112 84,049 31,500 63,002 94,503 
10th 
Percentile 2,674 5,349 8,023 5,319 10,378 15,957 
Those results suggest a wide range of estimates depending upon 
how much one attributes the fixed revenues to the team itself. In 
general, the estimates are lower than those presented in the literature, 
and, as discussed above, this is likely due to the use of the fixed-
effects estimation results. Just looking at a fifty-fifty split between 
value attributed to the players and value to all other aspects of the 
program, a football player on the median team in the football 
distribution has a value of approximately $101,000 per year. A men’s 
basketball player at the same place in the distribution has a higher 
value: roughly $127,000. Even though total men’s basketball team 
revenues are orders of magnitude lower than football revenues, the 
smaller squad sizes mean that the lower revenues are spread among 
far fewer players and each player has a higher marginal value. The 
implications of considering some kind of compensation scheme are 
explored in the sections that follow. 
VI 
ACCOMMODATING STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME AND LIKENESS 
COMPENSATION WITHIN THE COLLEGIATE MODEL 
Were student-athletes to receive a share of revenues from 
university, conference, and NCAA licensing ventures in which their 
names or likenesses are used, several consequences might ensue. This 
section discusses some of them. 
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A. Title IX 
Title IX requires that institutions that receive federal funds offer 
equal athletic opportunities to women and men.246 A nonexclusive list 
of ten criteria is used to determine if there is equal treatment between 
men and women student-athletes and their teams.247 No criterion 
addresses institutional promotional or commercial activities, and since 
student-athletes currently can accept no pay, no criterion addresses 
equality in payments for these activities. 
With regard to playing fields and equipment, Title IX requires 
equal treatment even if, for example, donor funds offered for facilities 
for one gender have to be declined because a school cannot find funds 
to upgrade facilities for the other gender.248 But equal treatment with 
regard to promotional and commercial ventures is a dance that 
requires two willing partners. To be sure, in at least one sense, an 
athletic department is in complete control over which teams or 
athletes are used in its marketing or commercial ventures. That being 
so, it could condition use of football and men’s basketball student-
athlete names and likenesses on a marketing or broadcast partner’s 
willingness to use an equal number of women student-athletes and, 
 
246 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
247 The ten factors were developed in 1975 by the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2013); 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1–86.71 (2013). They are 
equality in (1) the selection of sports and levels of competition in university athletic 
programs so as effectively to accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both 
sexes; (2) the provision of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and practice 
times; (4) travel and per diem allowance; (5) opportunity for coaching and academic 
tutoring; (6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of locker 
rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) provision of medial and training facilities 
and services; (9) provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and (10) publicity. 
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). The first factor, “effectively accommodat[ing] the interests and 
abilities of members of both sexes,” id., has, to date, captured virtually all the public 
attention and has been the subject of virtually all court challenges. See, e.g., Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993). Courts have struggled with how to 
determine whether women and men have equal athletic participation opportunities (in 
other words, that their interests and abilities are effectively accommodated). See id. There 
are at least two reasons for the difficulty: first, because past patterns of societal 
discrimination deflated women’s interest in athletics and their opportunity to participate, 
courts have been unwilling to discern women’s athletic interest by resorting to historical 
participation numbers; second, through its athletic department, a university controls the 
male and female composition of its student-athlete population by decisions as to which 
sports to sponsor and whom to recruit. Id. 
248 Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (M.D. Fla.1997) 
(holding unequal treatment under title IX where a high school funded boy’s baseball and 
girl’s softball equally but used private booster contributions for an electronic scoreboard 
and field lights for baseball). See generally Cynthia Lee A. Pemberton, More of the 
Same—Enough Already!, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 597, 601 (2012). 
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indeed, male student-athletes in other sports. The price would be lost 
revenues if a marketing or broadcast partner declined the dance.249 
Nonetheless, market factors are not irrelevant to the calculus even 
with regard to Title IX. For example, although athletic departments 
provide sports information for women’s teams and attempt to get 
media coverage for them, universities cannot control whether or how 
the media cover women’s sports. Similarly, the Equal Pay Act 
recognizes that market factors may influence coach salaries favoring 
male coaches.250 
The one incontrovertible thing we can say with regard to the 
impact of Title IX if student-athletes were to be paid for marketing 
and promotional ventures in which their names and likenesses are 
used is that it is not possible to predict the impact of Title IX with any 
confidence.251 
B. Dissension 
There is no telling what name and likeness compensation to 
student-athletes might do to the campus environment, in large part 
because there currently is no telling the amount of money to be 
distributed, how, or to whom. We believe that the impact on the 
campuses or on intra-department student-athlete relationships will be 
at the margin only, particularly if only a small number of student-
athletes reap large sums from the use of their names and likenesses252 
or if funds are held until after a student-athlete departs from a 
university.253 
Some potential impacts are that payments to student-athletes for 
commercial use of their names and likenesses will enlarge the gulf 
between the treatment of student-athletes, particularly football and 
men’s basketball student-athletes, and students on the greater campus; 
undermine efforts to provide equitable treatment to all student-
athletes by athletic departments; spur an enhanced sense of 
 
249 A worthwhile subject for discussion would be whether this result might advance the 
collegiate model more than the use for all student-athletes of revenues attained by 
marketing and other commercial ventures. 
250 Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1322–23 (9th Cir. 1994); Jacobs v. Coll. 
of William and Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff’d, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 
1981). 
251 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322–23; Jacobs, 517 F. Supp. at 797. 
252 See discussion supra Part VI. 
253 Whether by graduation, exhaustion of eligibility, or for other reasons. 
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entitlement in football and men’s basketball student-athletes; and 
strain student-athlete interactions. These consequences may occur, but 
we are unpersuaded that they will make much difference. 
In the first place, preferential treatment of football and men’s 
basketball student-athletes already exists. Football and men’s 
basketball are two of only five NCAA head count sports.254 Each 
scholarship athlete in a head count sport receives tuition, room and 
board, and books (a full-ride scholarship).255 All other NCAA sports 
are equivalency sports. These teams have a maximum amount of 
scholarship money to distribute among team members but no 
minimum limit on the amount of aid; a full-ride scholarship is rare.256 
In addition, public attention for football and men’s basketball 
student-athletes already sets them apart from all other students, 
including other student-athletes. Eighteen of the twenty largest 
football stadiums in the United States host college, not professional, 
games.257 Through 2012, the University of Nebraska has had 325 
consecutive home football game sell-outs.258 Football game days are 
such big events that security and traffic control costs can run more 
than $200,000.259 
Football and men’s basketball student-athletes also are featured in 
more local media stories than are student-athletes in other sports, and 
 
254 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.2. 
255 In head count sports a coach has a specified number of student-athletes to whom he 
can award scholarships, and every scholarship counts as a full ride no matter whether a full 
amount is awarded. Id. § 15.5.2. FBS universities almost always fully fund each 
scholarship. 
256 Id. § 15.5.3. Baseball is one of two outlier programs. Although an equivalency sport, 
its squad size is capped at twenty-seven and each scholarship student-athlete must receive 
at least twenty-five percent of a full scholarship. Id. § 15.5.4. Ice hockey is the other 
outlier. It is limited to thirty student-athletes who may receive any portion of an athletic 
scholarship. Id. § 15.5.7. 
257 List of American Football Stadiums by Capacity, WIKIPEDIA, http://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_American_football_stadiums_by_capacity (last visited Mar. 
8, 2014). The “Big House” at the University of Michigan heads the list with stadium 
capacity of more than 108,000. Sean, Michigan Stadium Capacity to Max Out at 
110,000+, Later Drop to 108,000+, MICH. SPORTS CTR. (Aug. 27, 2009, 5:30 AM), 
http://michigansportscenter.com/2009/08/michigan-stadium-capacity-to-max-out-at           
-110000-later-drop-to-108000.html. 
258 Memorial Stadium–Home of the Huskers, NEB. ATHLETICS, http://www.huskers 
.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=734 (last visted Mar. 8, 2014). 
259 Football game day traffic control and security costs can mount. At Clemson and 
South Carolina, for example, the combined total is nearly $500,000. Brennan Somers, Cost 
of Security at College and High School Sporting Events, WMBF NEWS (July 31, 2013, 
3:28 PM), http://www.wmbfnews.com/story/22983292/the-cost-of-security-at-college-and 
-high-school-sporting-events. 
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they get the bulk of national media attention. Countless hours of talk 
radio in a city with a major FBS school260 and a top (or aspiring-to-
be-top) football program are devoted to the football team.261 
Countless hours of talk radio in a city with a major FBS school and a 
top (or aspiring-to-be-top) men’s basketball program are devoted to 
the basketball team. Prominent players are recognized on campus and 
by sports fans around the country. March Madness is a national story 
with office bracket pools everywhere. 
If payment for student-athlete names and likenesses would cause 
additional strain on a campus or in athletics, therefore, it likely will 
not be among all students or all student-athletes but, instead, within 
the football and men’s basketball teams. There are two models for 
providing name and likeness compensation.262 Student-athletes might 
be paid for use of their names and likenesses commensurate with their 
individual value.263 For example, the quarterback would be paid more 
than the walk-on in men’s basketball, and elite student-athletes at 
each position would be paid more than their counterparts at the 
position. This could lead those with higher values to flaunt their 
statuses. Alternatively, all football and men’s basketball student-
athletes might be paid exactly the same amount.264 This could lead to 
resentment from those who believe their value is higher and should be 
recognized and compensated as such. 
In either case, resentments may fester. Although unlikely to lead to 
shirking on the field, resentments might cause morale issues 
detrimental to team play.265 Resentments could also explode in off-
field incidents. 
 
260 Today, this would also include the new Big East Conference with no football or 
prominent basketball programs. See BIG EAST, http://www.bigeast.com (last visted Mar. 8, 
2014). 
261 See, e.g., College Hoops Digest Forum: College Basketball Talk Radio, BLOG TALK 
RADIO, http://www.blogtalkradio.com/collegehoopsdigest/2014/01/04/college-hoops         
-digest-forum-college-basketball-talk-radio (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
262 See supra Part IV. 
263 Id. 
264 This is the model advocated for by the Plaintiff’s economist in the Keller/O’Bannon 
litigation. See Jon Solomon, Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA: The Arguments for and Against a 
Class-Action Suit, AL.COM (June 15, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.al.com/sports 
/index.ssf/2013/06/ed_obannon_v_ncaa_the_argument.html. 
265 See, e.g., LEWIS C. SOLMON & MICHAEL PODGURSKY, MILKEN FAM. FOUND., THE 
PROS AND CONS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION 1, 4 (2000), available at 
http://web.missouri.edu/~podgurskym/articles/files/Pros_cons.pdf; Gaynor McCown & 
Wade Nelson, Point/Counterpoint: Teacher Merit Pay: Prudent or Pointless?, 
SCHOLASTIC ADM’R (June 2004), http://www.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp?id=234. 
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VII 
FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING 
NAME AND LIKENESS PAYMENTS TO STUDENT-ATHLETES 
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that, to the extent 
universities could quantify name and likeness revenue attributable to 
specific student-athletes, attempting to share such revenue with the 
student-athletes would be unwise. Nonetheless, our analysis would be 
incomplete without examining tax and related problems raised by 
proposals to share name and likeness revenue. In this discussion, we 
assume that any such revenue sharing would not be part of a paradigm 
shift, such as paying student-athletes to play or compensating them 
with money in hand266 for the value of their names and likenesses 
while they are still students. Instead, our analysis considers the means 
by which universities267 could accumulate and hold such payments 
until a student-athlete graduates.268 In the following sections, we 
discuss two alternatives for accomplishing this goal and the problems 
associated with each: first, we discuss university-established holding 
accounts; second, private express trusts. 
 
266 We make this assumption because a decision to allow universities to pay student-
athletes would, at a minimum, cause the universities to lose their current protection from 
the unrelated business income tax. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. It is also 
possible that the universities could lose their federal income tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
267 We recognize that it might be possible for companies or the NCAA to create and 
maintain name and likeness holding accounts. Apart from the practical problems 
associated with separating such payments from the university context, those alternatives 
would raise essentially the same income tax issues and associated trust issues discussed in 
this section of the Article. 
268 For ease of discussion, we discuss holding and distributing revenues to student-
athletes and key the distribution of revenues to when they “graduate.” Revenues could also 
be distributed when a student-athlete exhausts competition eligibility even if that student-
athlete has not graduated. Similarly, revenues could be distributed when a student-athlete 
irrevocably will no longer compete, even if the student-athlete has eligibility remaining. 
Such a result could occur, for example, as a consequence of career-ending injury, 
exclusion from competition because of the commission of violations, or expulsion or 
suspension for poor academic performance. Accepting a disbursement of revenues would 
irrevocably end the student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate competition. Thus, 
graduation is not the only trigger for distribution, but is merely a convenient shorthand 
reference for purposes of this Article. 
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A. University-Established Holding Accounts 
A university could establish accounts269 into which it would pay 
name and likeness revenue allocable to a student-athlete. In the 
simplest structure, the university would hold the funds until the 
student-athlete graduated and thereafter would pay the balance in the 
account to the student-athlete. Because such a structure would not 
protect a student-athlete against inflation during the period prior to 
graduation, the university might agree to pay interest at a variable rate 
based on interest paid by local banks or thrift institutions. The interest 
would not perfectly compensate for inflation, but would provide some 
protection to a student-athlete whose funds are being held.270 If a 
university provided that student-athletes could not, under any 
circumstances, obtain any payments from these accounts prior to 
graduation,271 then the current collegiate model presumably would be 
preserved. Unfortunately for the university and the student-athlete, 
this sort of arrangement poses serious income tax issues. 
From the perspective of universities exempt from federal income 
taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code,272 there is 
no federal income tax liability incurred for revenues from commercial 
and promotional uses of student-athlete names and likenesses because 
these revenues are related to the educational purpose that permits 
exemption from federal tax liability. In other words, they are not 
“unrelated business taxable income.”273 By contrast, the revenue is 
“gross income”274 to student-athletes. 
 
269 The university—not its charitable foundation—would have to establish the 
accounts. The charitable foundation could not properly receive and administer funds that 
were not gifts. The name and likeness payments could not be characterized as gifts. 
270 The interest clearly would be income to the student-athlete, see 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(4) 
(2012), and the timing of reporting the interest would depend on the rules discussed 
previously. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
271 For reasons other than graduation that would permit a student-athlete to gain access 
to funds held on her behalf, see supra note 220. 
272 Most universities are recognized as exempt from federal and state income taxation 
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
Some universities are exempt from federal income taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 115, which 
provides that “[g]ross income does not include (1) income derived from any public utility 
or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any 
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia.” A few universities are subject to 
federal and state corporate income taxation. See generally RS, IRS EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES COMPLIANCE PROJECT (May 7, 2010), 
available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cucp_interimrpt_052010.pdf. 
273 26 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). A university is exempt from taxes from revenues generated 
as part of its tax-exempt function but must pay taxes on revenues produced by it that are 
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Student-athletes almost certainly are “cash method” taxpayers.275 
Under both the constructive receipt and “economic benefit” doctrines 
discussed below, student-athletes would have to report name and 
likeness revenues as gross income when actually or constructively 
received by them. It is tempting to conclude that they could wait to 
report revenues in an income tax return until they actually receive the 
payments from a university. The Internal Revenue Service might 
argue, however, that a student-athlete constructively received some or 
all of the name and likeness revenue when the university placed it in a 
student-athlete’s account, or that placing the revenue in the account 
created an immediate economic benefit in favor of the student-athlete 
sufficient to justify immediate taxation to the student-athlete. We 
discuss both arguments below. 
1. The Constructive Receipt Doctrine 
The Treasury Regulations provide that 
income is constructively received by [a taxpayer] in the taxable year 
during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or 
otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, 
or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if 
notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is 
not constructively received if the taxpayer’s control of its receipt is 
subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.276 
 
unrelated to its tax exempt status. For examples of operations with revenue taxed as 
unrelated business income, see William H. Lyons & Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, The Federal 
Income Tax and Reform of College Athletics: A Response to Professor Colombo and an 
Independent Critique, 2 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 233 (2009). Although the rationale 
for the position is tenuous at best, under present law, the income produced by the major 
athletic programs at Division I schools—including any name and likeness revenue 
component—is not treated as “unrelated business income.” 
274 Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code defines “gross income,” the starting 
point for computation of federal income tax liability, as “all income from whatever source 
derived.” § 61(a). There can be no question but that the name and likeness revenues would 
be “income” and therefore “gross income” to the student-athletes. The revenues might be 
payment for services under section 61(a)(1) or gains from dealings in property (to the 
extent that names and likenesses are intangible property interests) under section 61(a)(3). 
275 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) provides: 
Cash receipts and disbursements method. Generally, under the cash receipts and 
disbursements method in the computation of taxable income, all items which 
constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to 
be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received. 
Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made. 
276 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (emphasis added). 
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In general, courts have held that a cash method taxpayer need not 
include compensation in gross income under the constructive receipt 
doctrine unless: (1) the money was available to the taxpayer; (2) the 
payor was able and ready to pay; (3) the taxpayer’s right to be paid 
was unrestricted; and (4) the taxpayer’s failure to receive the money 
resulted from an exercise of the taxpayer’s own choice.277 Thus, a 
student-athlete likely could escape the constructive receipt doctrine, 
provided a university made it impossible for the student to receive the 
revenue payments prior to graduation. 
To avoid application of the constructive receipt doctrine to a 
student-athlete, a university should execute a written agreement with 
the student-athlete, making clear that (1) money in such an account is 
not available to the student-athlete prior to his or her graduation;278 
(2) the university has absolutely no obligation to make distributions to 
the student-athlete prior to his or her graduation; (3) the student-
athlete has absolutely no right to anticipate, assign, borrow against, or 
receive money from the account prior to his or her graduation; and (4) 
the student-athlete cannot receive or otherwise benefit from the 
money in the account prior to his or her graduation279 because of an 
explicit prohibition in the NCAA Bylaws. The agreement should be 
executed in a timely manner before the period of service for which 
name and likeness payments are payable.280 The safest way to 
accomplish this goal is to execute these agreements with all student-
athletes at the time they matriculate or transfer, regardless of whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that any particular student-athlete 
would actually generate name and likeness revenues. 
2. The Economic Benefit Doctrine 
The constructive receipt doctrine comes from the general rule of 
section 451(a) of the Internal Revenue Code281 governing which 
 
277 See, e.g., Gullett v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 31 B.T.A. 1067, 1069 (1935). 
278 To be precise, as explained in supra note 232, the agreement should describe the 
time of disbursement in relation to the conclusion of a student-athlete’s university athletic 
career. 
279 See supra note 232. 
280 Rev. Proc. 71-19 § 3.01, 1971-1 C.B. 698 (“If the [deferred compensation] plan 
provides for an election to defer payment of compensation, such election must be made 
before the beginning of the period of service for which the compensation is payable, 
regardless of the existence in the plan of forfeiture provisions.” (emphasis added)). 
281 26 U.S.C. § 451(a) (“The amount of any item of gross income shall be included in 
the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under the 
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taxable year of inclusion of an item is income. In contrast, the 
economic benefit doctrine derives from the definition of gross income 
in section 61(a).282 The Internal Revenue Service and courts usually 
apply the economic benefit doctrine in the context of an employment 
relationship. Courts typically use the following formulation: 
Under [the economic benefit] doctrine, an employer’s promise to 
pay deferred compensation in the future may itself constitute a 
taxable economic benefit if the current value of the employer’s 
promise can be given an appraised value. . . . A current economic 
benefit is capable of valuation where the employer makes a 
contribution to an employee’s deferred compensation plan which is 
nonforfeitable, fully vested in the employee and secured against the 
employer’s creditors by a trust arrangement. 283 
The logic of the doctrine is equally persuasive outside the 
employment context. When translated into the context of the 
university-established holding accounts, the three key elements of the 
economic benefit analysis are whether the funds in the accounts are 
(1) non-forfeitable by the student-athlete, (2) fully vested in the 
student-athlete, and (3) secured against the university’s creditors. The 
first two criteria would be satisfied because the amounts deposited in 
the accounts could be structured to be nonforfeitable and to vest fully 
in the student-athlete. The same is generally true for nonqualified 
deferred compensation accounts established by employers for 
employees.284 The critical issue for both deferred compensation plans 
established by employers and university-established holding accounts 
is the third criterion. 
To deal with the third criterion, and to avoid the application of the 
economic benefit doctrine, employers often leave the source of the 
deferred compensation subject to the claims of their creditors. Note 
that the question is not how likely it is that the employer’s creditors 
would actually assert claims against the deferred compensation 
amounts. Rather, the question is whether the employer’s creditors 
would have the right to do so. The point is that the deferred 
compensation is at risk from the employer’s creditors. Thus, the fact 
 
method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly 
accounted for as of a different period.”). 
282 § 61(a). 
283 Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985). 
284 See id. 
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that the employee cannot forfeit the compensation is not a controlling 
factor.285 
The level of student-athlete risk associated with subjecting 
amounts in such accounts to the claims of university creditors is not 
necessarily the same as the employee risk associated with subjecting 
deferred compensation accounts to the claims of the employer’s 
creditors. As with many employers who establish deferred 
compensation plans, the actual risk that a university would have large 
and long-standing unpaid bills prompting creditor lawsuits is probably 
low. Further, it seems unlikely that university creditors would attempt 
to reach funds in student-athlete accounts. Not only would this action 
create a negative public perception, these accounts are also unlikely to 
contain large deposits, at least when compared to other university 
accounts. One troublesome point for public universities is that they 
likely would have sovereign immunity, which would either insulate 
them from liability—or at least limit the extent of the liability—from 
creditor lawsuits. In that case, the Internal Revenue Service might 
argue that the amounts in the student-athlete accounts would 
essentially be unreachable by creditors and thus subject to the 
economic benefit doctrine. 
In addition to allowing the money in student-athlete name and 
likeness accounts to remain subject to the claims of the university’s 
creditors, a university might consider other mechanisms to help the 
student avoid application of the economic benefit doctrine. For 
example, the university might provide that student-athletes could not 
assign their rights in such accounts prior to distribution, limiting the 
ability of the creditors of the student-athletes to reach the money in 
such accounts prior to distribution. In the employment context, such 
plans usually provide that employees may not assign their benefits 
under the plan. Although it is not clear whether such a limitation 
would offer additional protection to funds in university-established 
holding accounts for student-athlete name and likeness revenues, it 
seems prudent for universities to include such a limitation, both by 
insulating the funds from third-party claims and by explicitly 
prohibiting student-athletes from assigning their claims. 
Because name and likeness revenues would be gross income for 
student-athletes,286 a university would be obliged to prepare and file a 
 
285 Id. at 1485 (“If the employee’s interest is unsecured or not otherwise protected from 
the employer’s creditors, the employee’s interest is not taxable property so the 
forfeitability [sic] of the employee’s interest is irrelevant.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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Miscellaneous Income Form (Form 1099-MISC) with the Internal 
Revenue Service for each student-athlete.287 It is unclear whether the 
university would need to file that form for any taxable year of a 
student-athlete prior to actual distribution of the money in the 
account. If neither the constructive receipt doctrine nor the economic 
benefit doctrine causes a student-athlete to recognize income prior to 
actual distribution, a university would presumably file a 
Miscellaneous Income Form only in the year of distribution. A 
university would be obliged to obtain an Internal Revenue Service 
Form W-9288 from each student-athlete, or do so-called “backup 
withholding” of federal income taxes from the revenues.289 
The fact that the university might create separate accounts to deal 
with student-athlete name and likeness revenues prior to the student-
athletes’ graduations without creating tax problems for the institution 
does not automatically mean that a university would find that 
approach workable. Public universities subject to audit by the state 
might find that maintenance of such accounts violates state financial 
rules. Both public and private universities might find the costs 
associated with maintaining such accounts to be unacceptable.290 
Should such problems exist, a university’s alternative might be to set 
 
286 We assume that the student-athletes would not be properly characterized as 
employees of the university during their playing days, so the university would not be 
responsible for providing the students with the Internal Revenue Service W-2 forms 
employers must provide to employees. 
287 See Form 1099-MISC, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1099msc 
.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). The IRS Form 1099-MISC is used by persons who make 
payments that are income to the recipient. The Form alerts the Internal Revenue Service to 
the payment and provides the recipient with the information for inclusion on the 
recipient’s federal income tax return. 
288 See Form W-9, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw9.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
289 “Backup withholding” is a flat percent rate applied to the amount of income paid to 
a taxpayer, which is currently twenty-eight percent. 26 U.S.C. § 3406 (2012). The taxpayer 
can treat the amount withheld as a credit toward federal income tax due. 26 U.S.C. § 
6401(b)(1). Backup withholding is a device to ensure the recipient of taxable income will 
in fact pay the tax due on that income. Backup withholding is not an employment concept 
and is usually used for payments of interest, dividends, and nonemployee compensation. 
See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3406(a)-4 (2014). In the context of the accounts for the student-
athletes, the withholding would be based on the amount in the account immediately before 
distribution. The distribution to the student-athlete would be the amount in the account 
reduced by the amount of withholding. A state with an income tax might also require 
backup withholding of state income tax. 
290 If the NCAA expressly approves of such accounts, the persuasiveness of the 
university’s arguments against using such accounts based on their cost and associated 
inconvenience would be of limited value. As noted in text, however, there may be other 
potentially significant reasons for universities to resist use of such accounts. 
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up a private express trust to receive, hold, and disburse name and 
likeness payments. 
B. Private Express Trust291 
The purpose would be to receive student-athlete name and 
likenesses payments, hold them until the student-athletes graduate,292 
and then disburse the payments to them. 
1. Trust Law Issues 
Presumably, a university could establish a private express trust 
despite the lack of donative intent in creating the trust.293 It is unclear 
whether the university itself could act as trustee of the trust.294 To 
avoid possible problems created if the university acted as trustee, the 
university most likely should employ a corporate trustee. Using a 
corporate trustee would not, however, eliminate collateral problems. 
For example, the corporate trustee’s fees for managing the trust 
property could be significant and would be payable from the income 
or the principal of the trust—or both—thus diminishing the amounts 
ultimately payable to student-athletes. To avoid having the name and 
likeness payments eroded by inflation while the student-athletes are in 
school, the trustee should have the power to invest the payments. 
Exactly how the trustee would invest the payments to prevent loss 
from inflation, yet avoid or at least minimize investment losses that 
would diminish what the student-athletes would receive, would 
require careful drafting of the trust document. The trustee should also 
have the power to maintain separate accounts for each student-athlete, 
 
291 The word “private” in the term “private express trust” distinguishes trusts 
established for private, as opposed to public, purposes. The word “express” distinguishes 
between arrangements established either orally or in writing as trusts, as opposed to 
equitable remedies, such as the “constructive trust” or “resulting trust.” 
292 To be precise, as explained supra note 232, the trust instrument should describe the 
time of disbursement in relationship to the conclusion of the student-athlete’s university 
athletic career. 
293 Although the principal use of private express trusts in the United States is to 
accomplish donative transfers, private express trusts are also used for other purposes. For 
example, a private express trust could be established to receive and administer a judgment 
or settlement in a personal injury case. “A trust may be created only to the extent its 
purposes are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve. A trust and its 
terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.” Unif. Trust Code § 404 (emphasis 
added). 
294 Whether a university could act as a trustee of a private express trust would depend 
on the university’s charter and on the laws of the state in which the university is situated. 
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yet manage the entire fund as a unit to obtain the maximum flexibility 
for investing. 
Use of a private express trust to hold the name and likeness 
payments may not be a viable option in many states because of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP).295 Although a number of states 
have either repealed or limited the RAP as it applies to private express 
trusts, a majority of states still have some version of the RAP. In 
those states, the trust here described would almost certainly violate 
the RAP because the trust would have new beneficiaries each year, 
and at some point the interests of the new beneficiaries would vest 
beyond the period of the RAP, however computed.296 
2. Income Tax Issues Associated with Using a Trust 
As previously noted, most universities would pay no federal 
income tax on name and likeness revenues. Similarly, student-athletes 
would pay no income tax on their name and likeness revenues held by 
a trust until the revenues were distributed to them. Nonetheless, there 
are distributive tax consequences to student-athletes. 
Application of these income tax rules is relatively straightforward. 
The revenue deposited in a trust would be income to the trust when 
received.297 In addition, any income earned by the trust from 
 
295 The RAP, first articulated in England in a series of cases starting with the Duke of 
Norfolk’s Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682), which was developed to diminish 
the decedent’s ability to limit transferability of his or her property in perpetuity. Professor 
John Chipman Gray stated the United States version of the rule in the following way: “No 
[non-vested property] interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES vii (2d ed. 1906). Although the RAP has undergone 
significant changes in the United States since 1906, many states still retain some form of 
the RAP. 
296 The Uniform Trust Code permits creation of trusts that avoid the RAP because they 
exist for a limited period (the Uniform Trust Code specifies twenty-one years). Such trusts, 
however, are for animals and other purposes not involving human beneficiaries, such as 
maintenance of monuments or buildings. 
297 Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, the exclusion for “qualified 
scholarships,” would not apply because the student-athlete could not satisfy the “use” 
requirement (“[t]he term ‘qualified scholarship’” means any amount received by an 
individual as a scholarship or fellowship grant to the extent the individual establishes that, 
in accordance with the conditions of the grant, such amount was used for qualified tuition 
and related expenses.” (emphasis added)). Repaying a loan used to pay “qualified tuition 
and related expenses” using money distributed by the trust would not satisfy the use 
requirement in the statute. 
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investing the revenue would be income to the trust.298 Unless 
Congress were to create an exemption from federal income taxation 
specific to these trusts,299 the trust would be a taxpayer subject to the 
graduated tax rates set forth in section 1(e) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.300 The trust would be set up to distribute neither the name and 
likeness payments nor any interest or investment income on payments 
to the student-athlete until after his graduation. The trust would 
compute tax liability and pay taxes annually. 
The name and likeness revenue and any investment income earned 
on that revenue would be taxed both when received by the trust and 
when the benefit conferred by the trust (avoiding problems with 
NCAA rules) justifies the “toll charge” of the higher rates paid by the 
trust. When a trust subsequently distributes the taxed name and 
likeness payments and any income from investment to the student-
athletes, the student-athletes would pay taxes on any income earned 
during the year of distribution but would not be taxed on the portion 
of the distribution that was previously taxed to the trust. 
If the trust receives payments relating to multiple student-athletes, 
the trustee could establish separate accounts for each student-athlete. 
Trusts can and do use separate accounts for individual beneficiaries, 
although that approach increases administrative costs. The trust 
should still be able to file a single fiduciary income tax return despite 
having multiple beneficiary accounts. 
The problem for student-athletes is that this straightforward 
application of Internal Revenue Service rules also means that taxes on 
their funds held in trust will, in all likelihood, be significantly greater 
than if student-athletes had reported the payments annually in their 
own individual tax returns.301 The name and likeness revenue must be 
treated as ordinary income, as opposed to capital gain, whether it is 
treated as self-created intangible property or payment for the student-
 
298 Under 26 U.S.C. § 61(a), the trust would be required to include as income interest (§ 
61(a)(4)), dividends (§ 61(a)(7)), gains from dealings in property (section 61(a)(3)), and 
any other “income” the trust might receive. 
299 Under present law, the trust could not qualify for an exemption from federal income 
tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Congress could create a new 
exemption for such trusts, but there is no sound tax or social policy support for such an 
exemption. 
300 26 U.S.C. § 1(e). 
301 Compare the tax rate brackets in 26 U.S.C. § 1(a) (married filing jointly), (b) (head 
of household), and (c) (unmarried), with the tax rate brackets in 26 U.S.C. § 1(e) (estates 
and trusts). 
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athlete’s services.302 Thus, the trust would not receive the special 
reduced tax rate reserved for long-term capital gain.303 The 
significantly greater tax payments result from the fact that the rate 
brackets for trusts, although adjusted annually for inflation, are very 
compressed in comparison with the brackets for individuals.304 
Special problems exist if a student-athlete is not a United States 
citizen. The tax treatment would depend, in part, on whether the 
United States and the student-athlete’s home country have entered 
into a tax treaty. Those problems are beyond the scope of this Article. 
3. Resolving the Quandary 
As discussed above, a public university may be unable or unwilling 
to hold funds outright and may also be unable to create a trust to 
avoid providing earned name and likeness revenues to student-
athletes. Should NCAA bylaws ultimately permit student-athletes to 
share such revenues after student-athletes graduate, those states could 
be on the horns of a dilemma. 
One solution, of course, would be for those states either to adjust 
their financial audit rules or to legislatively change their approach to 
the RAP. One can argue that for purposes of the RAP, there is no 
good policy justification to treat student-athlete trusts differently from 
other private express trusts. More importantly, the unseemly rush in 
certain states to limit or eliminate the RAP simply to accommodate 
 
302 See 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(3), which provides that the term “capital asset” does not 
include: “a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, 
or similar property, held by . . . a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property     
. . . .” Id. 
303 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (net long-term capital gain taxed at a rate not in excess of twenty 
percent). 
304 For 2013, the rate brackets in § 1(e) are: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $2,450 15% of the taxable income 
Over $2450 but not over $5700 $367.50 plus 25% of the excess over $2450 
Over $5700 but not over $8750 $1180 plus 28% of the excess over $5700 
Over $8750 but not over $11,950 $2034 plus 33% of the excess over $8750 
Over $11,950 $3090 plus 39.6% of the excess over 
$11,950 
 By contrast, in 2013, an unmarried individual who is not a head of household or 
surviving spouse would not be subject to the 39.6% bracket until she had taxable income 
in excess of $400,000. Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2013-5, IRS (Jan. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-05_IRB/ar06.html. 
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federal wealth transfer tax planning should remind legislatures in 
other states to proceed with caution in amending the RAP.305 
Congress could also resolve the quandary by creating a special tax 
bracket system for student-athlete trusts to treat the trusts, in effect, as 
unmarried human taxpayers. There seems to be no sound tax policy 
justification for creating such a special regime, and no social policy 
justification either. An alternative might be to create the equivalent of 
trust “throw-back” rules.306 Under that alternative, the trust would 
pay income tax annually until a student-athlete’s graduation. Upon 
distribution, student-athletes would compute their taxes on the 
distributed income at their own rates for the distribution year and 
would receive a tax credit for tax payments previously made by the 
trust. Such an alternative would also require congressional action. 
Like the special rate rule mentioned earlier, there appears to be 
neither a tax policy justification nor a social policy justification for 
such an alternative. 
An alternative that might require no adjustment to the general 
operation of public university policies would be for either the NCAA 
or the conference to which a university belongs to administer a 
holding fund or trust. Such an alternative would likely raise the same 
federal tax issues already discussed.307 
 
305 When Congress added the federal Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax (GSTT) in 
1986, it probably did not envision that people would couple the intended limitation on the 
application of the tax (a one million dollar exclusion that would, in effect grow as trust 
property increased in value over time) with the limitation or repeal the RAP. The result, 
popularly known as the “dynasty trust,” allows large transfers of wealth from generation to 
generation without federal wealth transfer taxation until the trust terminates. Because the 
elimination of the RAP alleviates the need to terminate the trust, the trust can continue 
indefinitely. 
306 26 U.S.C. §§ 665–68. The throw-back rules originally applied to all trusts that 
distributed accumulated income, but have essentially applied only to foreign trusts, since 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The throw-back rules, as applied to domestic trusts, were 
intended to discourage trusts from accumulating income for many years as relatively low 
trust income tax rates, rather than distributing the income to beneficiaries who were in 
higher tax brackets. The Internal Revenue Service treated actual distributions of 
accumulated trust income as all earned in the year of distribution and to force a beneficiary 
to include all the income on his or her tax return, if the beneficiary’s average marginal tax 
rate in the previous five years was higher than the tax rate of the trust. The 1997 legislation 
instituted the narrow trust tax brackets for domestic trusts and thus eliminated the need to 
apply the throwback rules to most domestic trusts. 
307 Whether some of the same state trust law issues also would arise depends on the 
state in which the funds would be administered. 
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A very partial solution is available to avoid tax, trust, state, and 
university policy issues. As previously described,308 the NCAA 
distributes revenues through the conferences to the campuses to be 
made available through athletic department administration of a 
Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund (the Fund). In White v. NCAA,309 a 
class of FBS football and men’s basketball student-athletes 
challenged NCAA’s scholarship limits.310 Pursuant to a settlement in 
White, the NCAA added to the monies to be distributed through the 
Fund.311 Were a share of NCAA and conference revenues allocated to 
the Fund, more money would reach the hands of student-athletes 
while they are student-athletes. However, this alternative would likely 
require that student-athlete uses of the Fund would be tied to 
particular expenses derived from their student status. Moreover, the 
total amount allocated to each student-athlete would not reach the 
revenue amounts that the Keller/O’Bannon plaintiffs claim is owed to 
them. 
X 
THE DRIFT IN THE COLLEGIATE MODEL 
The commercialization of athletic departments is part and parcel of 
the commercialization of the universities to which they belong. Both 
are propelled by the need to find revenue to support operations. 
A. How Revenue Is Generated 
Not all revenue streams can or should be pursued if principle, not 
simply principal, is to govern. Obvious examples are corporate 
sponsors whose products or services are incompatible with 
intercollegiate athletics and campus values—alcohol, including beer 
 
308 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
309 White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-999-RGK (MANx), slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 
2006). 
310 Jack Carey & Andy Gardiner, NCAA Agrees to $10M Settlement in Antitrust 
Lawsuit, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2008, 12:03 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports 
/college/2008-01-29-ncaa-settlement_N.htm. 
311 The additional money was available for a five-year period from 2008 to 2013. For 
the full terms of the settlement, see Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement Between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association, Case No. CV06-0999 
VBF (MANx), White v. NCAA (C.D. Cal. Jan. Jan. 29, 2008), available at 
http://i.usatoday.net/sports/college/2008-01-29-ncaa-settlement.pdf. At the time of the 
White settlement, the fund was called the “Student-Athlete Assistance Fund.” 
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and wine; tobacco and cigarettes;312 and overtly sexual content. 
These, however, are only starting points for discussion. 
1. Merchandise, O.K. 
Athletic departments and the NCAA operate both onsite and web-
based merchandise outlets. Universities, conferences, and the 
NCAA313 sell items with their names and logos on them. They sell 
exclusive licenses to Coke or Pepsi, Dr. Pepper or Fresca, Pizza Hut 
or Chick-fil-A, so that only that product may be sold in their buildings 
and at their venues.314 They sell exclusive licenses to Nike or Adidas 
or other clothing and equipment merchandisers to be the only 
“official” apparel that may bear an NCAA, conference, or university 
name or logo.315 In addition, universities and—until recently—the 
NCAA sold apparel and other items on which player numbers are 
affixed.316 All of these activities seem unremarkable. 
There are also university agreements with Nike or Adidas by which 
they receive team uniforms and equipment without charge; these 
deals can be worth more than $2 million.317 They are problematic 
because student-athletes wear the uniforms and use the equipment 
during games and at practices. The quid pro quo for the merchandiser 
is that its logo or design appears on the uniforms. 
NCAA bylaws regulate the size and placement of logos and 
designs not only on uniforms318 and equipment319 used by student-
 
312 The NCAA prohibits alcohol, cigarette, or gambling advertisements in conjunction 
with NCAA championships. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 31.1.14.1. On the other 
hand, wine and beer products with less than six percent alcohol content are permitted if 
they take up less than fourteen percent of program space or no more than sixty seconds per 
hour of air time. Id. § 31.1.14.1.1. No alcohol of any kind may be sold at a championship 
venue. Id. § 31.1.15. 
313 Dennis Dodd, NCAA to ‘Exit’ Business of Selling School-Related Online Items, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball 
/blog/dennis-dodd/23070728/ncaa-to-exit-business-of-selling-schoolrelated-online-items. 
314 See supra note 69. 
315 For an example of an exclusive merchandise license, see the sponsorship agreement 
between Nike and the University of Arizona, available at http://media.oregonlive 
.com/pac10/other/Arizona-State-Nike-Sponsorship.pdf. 
316 See infra notes 362–64 and accompanying text. 
317 Kristi Dosh, Montana Finds Cost-Effective Ways to Compete on Uniform Front, 
BUS. C. SPORTS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2013/10/29/montana  
-finds-cost-effective-ways-to-compete-on-uniform-front/.commentators. 
318 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.4; Cork Gaines, Nike Made Top College 
Football Coaches Return Apparel that Didn’t have Enough Swooshes, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 6, 2013, 2:55 PM) (describing Nike apparel recall because swoosh not sufficiently 
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athletes, but also on uniforms for bench personnel,320 band members, 
spirit squads, dance teams, and university mascots.321 The revenues 
generated through these apparel deals, together with prescribed limits 
on logo size and placement, lead to the conclusion that they should be 
accommodated in the collegiate model even though the consequence 
is that student-athletes effectively are models for the uniforms. 
2. Merchandise, Not O.K. 
Some teams wear shoes from a particular shoe manufacturer 
because the head coach, typically in basketball,322 has an 
endorsement deal.323 Shoes worn by all team members are not 
associated with individual student-athletes. Shoes, moreover, have no 
logos. They are discernible, if at all, because of their style. These shoe 
deals would be unexceptionable, therefore, were the contract with a 
university, even if all the profits derived from them were allocated to 
a particular head coach’s salary. The deals also might be worth less 
money, however, if they included no coach’s public endorsement. 
Often, although not exclusively, less-resourced schools permit head 
coach endorsement deals as ways to augment a coach’s salary.324 
Nonetheless, a coach’s personal endorsement deal, and consequent 
 
visible). Shoe deals can be particularly problematic, given the relationship of 
manufacturers with high school (and grade school) basketball teams unassociated with 
educational institutions. Tom Gieryn, Is It All in the Shoes?, DUKE CHRON. (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2012/10/04/it-all-shoes. 
319 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.4. Equipment includes shoes, helmets, skis, 
bats, hockey, and lacrosse sticks. 
320 Id. § 31.1.7. 
321 Id. § 31.1.8. 
322 Steve Wieberg & Jodi Upton, Success on the Court Translates to Big Money for 
Coaches, USA TODAY (Mar. 8, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college 
/mensbasketball/2007-03-08-coaches-salary-cover_N.htm. 
323 BYERS, supra note 2, at 9–10; ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 137. Jerry Tarkanian, the 
head men’s basketball coach at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, received a free pair 
of shoes for every pair he bought for the team. ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 137. Deals that 
funnel benefits to coaches or athletic department staff are not confined to head coach shoe 
deals. See, e.g., Lewis Kamb, Big-Time Coaches Score Big-Time Perks, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 23, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2022321329_coaches 
payxml.html. Head coaches and senior athletic department staff receive free golf club 
memberships. Id. They routinely are provided automobiles by corporate sponsors and 
donors, including loaners at away games. Id. They have access to private charters. Id. 
Those benefits are often included in head coach contacts. Id. Head coaches also market 
their athletic reputations by participating in commercials or acting as color commentators 
to games when their competition seasons are over. 
324 Mark Yost, Who Pays the College Coach, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2008, 11:59 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122853304793584959. 
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direct profit, from shoes his team wears makes these deals 
indefensible under a collegiate model. 
3. Advertisements, O.K. 
Advertisements are videos streamed on ribbon boards at university 
competitions and conference and NCAA championships. Names of 
corporate sponsors circle stadiums and arenas while commercial 
messages are displayed on big screens during games. FBS athletic 
department websites are replete with advertisements. These may be 
unappreciated by fans, but again they seem relatively unremarkable 
ways to produce revenues. 
4. Advertisements, Not O.K. 
Another commercial use engaged in at least by the NCAA is the 
inclusion of advertising on DVDs, webcasts, and photographs 
featuring individual student-athletes and former student-athletes. 
Examples are video streaming of ads on website video clips and on 
DVDs of famous plays that showcase and name individual student-
athletes325 as well as advertisements on pictures of individual players 
taken during a game.326 There is a substantive difference between 
NCAA sales of DVDs that depict a game, a series of famous game 
plays, or student-athlete pictures taken during a game and the same 
depictions that also contain advertisements. The practice should be 
discontinued. 
5. Media Contracts, O.K. 
Commercial networks regularly televise football and men’s 
basketball games. Competitions in other sports also are televised, 
although typically on a more limited, and often more local, basis. 
Commercials interrupt the flow of competition. Yet, no critic suggests 
that telecasts and other real-time video dissemination of competitions 
with commercial breaks should be prohibited outright because they 
commercialize intercollegiate athletics or because they offend the 
 
325 Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 147, at 48. One 
such example involves McDonalds ads that run on the bottom half of video clips that 
depict plays with identified student-athletes. Id. at 70. 
326 One such example involves a photo of former men’s basketball student-athlete and 
NBA star Oscar Robertson. Id. at 24. 
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collegiate model.327 If live telecasts are consistent with the collegiate 
model and offend no student-athlete legal entitlement, then DVD 
sales of games or of famous plays and telecasts of archived game 
footage seem an appropriate offshoot of the authority to broadcast in 
the first instance. 
B. Wink, Wink 
As discussed in Part IV, NCAA bylaws formally describe a narrow 
area in which the NCAA, conferences, and universities may use 
student-athletes, or their names and likenesses, in commercial 
ventures. In line with these bylaws, the NCAA license granted to EA 
Sports was a license to use the NCAA name and logo, not a license to 
use student-athlete names and likenesses in the game. The courts will 
decide whether the NCAA’s knowledge of how EA Sports produced 
the games, and its evident failure affirmatively to police restraints on 
what EA Sports might do in the games,328 triggered legal 
responsibility for the use of student-athlete names and likenesses; and, 
if so, whether student-athletes should be paid. Even if the NCAA 
prevails on its legal claim, however, that by no means ends the story. 
Although the NCAA relied on outsourcing the responsibility to 
assure EA Sports’s compliance with NCAA amateurism bylaws as 
part of its defense in the Keller/O’Bannon litigation,329 the NCAA 
cannot credibly claim that it had no knowledge that EA Sports used 
avatars and a computer application. In fact, in 2004, Collegiate 
Licensing Company (CLC) advised the NCAA to permit greater 
verisimilitude in the games to protect sales revenue.330 The 150 
institutions and conferences that, through CLC, extended their 
licenses with EA Sports331 did so in the midst of media coverage of 
 
327 The Supreme Court has prohibited NCAA bylaws that limit team broadcast 
appearances. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
328 In line with what is required of conferences and institutions by the NCAA Manual, 
EA Sports agreed in writing to abide by applicable NCAA bylaws. See NCAA MANUAL, 
supra note 1, §§ 32.4.18.1, 3.3.4.7.1; Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury 
Demand, supra note 58, at 4. The NCAA has now sued EA Sports and CLC for 
indemnification from any damages award and also for attorney fees. Complaint for 
Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury Demand, supra note 58, at 4. 
329 Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief, and Jury Demand, supra note 58, at 
11,13, 26. 
330 Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 147. 
331 The number also included some bowls. The game was to be called “College 
Football” rather than “NCAA Football.” Brent Schrotenboer, EA Sports Re-Ups on 
College Football After NCAA Snub, USA TODAY (July 19, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://www 
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the Keller/O’Bannon lawsuit. They certainly cannot credibly claim 
ignorance of the nature of the EA Sports videogame. 
A fundamental obligation under the collegiate model should be to 
avoid the use of student-athlete names and likenesses in commercial 
ventures or promotions both directly, and also indirectly through 
actions of corporate partners that can be anticipated and prevented by 
due diligence. Principled and consistent application of the amateurism 
principle, particularly by higher education leaders, demands more 
than a closed-eye or “wink, wink” approach. Examples abound.332 
Consider that, until recently, the NCAA marketed school-related 
apparel and memorabilia on a website that handled NCAA 
merchandise sales.333 The NCAA sold Texas A&M football jerseys 
that sported player number “2,” the uniform number of Texas A&M 
quarterback Johnny Manziel. To locate a number “2” Texas A&M 
jersey, a purchaser need only type “Johnny Manziel” into the 
website’s search engine.334 A purchaser could also type “Terrelle 
Pryor” into the search engine to find and purchase a jersey with 
Pryor’s Ohio State player number.335 Among other items, the website 
also featured an autographed photograph of former University of 
Southern California football athlete Reggie Bush.336 These latter two 
instances are particularly indefensible as both Pryor and Bush were 
 
.usatoday.com/story/sports/NCAAf/2013/07/19/ea-sports-college-football-contract             
-renewed/2570119/. 
332 Television broadcasts at one time touted the CBS Chevrolet Player of the Game at 
Men’s Basketball Tournaments. See Troy Bell: As a Sophomore, BOSTON C., http://www 
.bceagles.com/sports/m-baskbl/mtt/troy_bell_15731.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). On 
official athletic department websites, universities encourage fans to vote for the Pontiac 
Game Changing Performance of the Year, with award money going to the university at 
which the winning student-athlete competed. E.g., Vote for University of Maryland’s 
‘Pontiac Game Changing Performance’ and the Terrapins Could Win $5,000, MD. 
ATHLETICS (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.umterps.com/ViewArticle.dbml?&DB_OEM_ID 
=29700&ATCLID=207291703; Vote for Ronnie Palmer in the Pontiac Game Changing 
Performance, ARIZ. ATHLETICS (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.arizonawildcats.com/View 
Article.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=30700&ATCLID=207926126. 
333 Dodd, supra note 314. 
334 Laken Litman & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Apparel Sales Site Used Athletes’ Names 
in Search, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports 
/ncaaf/2013/08/06/ncaa-shop-search-football-jerseys-johnny-manziel/2625119/. Other 
examples of the operation of the search engine are Jadeveon Clowney of South Carolina 
and Braxton Miller of Ohio State. Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
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central figures in major infractions cases involving their 
universities.337 
1. Outsourcing 
Outsourcing licensing and general marketing responsibility is a 
cost-effective way to market inventory and locate new revenue 
streams.338 But outsourcing the marketing arm distances these 
decisions from the campus environment or direct campus or NCAA 
control.339 The result is that financial gain is more likely to be the 
only, or at least the prime, interest advanced.340 
Either the NCAA, conferences, and universities mean what they 
say about their obligations under the collegiate model, or they do not. 
In this case, moreover, principle is matched to prudence. Continuing 
activities like the ones described above risks further litigation and 
certainly will not still the drums of complaints. 
2. Policing 
Currently, the Division I Championships Cabinet reviews media 
rights contracts related to NCAA championships.341 The NCAA 
executive committee, comprised of presidents and chancellors from 
all three NCAA divisions, has specific authority to seek detailed 
information regarding NCAA commercial activities.342 The Division 
I Board and Leadership Council may request information regarding 
 
337 Ohio State University Infractions Report No. 358 (2011); University of Southern 
California Infractions Report No. 323 (2010). As NCAA President Mark Emmert rightly 
put it, “We certainly recognize why that could be seen as hypocritical. . . . Indeed, the 
business of having the NCAA in those kinds of goods is a mistake. We’re going to exit 
that business immediately. It’s not something core to what the NCAA is about. We 
probably never should have been in that business.” Dodd, supra note 314. 
338 See Dodd, supra note 314. 
339 It also may be true that universities, conferences, and the NCAA are more inclined 
to permit commercial uses as ways to increase the license fee paid. One example may be 
the increase in the number and length of commercials during broadcast games. Although 
more and longer commercials during broadcasts may have occurred regardless, some have 
been attributed to a quid pro quo for the large broadcast fees. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 
2. 
340 Id. 
341 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 31.6.4.1. 
342 Id. § 31.6.4.2. 
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commercial ventures.343 That oversight is neither regular enough nor 
focused enough.344 
To assure that principle trumps principal, there should be a very 
clear set of guidelines that articulate permissible marketing and 
promotional activities. On campus, there should be regular 
discussions between the athletic department and representatives of the 
greater campus regarding the appropriate nature and scope of 
commercial ventures. The NCAA should form a committee of 
representatives from NCAA institutions to oversee NCAA marketing 
and promotional decisions and to conduct annual reviews of the 
nature and scope of all commercial ventures. It may be unwieldy to 
review all such contracts as they develop and perhaps even before 
they are signed, but annual quality audits should be conducted. Such 
vigilance is needed to offset the otherwise compelling allure of 
revenue production, no matter its source or scope, and the consequent 
continuing threats to the viability of the collegiate model. 
C. How Money Is Spent345 and Exempt Status for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes 
As previously described, to acquire tax-exempt status, an 
educational institution must be organized and operated for exclusively 
educational purposes. This requirement seems to be met for athletic 
programs when a university administers varsity athletic competition 
as part of the overall university mission or treats varsity athletic 
competition as itself an educational experience.346 
When revenues generated by athletic departments go to support the 
campus generally, the educational purpose is eminently clear. When 
revenues generated by athletic departments go to fund forty sports and 
academic support staffs to assure student-athletes succeed 
academically and graduate, again, the educational purpose is clear. 
When revenues generated by athletic departments provide varsity 
 
343 Id. 
344 The NCAA’s claim that CLC should have exercised oversight of the contours of the 
EA Sports video game underscores the need for closer and more direct NCAA supervision. 
See infra notes 293–95 and accompanying text. 
345 In the following section, we examine how use of revenue generated by a university 
exempt from income taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code could 
affect retention of that tax-exempt status. This question is not the same as the question of 
whether money received by a tax-exempt university constitutes “unrelated business 
income” subject to the “unrelated business income tax.” 
346 Lyons & Potuto, supra note 273, at 234–39. 
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athletic opportunities to large numbers of student-athletes, then the 
educational purpose also seems relatively clear. By contrast, if 
revenues generated by athletic departments support student-athletes in 
sixteen sports, with the bulk of revenues directed at building athletic 
palaces, paying big salaries to coaches and other athletic personnel, 
and otherwise spent on items with little direct benefit to students or 
student-athletes, then that is another matter entirely.347 
IX 
A NEW PARADIGM 
A. Doing More for Student-Athletes 
Consistent with the collegiate model, there are a number of things 
that might be done to enhance the experience of student-athletes and 
direct more benefits to them. The following sections briefly discuss 
some of these items, simply as placeholders indicating the type of 
reforms that could have a discernible impact on the treatment of 
student-athletes without triggering a paradigm shift in the collegiate 
model. 
1. Educational Aid 
Nothing is more central to the collegiate model than optimizing a 
student’s opportunity to get a degree. Also important is optimizing the 
opportunities to pursue postgraduate or professional educational 
opportunities. The most important set of reforms, therefore, is in 
scholarship support. First, scholarships should be funded to the full 
cost of attendance348 rather than capped at tuition, room and board, 
and books. A second reform would be to make all sports head count 
sports. As noted previously, football and men’s basketball are two of 
 
347 Way back in 1969, the recruitment of a high profile men’s basketball student-athlete 
could cost twenty-five thousand dollars. BYERS, supra note 2, at 220. 
348 We recognize that full-ride scholarships are not fully excludable as scholarships 
under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, only 
that portion of a scholarship grant actually used by the recipient for tuition, books, lab 
fees, and similar expenses qualifies for the exclusion. Any portion of a scholarship used by 
a student for other costs, including but not limited to room and board, represents gross 
income that the recipient must report on his federal income tax return. That Congress, for 
tax policy reasons, has elected to make a portion of a scholarship taxable does not 
undercut our argument that athletic scholarships should all be full-ride grants. The tax 
consequences of receiving a full-ride scholarship are the same for all students (other than 
foreign nationals), regardless of whether they receive the scholarships in recognition of 
athletic ability, academic merit, or financial need. 
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only five NCAA head count sports.349 Under the collegiate model, the 
quid pro quo for athletic participation is a scholarship and a college 
degree. Student-athletes in equivalency sports work as hard as their 
counterparts in football and men’s basketball. Their commitment is 
just as serious. Their scholarship support also should be the same. 
Equating educational support with revenues produced by that sport is 
inconsistent with the collegiate model. 
A third reform would be to enhance the NCAA post-graduate 
scholarship program.350 There should be more postgraduate 
scholarships awarded, for larger amounts, and for more than one 
year.351 
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
a. Transfers 
There are many sound reasons for NCAA bylaws that discourage 
transfers by imposing eligibility or scholarship consequences, not the 
least of which are data that show that student-academic performance 
suffers and graduation is less likely. Nonetheless, except for intra-
conference transfers,352 transfer restrictions should be eliminated. 
Students, including student-athletes, sometimes make bad decisions 
about where to attend school. If a student-athlete is unhappy with his 
athletic department, treatment by a coach, or situation at a 
university—whether the reasons are well-founded or not—the 
student-athlete should be able to transfer to find a better fit.353 The 
 
349 See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text. 
350 In addition, a review should be conducted of the number of NCAA degree-
completion scholarships to assure that the number is adequate to cover student-athletes 
whose failure to achieve a degree was not due to clear shirking of their academic work 
when initially enrolled. 
351 Postgraduate scholarships should be available at least to any letter winner who 
achieves a 3.70 or higher grade point average. Additionally, the scholarship amount should 
be increased from $7500 to $10,000. The scholarship should also cover at least two 
postgraduate years, subject to the students’ achievement of a stated minimum grade point 
average in the first year. 
352 Intra-conference transfers involve increased opportunities for tampering, more 
compelling coach concerns about facing a former student-athlete in competition (knowing 
playbook, etc.), and the intra-conference need for continuing member cooperative 
interaction that might be affected by tampering concerns. 
353 An alternative to eliminating all restrictions, therefore, would be to limit transfers in 
a student-athlete’s first two years of enrollment. 
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fact that coaches can walk out on contracts seemingly at will only 
exacerbates the perception that student-athletes are treated unfairly.354 
b. Oversigning 
A prospective student-athlete who signs a national letter of intent 
(NLI)355 thereby declines the opportunity to attend another university 
and compete. His announced intention to sign an NLI may discourage 
other schools from continuing to recruit him, particularly if he is not a 
prime recruiting target. If at or near signing day a coach pulls the 
scholarship offer, that prospective student-athlete may have little or 
no viable options, and certainly will have fewer of them than he had 
earlier in the recruitment period. Of course, prospective student-
athletes have been known to de-commit at the last moment.356 That 
means that a coach needs some “play in the joints” in making 
scholarship offers as he cannot project with certainly what will 
happen among all commits on signing day. Nonetheless, some of the 
reported coach behaviors357 go well beyond the need to account for 
potential de-commits and instead seem designed to provide a large 
pool of commits from which a coach may then choose the most 
talented to fill his recruiting class. However limited this practice may 
be, it must stop. It is not fair to those recruits who ultimately are 
boxed out.358 
c. Play/Practice Limits 
College athletic participation is part of a student-athlete’s 
university experience but should not engulf it. NCAA bylaws limit 
the number of required hours that student-athletes may devote to a 
 
354 Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports 
/308643/. 
355 The NLI program is administered by the NCAA. See The National Letter of Intent, 
NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/national-letter-intent (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014). For signing dates by sport for 2013 to 2014, see NLI Signing Dates 
for Prospective Student-Athletes Enrolling 2014-15, NLI, http://www.nationalletter.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
356 See Luke Winn, The Commitment Project: A Study of Top-100 Recruit Behavior, 
SI.COM (Aug. 5, 2011, 11:15 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/luke 
_winn/08/01/commitment.trends/. 
357 See Grant Freking & Jimmy Oldham, Oversigning: Football’s Latest 
Overindulgence, LANTERN (Jan. 31, 2011), http://thelantern.com/2011/01/oversigning       
-footballs-latest-overindulgence/. 
358 We do not suggest that it will be easy to identify by regulation between acceptable 
and unacceptable oversigning, but the effort must be made. 
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sport,359 but they do not attempt to constrain student-athlete voluntary 
time. A student-athlete may not be required to practice with 
teammates over the summer, but he knows that summer practice may 
enhance skills and team-building that, in turn, will enhance his 
opportunity to compete in the fall. While it may be difficult to redirect 
student-athletes’ voluntary time away from sports-related activities, it 
should be possible to introduce limits in the overall time that student-
athletes are required to devote to sports-related activities. One reform 
might be to prohibit student-athlete access to practice and training 
facilities during a period of time in the summer.360 A reform that 
clearly limits overall mandatory time devoted to a sport would be to 
limit the number of total competitions,361 particularly as conference 
realignment has led to more team travel to get to competitions. 
d. Assistance in Evaluating Professional Potential 
Some student-athletes have the potential or desire to play 
professionally. They may want to consider whether it is in their 
financial interest to leave college before graduating to pursue 
professional careers. They also may want help in wending their way 
through the intricacies of contract negotiations. Currently, however, 
they may not seek the assistance of lawyers or sports agents in 
considering whether to sign a professional contract because to do so 
renders them ineligible for college competition.362 The concerns 
 
359 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 17. 
360 As with any reform, there are potential negative consequences. This proposal, for 
example, might impel student-athletes to seek practice and training facilities elsewhere. 
Those alternatives may not be monitored for health and safety in the way that university 
weight rooms and practice facilities are monitored. 
361 There are fifty-six regular-season baseball games; for teams in post-season, there are 
regionals, super regionals, and the College World Series. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 
17.2.5.2. Teams also compete in a conference tournament. Id. § 17.2.5. Basketball and 
track and field span two seasons. Many sports have a non-championship season with 
additional games played. E.g., id. §§ 17.2.1.1, 17.20.1. The increase in games is notable. In 
1969, there were nine total football games plus a bowl game; today there are twelve 
regular season games plus a bowl game. In most FBS conferences, there is a conference 
championship game. The new FBS championship will add yet another game for two 
teams. See Potuto, They Take Classes, supra note 49, at 338 n.161. The NCAA Men’s 
Basketball Tournament began with sixteen teams; there are now sixty-eight teams, 
regionals and superregionals. Id. at 339 n.166. 
362 NCAA bylaws permit universities to create professional advising panels. NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.3.4. These may be insufficient to provide the advice needed 
and, in any event, are unavailable to prospective baseball student-athletes needing 
assistance to decide whether to enter the professional baseball draft or attend college. 
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about agent influence are not negligible, particularly if a student-
athlete thereafter elects to remain in school.363 Nonetheless, we 
believe the equities are in favor of permitting student-athletes to 
receive assistance. 
Litigation involving Andrew Oliver, a baseball pitcher at 
Oklahoma State University, suggests that courts are inclined to agree, 
at least if the agent is also a lawyer.364 Oliver was rendered ineligible 
for intercollegiate competition because his lawyer was present during 
contract discussions between him and the Minnesota Twins baseball 
team—conduct that the NCAA deemed prohibited agent 
involvement.365 The trial judge held that preventing a student-athlete 
from having the assistance of counsel in contract negotiations violated 
Ohio public policy.366 
e. Independent Voice in Student-Athlete Reinstatement Processes 
Currently, student-athletes have no independent opportunity to 
plead their case when they are declared ineligible for competition and 
seek reinstatement of eligibility.367 We believe they should have 
independent access to reinstatement processes when they face the loss 
of half a season or more of competition opportunities and they contest 
factual conclusions adverse to them that were reached by their 
universities. 
f. Health and Well-Being 
As previously discussed, universities may cover the full cost of 
medical attention for their student-athletes. But medical aid is only 
one of many initiatives that would enhance student-athlete health and 
well-being. Two other initiatives may serve as examples. First, there 
should always be a trainer or physician on the sideline and at practice, 
at least in any contact sport or where the risk of concussions or 
 
363 For a discussion of some of the problems, see supra note 128 and accompanying 
text. 
364 Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com.Pl. 2009), vacated pursuant to 
settlement. The judge also expressed concern with NCAA bylaws that permit student-
athletes to hire lawyers but then “attempt to control what that lawyer does.” Id. at 214. 
365 Id. at 206–07. NCAA amateurism bylaws permit lawyers to represent student-
athletes but not to act as agents for them. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.3.2. 
366 Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 214–15. 
367 A discussion of student-athlete reinstatement is well beyond the scope of this 
Article. For details on its operation, see Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules 
Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement, and Infractions Processes: The Laws that Regulate 
Them and the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 283–87 (2010). 
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serious injury is high in comparison to other sports. Second, there 
should be no limits on the number of meals that may be provided to 
scholarship student-athletes in or out of season. 
B. Aligning with the Collegiate Model 
The collegiate model extends beyond imposing restraints on 
commercialization. It also extends beyond the equitable treatment of 
individual student-athletes and the particular benefits provided to 
them. Overall, there needs to be assurance that college sports are 
administered for all student-athletes consistent with the campus 
environment and the primacy of academic values. 
One example of a failure to align conduct with the collegiate model 
relates to the so-called “one-and-dones”—men’s basketball student-
athletes who are in college only because the NBA collective 
bargaining agreement forecloses their entry into the NBA until one 
year after high school graduation.368 Entry rules for professional 
sports admittedly are outside the NCAA’s control. Within its control, 
however, is revising the metric used by the Division I Committee on 
Academic Performance to calculate a team’s academic progress rate 
(APR).369 Currently, a team suffers no APR consequence when a 
scholarship student-athlete fails to return to school the academic year 
after his season ends because he signed a professional contract. The 
metric should be revised to impose an APR consequence if a student-
athlete goes pro after only one year on campus. At the margin, this 
will affect coach recruiting behaviors. Coaches who recruit several 
one-and-dones will need to change their behavior or risk penalties that 
may be imposed for a low APR team score. 
C. The Flip Side of Name and Likeness: Student-Athletes Marketing 
Themselves 
As previously discussed, NCAA bylaws limit the circumstances in 
which student-athletes may participate in promotions and commercial 
ventures. Student-athletes currently are not paid for those activities; at 
most, they can be reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses.370 
 
368 Myron Medcalf, Roots of One-and-Done Rule Run Deep, ESPN.COM (June 26, 
2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8097411/roots-nba-draft-one 
-done-rule-run-deep-men-college-basketball. 
369 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
370 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.1.1(f). 
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There is another side to the coin: student-athletes also are prohibited 
from independently arranging and participating in promotions and 
other commercial ventures.371 
1. Emma Watson vs. Sam Keller 
College music majors can play in bands for money and still also 
play in a university marching band and receive a university-
administered scholarship. Emma Watson, the actress who played 
Hermione Grainger in the Harry Potter movies, attended Brown 
University.372 Acting in the Harry Potter movies did not disqualify 
her from appearing in amateur campus theatrical productions. No rule 
prevented her from getting a scholarship because she made movies on 
her summer break or might have done a commercial. No one 
regulated her spare time or limited the number of hours of acting 
lessons she might take or the hours she might spend rehearsing and 
appearing in a campus production.373 Nothing prevented her from 
hiring an agent to market her acting talent. Why, then, are student-
athletes treated differently? 
One answer, set forth above, is that the NCAA amateurism 
principle protects the brand of college athletics and helps demark 
college athletics and student-athletes from professional team sports 
and professional players. There also is something qualitatively 
different between Emma Watson’s situation and that of college 
athletes, even those who compete in football or men’s basketball. 
Brown theater productions are independent activities that do not 
compete with theatrical productions at other universities. Emma 
Watson does not depend on a team logo or her affiliation with Brown 
to get film roles or product endorsements. There is no specter of a 
Brown booster willing to pay her to endorse products just to get her to 
attend Brown and perform in Brown amateur theatrical productions. 
Her name and likeness value has nothing to do with Brown. 
 
371 Related to the independent marketing of their names and likenesses, student-athletes 
have the opportunity to leverage their athletic skills or reputations in other ways. One such 
example is employment by a booster because the student-athlete is an athlete. Here, too, 
the strict amateurism principle should give way, even though illicit booster conduct may 
result. 
372 Westerholm, Emma Watson’s Brown University Professors Thought She Should 
Quit Acting, UNIV. HERALD (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.universityherald.com/articles 
/4137/20130806/emma-watsons-brown-university-professors-thought-quit-acting.htm. 
373 Student-athletes are subject to restrictions on mandatory play/practice time. See, 
e.g., NCAA MANUAL, §§ 17.02, 17.1.6, 17.7.6. There also are restrictions on interactions 
with coaches. See, e.g., id. §§ 17.02.1, 17.02.13. 
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There are significant enforcement issues inherent in permitting 
student-athletes to negotiate deals for the commercial use of their 
names and likenesses, and they should not be minimized. Certainly, 
there are donors willing to commit NCAA violations to get student-
athletes to attend374 or remain375 at their schools. These same donors 
undoubtedly would be willing to enter into promotion, endorsement, 
or other commercial contracts with student-athletes for the same 
reason, and not as above-board, arms-length deals motivated by 
commercial interests. 
A student-athlete also could make money off his name and likeness 
in ways much more quickly than through commercial contracts. 
Signing autographs for money is one such example.376 Booster 
payments here might substitute for the five-hundred-dollar handshake. 
The NCAA enforcement staff likely will be unable to untangle the 
strings of these donor deals except in the most blatant and egregious 
situations.377 The result would be enforcement directed only at the 
most egregious cases, or perhaps NCAA bylaws that place no limits 
on how these deals are done. The concomitant result would be even 
more competitive imbalance among collegiate programs or a “wild 
 
374 In one case, an Alabama booster gave an SUV and paid $160,000 in cash to 
“deliver” a football prospect to the University of Alabama. UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA 
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 193 (2002). In the same case, boosters gave $20,000 to 
a prospective student-athlete and his family. Id. In a case involving the University of 
Michigan, a booster gave four student-athletes cash and benefits totaling more than 
$600,000. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 208 (2003). 
375 In a case involving Southern Methodist University, the so-called “death penalty” 
was imposed—for the only time—by the Division I Committee on Infractions. See NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.5.2.3.2. Boosters made weekly cash payments to members of 
the football team. NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT (Feb. 25, 
1987). See also DAVID WHITFORD, A PAYROLL TO MEET: A STORY OF GREED, 
CORRUPTION, AND FOOTBALL AT SMU (1989). 
376 Johnny Manziel was suspected of selling his autograph for cash. Jeremy Fowler, 
NCAA’s Manziel Investigation Opens Player-Rights Discussion at Right Time, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Aug. 4, 2013, 10:45 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball 
/writer/jeremy-fowler/23017082/ncaas-manziel-investigation-opens-playerrights                
-discussion-at-right-time. 
377 The fact that disentanglement may not be possible was judicially acknowledged in a 
related area in litigation involving Jeremy Bloom, a student-athlete on the University of 
Colorado football team who was also an Olympic skier. Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 
(Colo. App. 2004). Bloom’s situation also involved untangling the reason for the 
endorsement contract; Bloom claimed that he endorsed products as a skier and, therefore, 
should not lose his college eligibility to play football. The NCAA successfully defended 
amateurism bylaws that prohibited Bloom from endorsing products on the ground that it 
would be too difficult to discern the basis on which he was awarded the endorsement 
contract. 
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west” permitting program donors to bid against each other for elite 
athletes under the guise of projected commercial contracts. 
Yet another issue is whether a student-athlete should be permitted 
to engage an agent to negotiate commercial contracts for him because 
of the potential negative consequences that might ensue from the 
relationship between an agent and a student-athlete. Not all agents 
have their clients’ best interests at heart.378 Some agents might define 
client interests only in terms of post-college professional contracts, 
not in terms of student-athletes’ best interests in their college 
educations or in collegiate competition. An agent might tell a hitter to 
swing away, no matter what the coach says, because homeruns (even 
if combined with a higher strikeout rate) more readily will attract the 
attention of pro scouts. Similarly, an agent might tell a football player 
to sit out to avoid risk of injury. Finally, an agent might urge even a 
student-athlete with marginal talent to leave school rather than to stay 
and complete his education. 
One possibility for avoiding significant enforcement issues might 
be for student-athlete name and likeness marketing deals to be 
achieved by group licensing and marketing arrangements.379 This 
possibility is not without problems. A couple of the issues that would 
arise are who would manage these arrangements and how revenues 
would be divided.380 Group licensing and marketing arrangements 
would also trigger some of the same issues discussed previously 
regarding when and how funds would be distributed to student-
athletes. 
Despite the potential for very significant enforcement issues, we 
believe that individual student-athletes should be permitted to market 
their own names and likenesses, particularly if group marketing and 
licensing arrangements pose too many problems to be feasible. Our 
reasons are several. 
First, and foremost, the money swirling around college athletic 
programs and coaches makes it difficult credibly to foreclose student-
athletes from negotiating their own deals. Permitting them to do so 
responds to the perception that everyone feeds at the trough except 
 
378 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 25–26 (quoting sports agent Mike Trope’s 
statement, “I would no sooner abide by the rules and regulations of the NCAA than I 
would the Ku Klux Klan”). 
379 This possibility was suggested by the Keller/O’Bannon plaintiffs as a way to handle 
student-athlete payments consistent with the collegiate model. 
380 This latter issue was part of the reason the Keller/O’Bannon judge declined to 
certify a subclass for damages. 
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student-athletes, and it does so without starting the slide down the 
slippery slope toward pay for play that might arise should the 
plaintiffs succeed in the Keller/O’Bannon litigation. 
Second, and most important, permitting them to do so will not lead 
athletic departments to accelerate their search for funds, resulting in 
yet more commercialization, or leading to revenue redistribution that 
further drains campus funds or that has negative impact on non-
revenue sports. 
Third, notwithstanding the specter of donors with illicit motives 
manipulating the process, we believe there will be few elite student-
athletes who will find opportunities to market their names and 
likenesses for any significant amount of money. In any event, the 
major FBS programs with donors willing to spend big money—licitly 
or illicitly—to assure that elite athletes enroll at their universities 
already have significant advantages that provide them a significant 
competitive edge. We doubt that student-athlete independent deals 
will affect that much, if at all. 
Finally, the mechanisms discussed above regarding the 
establishment of a trust to handle the bulk of the funds also could be 
employed in the context of individual contracts. 
2. What’s Good for the Goose 
The questions addressed so far focus on the name and likeness 
value of football or men’s basketball student-athletes independent of 
their universities381 and on the value they contribute to overall team 
revenues.382 There are two partners in the valuation dance, however. 
If student-athletes contribute to the overall value of an athletic 
program, then it also seems true that some of the marketing and 
endorsement value of a student-athlete, while enrolled and even after 
he turns professional, is because his college uniform said, for 
example, “Notre Dame” on the back.383 
 
381 As previously noted, this question does not lend itself to econometric modeling. 
382 This is the particular focus of the econometric model of student-athlete valuation 
provided supra Part VI. 
383 An analogous situation is a professor’s assignment of patent and other intellectual 
property rights for which she did research while employed at a university. A professor at a 
research university agrees that the university holds the patent should she invent something 
while on staff. It is her effort and creativity and her energy and sweat. But she uses the 
university’s resources and facilities. She attends conferences and gets ideas because she is 
at the university. She publishes because she is a university professor. 
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Consider Tim Tebow, the 2007 Heisman-Award-winning 
quarterback at the University of Florida.384 He was widely 
acknowledged by football gurus as lacking the talent to play 
quarterback in the NFL,385 and he currently works as a college 
football analyst.386 If he played in an NFL-equivalent to baseball’s 
minor leagues and not for Head Coach Urban Meyer at Florida, would 
he have achieved the fame that got him a multi-million dollar 
contract, a first round NFL draft pick,387 and the opportunity for 
major endorsement and promotion contracts? 
Were student-athletes able to independently market their names 
and likenesses while still eligible to compete, universities might be 
entitled to their share of the royalties derived while student-athletes 
are enrolled, and perhaps for some time thereafter.388 Similarly, if the 
Keller/O’Bannon case results in student-athlete legal entitlement to a 
share of revenues from university-licensed activities in which their 
names or likenesses are used or from games in which they appear, 
then perhaps universities should share in revenues from professional 
team and marketing contracts that are signed after a student-athlete 
turns professional. 
X 
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED 
Providing benefits and services to student-athletes along the lines 
we propose may carry a hefty price tag.389 The question is how 
universities might adjust their operations to account for more 
spending directed at student-athletes. 
A. Negative Consequences 
One response, alluded to by Judge Wilken in the Keller/O’Bannon 
litigation, is that universities might move from Division I to Division 
 
384 See HEISMAN TROPHY, http://www.heisman.com/winners/t-tebow07.php (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
385 Broncos Pick Tim Tebow in First Round, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2010, 6:12 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/22/broncos-pick-tim-tebow-in_n_548874 
.html. 
386 Tebow Lands Broadcasting Job, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/12/31/sports/football/tebow-lands-broadcasting-job.html?_r=0. 
387 Broncos Pick Tim Tebow in First Round, supra note 386. 
388 Valuation will not be easy. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 197. 
389 The revenue consequence to universities might also be high should the plaintiffs 
prevail in the Keller/O’Bannon litigation regarding television revenues. 
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III because they could not afford to pay royalties or compete for 
prospective student-athletes.390 While it is debatable whether 
reconfiguring a program as Division III should be classified as a 
negative consequence, other responses fall more clearly on the 
negative side. 
If a university is to pay more money to and for student-athletes, it 
has two ways to respond. One is to cut spending. The other is to seek 
additional revenues. 
On the cost-cutting side, one response with negative consequences 
would be to free up funds by eliminating some of the sports currently 
sponsored by universities. Given the large team size in football, were 
this to happen, Title IX gender equity requirements would mean that 
the impact of cuts would fall exclusively, or at least primarily, on 
men’s non-revenue sports.391 Another response with negative 
consequences relates to scholarships. NCAA authority to provide 
scholarships—whether equivalencies, full rides, or, as proposed here, 
full cost of attendance—is not a mandate either to provide 
scholarships or to fully fund them. Should the Keller/O’Bannon 
plaintiffs prevail, some universities might cover lost revenues by 
decreasing the number of athletic scholarships offered. Perhaps the 
most clearly negative response related to increasing the available 
revenues to athletic departments would be for universities to redirect 
even more money from the greater campus to the athletic program 
without concomitant constraints imposed on athletic department 
spending. 
The alternative to cutting costs is for athletic departments to 
undertake an even more accelerated search for revenue, producing 
even more commercialization and increasing the dependence on 
corporate sponsors.392 The arms race would not slow to a trot but, 
rather, would accelerate to a frenzied gallop. 
 
390 This was one reason she gave for deciding that damages were too uncertain to 
permit class action certification to the damages subgroup in the Keller/O’Bannon 
litigation. Class Certification Order, supra note 151, at 18–22. Big Ten Commissioner Jim 
Delany suggested that Big Ten universities might make the same choice. See supra note 
174. Should Big Ten universities make this choice, it would be for reasons other than 
financial. The “substitution effect” was an additional reason for denial of class action 
certification for the damages subgroup. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
391 For a discussion of the implications for Title IX, see supra notes 212–16. 
392 The search for revenues also could result in increased athletic department 
dependence on donors, with an accompanying increased risk of outside influence on 
athletic department decisions. 
POTUTO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:54 AM 
974 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 879 
B. What Might Be Done 
There is broad consensus that athletic spending is unreasonably 
unrestrained.393 There are growing calls to realign college athletic 
programs with campus educational values and priorities. Realignment 
could occur if FBS universities held athletic department revenues, and 
the search for revenues, at stasis, and covered student-athlete 
compensation by paring down the arms race in facilities, coach 
salaries, and the ever-growing support staffs, particularly in football. 
Nonetheless, no university can act unilaterally. So, then, what is to be 
done? 
One way to better align athletic spending with the collegiate model 
would be for the NCAA or conferences to require that every dollar 
generated in revenues by athletic departments must be matched by a 
dollar provided to the greater campus.394 And every dollar means 
every dollar, whether generated by donor contributions, payment in 
kind, marketing and promotion deals, or concession sales—
everything, in fact, except stadium and arena ticket sales and existing 
skybox leases. Another way to rein in spending, recommended by the 
Rawlings Panel at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,395 
would be for the NCAA or conferences to impose caps on total team 
spending independent of salaries.396 
The antitrust laws prohibit collective action that has an 
anticompetitive effect on competition. That does not mean, however, 
that all concerted action constitutes an antitrust violation.397 Because 
of the nature of organized athletic competition and the need for some 
 
393 This includes university presidents and chancellors. KNIGHT COMM’N ON 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, ART AND SCIENCE GROUP LLC (Oct. 2009). It also 
includes athletic directors. See, e.g., Lewis Kamb, Big-Time Coaches Score Big-Time 
Perks, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 23, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews 
/2022321329_coachespayxml.html. 
394 We owe thanks to Harvey Perlman, Chancellor at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, for first advancing this idea. See also REPORT OF THE RAWLINGS PANEL ON 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL 
HILL 20 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Rawlings Report] (describing financial incentives 
based on athletic-to-academic spending ratios to discourage excessive spending on 
athletics and/or spending growth rates for athletics that are disproportionate with rates of 
change for academics). 
395 The Rawlings Panel was appointed by the chancellor of the University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill to make recommendations regarding the role of athletics at the 
University. Rawlings Report, supra note 395, at 1. 
396 This alternative was proposed by the Rawlings Panel. Id. at 20. 
397 See supra note 147; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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level of cooperation among competitors, the courts have allowed the 
NCAA a degree of freedom from regular antitrust analysis.398 For 
example, although in all other contexts salary caps are per se anti-
competitive, NCAA employment of salary caps was evaluated under a 
rule of reason approach.399 Of particular importance when 
considering reforms, NCAA bylaws governing academic and 
amateurism policies to date have been treated as virtually per se legal 
under the antitrust laws.400 Requiring that dollars be returned to the 
campus to advance the academic mission seems on the right side of 
the line separating NCAA regulation that violates antitrust laws from 
that which does not. 
C. Final Thoughts 
There are, and need to be, differences among the various levels of 
amateur competition, and there are, and need to be, differences 
between collegiate competition and professional sports. So, call it the 
dichotomy between amateurism and professionalism. Call it an 
accommodation of different levels of talent. Call it the responsibility 
to protect young people from practice and competition to the 
detriment of their health or education. Call it what you will. There 
are, and need to be, differences among the various levels of amateur 
competition, competition associated with educational institutions, and 
professional sports. 
An amateurism model based on a 1906 campus and college 
athletics world is ill suited to the modern realities of universities and 
athletic competition. The amateurism model must be recalibrated, but 
not at the expense of the central principles that student-athletes have 
to be “real” students and that athletic departments must be part of the 
campus environment and advance the academic mission. It is well 
 
398 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 
399 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). The NCAA still lost: a degree of 
freedom is not insulation from clearly anticompetitive conduct. See also Bd. of Regents, 
468 U.S. 85. 
400 E.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 
1081, 1087–94 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340–46 (7th Cir. 
2012) (NCAA bylaws are “presumptively procompetitive” when they promote “the 
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” or the “preservation of the student-
athlete in higher education,” including most, if not all, eligibility bylaws, as well as NCAA 
bylaws that limit scholarship amounts to educational costs); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 
F.2d 1338, 1343–45 (5th Cir. 1988); Justice v. NCAA, 775 F. Supp. 356, 379 (D. Ariz. 
1983) (sanctions reasonably related to NCAA’s goals of preserving amateurism and 
promoting fair competition). 
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past time to realign aspiration with implementation. It is the right 
thing to do, and it should be done simply because it is right. It is also 
the eminently prudent thing to do. 
If those within the world of intercollegiate athletics fail to be 
proactive with reforms, then those outside will step in to fill the 
void.401 They may be right-hearted and right-headed, but they likely 
will have less understanding and experience with the intricacies and 
requisites of collegiate competition. They may adopt solutions that 
produce the right outcomes inefficiently or ineffectively or with 
serious negative ancillary consequences. To take charge of the future, 
universities, conferences, and the NCAA all need to act now.402 
  
 
401 Congress periodically takes a look at what is happening in college athletics. See 
Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, NCAA as State Actor Controversy: Much Ado About Nothing, 23 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2012). It is doing so again. Steve Berkowitz, Proposal 
Aims to Protect Athletes at Wealthiest Schools, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2013, 6:10 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/20/ncaa-collegiate-student-athlete  
-protection-act-tony-cardenas/3649699/. 
402 Indeed, reforms in the treatment of student-athletes that would enhance the 
collegiate model are also reforms that would undercut an argument that student-athletes 
are employees under federal and state labor laws. Consider, for example, Kain Colter’s 
testimony before the NLRB of the number of hours he said he spends on football. See, e.g., 
Chris Johnson, Northwestern’s Kain Colter States His Case College Football Union, 
SI.COM (Feb. 18, 2014), http://m.si.com/3969762/northwesterns-kain-colter-states-his-case 
-college-football-union/ (describing Colter’s estimation of fifty hours devoted to the sport 
during the season). Consider the argument that might be made about the one-and-dones 
and the fact that they (or most of them) have no intention to be students or to graduate. 
Full exploration of that subject is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES FROM THE COLLEGE 
FOOTBALL MODELS 
        Random-Effects   Fixed-Effects       IV Panel Model 
FB-Revenue Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
FB Win % 43,206 0.00 57,563 0.00 141,793 0.00 
MedianAge100 -69,826 0.73 -296,603 0.14 -344,132 0.13 
Pop ‘000 -49,930 0.01 -141,647 0.00 -167,338 0.00 
lnIncome100 -4,947,294 0.54 -3,892,370 0.61 -1,526,656 0.86 
lnEntertain100 4,124,643 0.74 4,584,154 0.70 1,742,340 0.89 
Students ‘000 409,027 0.00 272,465 0.10 253,864 0.15 
% Out of State 83,450 0.12 318,910 0.00 406,845 0.00 
Attend ‘000 52,982 0.00 29,404 0.00 21,117 0.00 
PctMenBA100 -285,443 0.44 -431,737 0.21 -623,290 0.09 
Year06 88,653 0.92 1,103,416 0.19 1,269,777 0.17 
Year07 2,003,026 0.03 3,073,947 0.00 2,954,392 0.00 
Year08 1,971,393 0.04 3,231,738 0.00 3,254,772 0.00 
Year09 3,882,417 0.00 4,660,036 0.00 4,367,268 0.00 
Year10 5,258,123 0.00 6,078,615 0.00 6,276,710 0.00 
Year11 7,781,376 0.00 8,992,557 0.00 8,810,459 0.00 
Year12 7,949,267 0.00 8,461,963 0.00 8,523,518 0.00 
Constant 24,000,000 0.49 29,000,000 0.38 27,100,000  0.44 
    FB-Win%*       
Number 5-Star 1.302 0.05 1.767 0.03 1.751 0.03 
Number 4-Star 0.242 0.10 0.029 0.90 -0.023 0.92 
Number 3-Star 0.161 0.08 0.077 0.57 -0.050 0.72 
Head Win% 0.188 0.09 -0.031 0.78 -0.083 0.44 
Head Bowls -2.098 0.05 -0.743 0.51 -0.037 0.97 
Staff Win% 0.236 0.09 -0.021 0.88 -0.029 0.83 
Staff Bowls 0.079 0.43 -0.013 0.91 -0.061 0.60 
Staff Size -0.333 0.27 0.121 0.71 0.951 0.03 
APR 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.92 0.001 0.56 
lnFBOp 3.768 0.01 2.478 0.10 14.431 0.00 
Sched.Strength -1.715 0.00 -1.506 0.00 -1.236 0.00 
Constant   0.430  0.98 42.119 0.05 -182.332 0.13 
* The first-stage IV equation (reduced form) also includes all the 
exogenous variables from the revenue equation. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES FROM THE MEN’S 
COLLEGE BASKETBALL MODELS 
          Random-Effects-      Fixed-Effect–   IV Panel Model 
   BB-Revenue Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
BB Win % 3,236 0.69 10,352 0.20 34,562 0.38 
MedianAge100 59,276 0.36 12,207 0.86 -12,176 0.88 
Pop ‘000 3,767 0.52 939 0.92 -669 0.95 
lnIncome100 -1,911,758 0.48 -1,236,595 0.65 -1,302,091 0.63 
lnEntertain100 -1,165,405 0.78 -2,042,883 0.62 -2,032,784 0.63 
Students ‘000 60,591 0.13 27,844 0.67 16,026 0.82 
% Out of State 17,905 0.32 21,860 0.51 27,152 0.43 
Attend ‘000 23,135 0.00 10,643 0.01 5,709 0.52 
% MenBA100 177,984 0.20 197,569 0.16 165,787 0.27 
Year06 -192,286 0.55 61,860 0.85 155,920 0.66 
Year07 431,597 0.19 688,930 0.03 796,425 0.03 
Year08 181,999 0.59 447,449 0.18 495,256 0.15 
Year09 1,174,726 0.00 1,416,382 0.00 1,490,130 0.00 
Year10 1,310,685 0.00 1,589,871 0.00 1,684,699 0.00 
Year11 1,803,793 0.00 2,140,820 0.00 2,271,020 0.00 
Year12 1,812,556 0.00 2,085,088 0.00 2,164,204 0.00 
Constant 29,100,000 0.02 32,900,000 0.01 34,300,000 0.01 
    BB-Win%*       
Number 5-Star 1.962 0.00 1.197 0.04 0.613 0.25 
Number 4-Star 0.414 0.23 -0.145 0.73 -0.166 0.67 
Number 3-Star 0.380 0.42 0.136 0.79 0.261 0.58 
lnOpExpense 2.847 0.00 2.474 0.01 9.454 0.00 
Sched.Strength -0.081 0.81 0.086 0.82 0.236 0.50 
Constant 19.539 0.16 23.535 0.14 -179.971 0.02 
* The first-stage IV equation (reduced form) also includes all the 
exogenous variables from the revenue equation. 
 
 
